Aristotle Nichomachean ethics. Book six, with essays, notes, and translation

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ARISTOTLE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

BOOK SIX

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(All Rights reserved]

ARISTOTLE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

BOOK SIX

WITH ESSAYS, NOTES, AND TRANSLATION

BY

L. H. G. GREENWOOD, M.A.

FELLOW OF KING’S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

CAMBRIDGE :
at the University Press

1909

FRANCISCO AUGUSTO HARE

GRAECARUM LITTERARUM EXIMIO DOCTORI
OLIM DISCIPULUS
INGRATUS NULLO TEMPORE FUTURUS
HAS QUALESCUMQUE PRIMITIAS
D. D. D. AUCTOR

PREFACE

N spite of the manifest importance of the Sixth Book of

the Nicomachean Ethics, there is probably no book
among the whole ten which has received so little attention
from Aristotelian students. No separate edition of it has
ever been undertaken, and some half-dozen dissertations by
German scholars, together with the miscellaneous notes sup-
plied by editors of the Ethics as a whole, leave much room
for further criticism and explanation. The present volume,
which is a slightly altered and enlarged form of a dissertation
submitted in 1906 to the electors to fellowships at King’s
College, Cambridge, is an attempt to supply this deficiency
to some extent. It is introduced by an examination of the
evidence for and against Aristotle’s authorship of the Sixth
Book, on the strength of which Aristotle is thereafter referred
to as the author. This is followed by a full discussion of the
doctrine of the Sixth Book, and its relation to the whole treatise.
The Greek text is not identical with any already published, but
is closer to Bywater’s than to Susemihl’s. It does not rest on
any fresh examination of the manuscripts : and it contains only
one reading (1139 b 28) that lacks the support of all modern
editors of standing. It seemed worth while to append to the
text, not such a critical apparatus as Bekker, Susemihl and
Bywater have already provided, upon which any important

vi PREFACE

improvement seemed impossible, but rather an account of the
readings, in all passages where the reading is really doubtful,
of the best manuscripts and of the chief modern editors.
The English translation that accompanies the text aims
rather at accuracy than at elegance. The two essays, on
Dialectic Method and on Formal Accuracy, have a somewhat
wider range of application than the Sixth Book itself: at
the same time their results are, if sound, of considerable value
towards the understanding of the Sixth Book, from which,
moreover, the illustrations are all drawn. Finally, a con-
siderable number of Miscellaneous Notes, which are chiefly
concerned with interpretation, aim at leaving no difficulty of
detail unhandled or unsolved. ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἔνια
συγγνώμην : and this book contains many obvious faults that
can put forward no better claim to be forgiven.

Ι, Η. α. α.

CHRISTCHURCH, NEW ZEALAND,
October, 1908

CONTENTS

PAGE
ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE SIXTH BOOK ἢ : és I
ARISTOTLE’S DOCTRINE OF INTELLECTUAL GOODNESS . : 21
THE TEXT OF THE SIXTH BOOK, WITH AN ENGLISH TRANS-
LATION. " 5 τ Γ 3 P : : 5 88
Two Essays :—
I. Dialectic Method in the Sixth Book . ; : . 127
11. On Formal Accuracy in Aristotle, with illustrations from
the Sixth Book . : : : : ‘ : 145
MISCELLANEOUS NOTES. ᾿ : ᾿ : : : . 167
ENGLISH INDEX . : : : : . : ‘ » 209

GREEK INDEX ᾿ ὃ 4 = ‘ - 211

INTRODUCTION

SECTION I.
ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

ANY attempt to throw fresh light on the meaning of the
sixth ‘book of the Mzcomachean Ethics at once brings the
inquirer face to face with the problem of the book’s author-
ship. Such problems are not-often easy of solution, and this
one is amongst the hardest of its class. There is indeed one
circumstance that lessens the labour of the search in one
direction, though it is at the cost of greatly increased difficulty
in reaching a final answer to the whole question. It is not
necessary, in order to discover whether this book is really
Eudemian or Nicomachean, to know the relative frequency
with which the words or phrases or small turns of thought
that are found in it are found also in the undoubtedly Eude-
mian and the undoubtedly Nicomachean books respectively.
Statistics on this head, however accurate they might be,
would be as likely to mislead as to inform: and whereas
their evidence is particularly untrustworthy unless it is pre-
sented in great quantity and is of well-marked uniformity,
it is undeniable that in the case of the Ethics the evidence is
and can be neither. The pupils of Aristotle so closely copied
their master’s vocabulary, style, and even mannerisms, that
they have here left the critic little or no ground to go upon.
Not that the critics have not turned this way. Fischer and
Fritzsche make a detailed comparison of the wording and
style of the disputed books with those of the undoubtedly
Eudemian books, on the strength of which alone, were other

G. I

2 INTRODUCTION

evidence wanting, they would pronounce the disputed books
Eudemian. If their comparisons are carefully examined it
will be agreed, I think, that they are less weighty than their
authors suppose, especially as similar comparisons of the
disputed books with the Nicomachean books have not been
made. But such detailed comparisons are hardly worth the
trouble of making. When one writer copies the style of
another as closely as Eudemus has admittedly copied the
style of Aristotle, resemblances in points of detail may be
numerous and close without betraying the actual writer.
English scholars have as a rule been reasonable enough to
take this view. Grant indeed has brought forward among
his proofs of Eudemian authorship the ‘peculiarly explicit
mode of introducing literary quotations’ which he regards as
common to the Eudemian and the disputed books but as
absent from the Nicomachean : and he relies to some extent
on the uses of certain formulae, such as ὅρος and ἁπλῶς
ἀγαθόν, to prove the same point. But he frankly admits that
he is not justified in attaching a great deal of importance to
this kind of evidence. Munro is distinctly of the same
opinion’. Stewart appears to agree with them: Burnet merely
takes the line that the evidence is unsound in itself. The
arguments from the form of any Peripatetic work can never
be as strong as the argument from its substance. Some of
the detailed points that have been adduced will be considered
elsewhere: but I have considered myself to be fairly exempted
from any systematic examination along the lines of Fischer
and Fritzsche.

We are further without the toil, and without the corre-
sponding advantage, of weighing one piece of external testi-
mony against another. There was little discussion of the
point, little at any rate of which any record has been preserved,
in ancient times: and that little was by persons who were ill
qualified to get at the truth. There are no opinions. of
antiquity that are, in this matter of authorship, of any appre-
ciable use to us.

1 Journal of Sacred and Classical Philology, 1855 (pp. 70—81).
® See his edition of the Ezhics, Introduction Ρ. xiii.

INTRODUCTION 3

Unhelped by external evidencé, unhelped by the internal
evidence of style, we are forced to depend on the internal
evidence of doctrine alone; and all arguments connected
with the doctrine of this book are liable to become involved
in an embarrassing circle. Here is a discussion, whose mean-
ing is far from plain at first sight, that has some claim to be
considered a part of each of two large treatises allowed to be
in the main the work of two different authors. Its meaning
can be properly determined only by reference to its context,
its context—we have just been forced to admit—only by
reference to its meaning. Interpretation, moreover, has to
concern itself with everything from the main problems to the
smallest details. Finally, all other difficulties are greatly
increased by our uncertainty as to the original text, and the
extent to which it has suffered losses, interpolations and
dislocations due to accident, or design, or both.

In maintaining the Eudemian authorship of this book as
well as that of v and vil, scholars have relied on the cumula-
tive effect of a number of different lines of argument rather
than on any one line in particular. Each has to be examined
in itself before the validity of the main conclusion can fairly
be judged: but there is one observation, applying about
equally to them all, that is of importance to the present
discussion. The fate of the sixth book is not bound up with
the fate of the others. Some of the characteristics of VI, it is
true, are alleged to belong to the other two books as well and
not to the undoubtedly Nicomachean books: and in so far as
this can be shown true, whatever special reasons there may
be for thinking v or VII to be Eudemian will go some way to
show VI to be Eudemian also. But as a matter of fact each
book is so independent of the others in subject and treatment,
and the objections to considering each as a true part of the
Nicomachean work are of such a nature, that whatever can
be shown true of any one of them is practically no argument
that the same is true of either of the others.

This contention can be justified only by examination of
the principal arguments that have actually been submitted to
the contrary. Fritzsche, in his edition of the Eudemzan

iS2

4 INTRODUCTION

Ethics, maintaining that NE vi and vir are Eudemian, tries
to prove that VI is Eudemian, not only on independent
grounds, but on the ground that v1 is by the same author as
VII is, and that VII is Eudemian. Whether vit is or is not
partly or wholly Eudemian is a question that I do not
propose to discuss here, because I see no reason to think that
VI is necessarily by the same author as VII, and therefore the
question is not of practical importance for determining the
authorship of νι. But it will be desirable to examine the
reasons Fritzsche gives for believing VI and VII to be by the
same author. If they are found inadequate, it will readily be
admitted that there is no better reason for believing V and VI
to be by the same author: so that my contention will be
justified, that the authorship of VI in no way determines or is
determined by the authorship of V or vil. For Munro’s
argument—that it is much harder to suppose that certain
parts of the disputed books are Eudemian than to suppose
that the whole is Eudemian—does not seem to be recom-
mended by anything beyond the weight of'so great a man’s
personal opinion.

Fritzsche’s view that VI and VII are by the same author,
whoever that author may be, depends on the following con-
tentions :--

(i) Thé matter, method, style and vocabulary.of vI and
vil are alike (res methodus stilus verba eundem auctorem
produnt).

(ii) The questions discussed in VII follow those discussed
in VI in a natural and logical order.

(iii) Definite references are made in VII to the conclu-
sions reached in VI.

(iv) Other passages in VII plainly assume passages in VI,
though they do not definitely refer to them.

(v) Words are used in VII only intelligible because used
in VI, and these could not have occurred if v1 had not been
written.

These reasons cannot be held strong enough to prove
that VI and vII are by the same author, or even, as I think,

INTRODUCTION 5

to raise. any strong presumption in favour of that view.
(i) What Fritzsche means by saying that the ‘res’ of the two
books is the same I do not quite know. The subjects of the
two books are different: and that differences of doctrine
between the two are not found where they might possibly
occur does not show much, considering how closely Eudemus
agrees with Aristotle as a rule where their respective points of
view can be compared with certainty. As for the ‘method,’
Fritzsche argues with small confidence from the frequency of.
ἀπορίαι and of backward and forward references, which he
admits are nearly as common in Aristotle as in Eudemus, in
other books nearly as common as in VI and vir: and the
other points, such as great subtlety and agreement of authors
quoted and so on, are highly disputable. The same may be
said of arguments from style and vocabulary, which, as I
have already said, cannot well be useful in discussing the
authorship of any Aristotelian work, seeing that the whole
school express themselves with wonderful uniformity of
manner. (ii) Fritzsche’s other four reasons may be met by
a single observation. Even supposing the facts to be entirely
as alleged, it only follows that a book corresponding fairly
closely to VI was written by the author of viI—supposing,
that is, that the author of viI did not take over VI as it stands
and write vil with reference to it—and not that vi is the
actual book. The reasons given by Dr Jackson for supposing
that Aristotle, if he did not write V VI VII, wrote their equiva-
lents, as against Grant who supposes that Aristotle never
wrote their equivalents or at any rate not until after he wrote
VIII IX X, show that either VI or its equivalent was in exist-
ence when VII was written: so that the passages of VII that
imply the conclusions or usages of VI are quite intelligible, no
matter who wrote either of the present books VI and VII.

If then Fritzsche fails to prove that VI is necessarily the
work of the author of VII, no amount of certainty that
Aristotle did not write VII? can prove that he did not write vI.
There are however other grounds, it is alleged, for believing

1 Tt is enough to observe that Professor sla for instance, does not reject the
Aristotelian authorship of vir.

6 INTRODUCTION

that v1 is the work not of Aristotle but of Eudemus: and
these it is necessary to examine. They are set forth clearly
and completely in Grant’s essay on the subject, and may be
classified as follows, only so much of them being here taken
into account as applies to VI either alone or in common with
Vv and VII :—

(a) That the passage Metaphysics 981 Ὁ 25—27, which
some think is in favour of Aristotle’s authorship of VI, really
tells rather against it in favour of Eudemus.

(2) That books VIII Ix X ignore matters discussed in vI
to which it would have seemed natural to refer.

(c) That certain references in VI to what has been said
already ‘correspond more closely with places in the earlier
books of the Audemian Ethics than to similar places in the
earlier books of the Nicomachean treatise.’

To these reasons may be added a number of small points,
made not in the Essay but in the notes to VI, which in one
way or another are meant to support Eudemus’ authorship.
These arguments of Grant’s must now be considered in detail :
many of the same points appear in Fritzsche’s prolegomena
and notes in his edition of the Eudemian Ethics.

(2) Grant admits that Metaphysics 981 Ὁ 25—27 Εἴρηται
μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ᾿Ηθικοῖς τίς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν must refer either to NE vI or to a
similar lost book: but maintains (1) that it would equally
well apply to a similar lost book, (2) that Asclepius’ record of
the tradition of Eudemus’ editorship of the Mezaphysics gives
ground for thinking the passage quoted an Eudemian interpo-
lation. To this it may be replied that (1) leaves the question
where it is, merely showing that the passage is no argument
for or against either view, while (2) is a mere conjecture
which Grant himself, it is plain, regards as ingenious rather
than plausible.

(Ὁ) Grant maintains that vI (like the other disputed
books) appears in its natural place if read as part of the

1 See Grant’s edition of the Ethics i-56.

INTRODUCTION 7

Eudemian Ethics, and that the later books of the Eudemian
Ethics are in harmony with it, but that the later books of the
Nicomachean Ethics (VIIl 1X X) ignore matters discussed in
vI to which it would have seemed natural to refer. Now
Dr Jackson has shown (Introduction to V, pp. xxix—xxxi) that
VIII to X do not ignore altogether the matter discussed in v1;
though he does not suppose VI to be Aristotle’s. work, but
assumes an Aristotelian equivalent of VI to have been written.
I shall later give reasons for believing that Χ ignores VI even
less than has hitherto been supposed. But even if Grant
were right in maintaining that VIII IX X ignore VI, his case
would be little the better off for this unless he could show
that Eudemian Ethics VII VIII ignore NE vi less than
NE vill 1x x ignore NE vi. But this he fails to do. The
few places? in EE VII vill where he believes NE v VI VII to
be recognised all refer, if they refer to NE v vi VII at all,
either to V or to VII, but in no case to vi. I shall try later to
show that EE VIII as a matter of fact takes considerably less
account of NE vi than NE x does. If it be urged that
EE vu is incomplete, and would no doubt if completed have
taken more account of NE vi and its doctrine, one can only
reply that there is no external or internal evidence of
EE vut’s incompleteness: its shortness is nothing to the
point, being the natural consequence of the omission of any
discussion of Pleasure or of the connection between Ethics
and Politics, but for which NE x would hardly be longer
than EE vim is: while to assume EE viii incomplete simply
because the results of NE vi are ignored in it as it stands is
of course to beg the question.

(c) Grant next gives certain references in the disputed
books to what has been said already, which he contends
‘correspond more closely with places. in the earlier books
of the Eudemian Ethics than to similar places in the earlier
books of the Nicomachean treatise.’ Four of these references
are from NE v1, and a fifth is added soon afterwards?» How
far is Grant’s contention justified in reference to them ὁ.

1 Grant, i 59. ? Grant, i δύ, 57.

8 INTRODUCTION

(1) The opening words of NE vi are compared with
EE 1222 a 6—12 ᾿Επεὶ δ᾽ ὑποκεῖται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη
ἕξις ad’ ἧς πρακτικοὶ. τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ᾽ ἣν ἄριστα
διάκεινται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστον τὸ
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς κτλ. But whereas in NE vI the
μέσον is defined by ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, in EE IV τὸ κατὰ
τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον is defined by τὸ μέσον: so that the reference
is not so satisfactory as the likeness of wording might at first
make it seem probable. And from such passages in the NE
as 1114 Ὁ 26 Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε
γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ᾽ ὧν τε
γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ «καὶ» καθ᾽ αὑτάς, καὶ ὅτι
ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος
προστάξῃ: 1103 Ὁ 31 τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον
πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω---ῥηθήσεται δ᾽ ὕστερον! περὶ
αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας
ἀρετάς : the well-known definition of moral virtue reached at
1106 Ὁ 36 Ἔστιν ἄρα. ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ ἐν μεσότητι
οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν:
1115 Ὁ 12 (ὁ ἀνδρεῖος) ὡς δεῖ καὶ. ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ
καλοῦ ἕνεκα, and so 1115 Ὁ 19, 1117 a 8, etce—from such
passages the statement at the beginning of NE v1 follows
as naturally and easily as from the sum of corresponding
passages in the EE. Of course the wording of the beginning
of NE vi does not even make it probable that the reference
is to one special passage rather than to a whole line of
argument worked out in various places.

(2) NE (v1 i 3) 1138 b 35 Tas δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς
διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ἤθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας
is compared with EE 1221 Ὁ 27 ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς,
καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα διήρηνται, καὶ αἱ μὲν τοῦ λόγον
ἔχοντος διανοητικαί, ὧν ἔργον ἀλήθεια, ἢ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει ἢ
περὶ γενέσεως, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου ἔχοντος δ᾽ ὄρεξιν. But simple
inspection shows the references to be as good or better to

1 This passage has been suspected on doctrinal grounds: but (as Professor

Burnet justly indicates by his reference in his note ad locum) it must stand or
fall with 1144 Ὁ 27.

INTRODUCTION 9

NE 1102 a 26—28...76 μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι τὸ δὲ λόγον
ἔχον, and the following explanation of this, together with
1103 a 3 διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην"
λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰᾶς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, κτλ.

(3) NE (VI viii 1) 1141 b 23—24 "Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ
καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν
αὐταῖς is compared with EE 1218 b 12 Τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ
τὴν κυρίαν πασῶν. αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ οἰκονομικὴ καὶ
φρόνησις. διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὗται αἱ ἕξεις πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τῷ
τοιαῦται εἶναι. πρὸς δ᾽ ἀλλήλας εἴ τι διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον
λεκτέον. It is true the three-fold division πολιτικὴ οἰκονομία
φρόνησις occurs earlier in the EE, and does not occur in the
NE. But NE vi 1141 Ὁ 23 does not really vefer to it at all—
there is nothing to show that the division is not being intro-
duced here for the first time in the treatise. No doubt the
anticipation in EE 1218 Ὁ 15 proves that Eudemus wrote,
or intended to write, a book like NE νὶ (supposing NE vi
not to be his): but there is no reason to think that Eudemus
would depart from the three-fold division of Practical Wisdom
if Aristotle had made it already: and the way in which
Eudemus anticipates the division rather points to its having
been made and recognised already.

(4) NE (VI xii 10) 1144 a 31—36 οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ
TOV πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ
τὸ ἄριστον... τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐ φαίνεται: διαστρέφει
γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ “περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς
ἀρχάς is compared with EE 1227 Ὁ 28—32 ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς
θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαΐ, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ
τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑποθέσις" “᾿Επειδὴ δεῖ τόδε ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη
τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, ‘Hi ἔστι τὸ
τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι’ The doctrine of the
Practical Syllogism, it is true, is not found in the undoubtedly
Nicomachean books: but the above seems to be the only
undoubtedly Eudemian passage in which the doctrine occurs:
and against this may be placed the passage that Grant
himself quotes from the Psychology (admittedly Aristotle’s
own work) 4348 16 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις Kal λόγος,

10 INTRODUCTION

ἡ δὲ τοῦ Kal’ ἕκαστα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον TO
τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἡ δὲ ὅτι τόδε τοίνυν τοιόνδε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε),
ἤδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλουι Even if the Psychology
is a later work than the NE, which is by no means cer-
tain, it does not follow that Aristotle only thought of the
doctrine of the Practical Syllogism between the time when he
wrote the NE and the time when he wrote the Psychology,
and therefore that no passage in the Ethics where the Prac-
tical Syllogism is spoken of cari be by him. Nor does the
single passage EE 1227 b 28—32 show Eudemus to have
been more familiar with that doctrine than Aristotle was, the
disputed books apart. It is the author of the Motzons of
Animals. who has elaborated the Practical Syllogism most
fully, and he it is agreed must have lived later than either
Aristotle or Eudemus.

(5) The doctrine of NE VI xiii is said to be anticipated
by EE 1234 a 28 ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ λεχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον,
ἑκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως. But
the answer to (3) applies here too. Eudemus is looking
forward in the passage quoted to an exposition, which he may
or may not actually have written, on the lines of NE v1.
But this passage does not show Eudemus to be the author of
NE vi any more than Metaphysics 981 Ὁ 25—27 (already
quoted) would, taken by itself, show Aristotle to be the
author of the same book NE v1.

(6) Grant? maintains that the psychology of (VI xii 6)
1144 a 6, "Ere τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν
ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν" ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκόπον ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ
φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον, is different from the psychology of
Aristotle but identical with that adopted by Eudemus in the
earlier books of .his Ethics. It is true that Eudemus,.: in
EE I xi, does adopt the same psychology s but Aristotle, in
NE x viii, 1178 a 16 συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἥ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ
ἤθους ἀρετῇ καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως
ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικάς εἰσιν ἀρετάς, τὸ δ᾽ ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν

1 7ο1 ἃ 7 5644. (quoted in Burnet’s second appendix to his edition of the
Ethics). 2 in his note ad locum.

INTRODUCTION II

κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν, makes just the same distinction, whereas
Eudemus takes no account of it at all when he discusses
καλοκαγαθία in EE viii iii. It seems to me, though Grant
thinks otherwise, that Aristotle in the passage just quoted
has the air of having already discussed and justified the
position there taken up, as the word εἴπερ (=‘if what we
have said is really true, namely’) among other things seems
to show. It is no fault on Aristotle’s part, but rather to his
credit, that he does not introduce the distinction in book ΠῚ,
where since intellectual virtue has not yet been treated such a
distinction would be unintelligible. Such an early introduction
is far more in accord with the less dialectic and more didactic
method that characterises Eudemus as compared with Aristotle.

If the above criticisms of Grant’s arguments are sound, it
must be admitted that he is hardly justified in his conclusion
that there is an especially close connection between NE v1
and the undisputedly Eudemian books, in so far at least as
that conclusion is founded on the arguments already men-
tioned. In his notes on NE VI he gives a number of further
reasons, with reference to particular points, for regarding
Eudemus as the author of that book; which it is hard for the
most part to bring under any general head, but whose cumu-
lative effect would be considerable if they were sound. Some
space must therefore be devoted here to asking whether they
are sound or not: and this will conclude my examination of
the arguments in favour of Eudemian authorship, since practi-
cally all the arguments on this side that have been adduced
are contained in the works of either Fritzsche or Grant or
both. I shall then bring forward certain positive arguments
on the other side, by which I hope to show that at any rate
the sixth book not only is not Eudemian but is Nicomachean.

(2) Grant gives, in his notes to VI, a number of references
to the EE that are, however, at least as good to the NE
where they are not better. Such are:—{i) On VI i 5 πρότερον
μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη «TA he refers to EE Π iv 11, but the reference
would be as good to NE 1102 a 27 οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς.

1 Vol. ii p. 148.

12 INTRODUCTION

εἶναι τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον, κτλ. (ii) On VI i 6 (£139 8 13) οὐδεὶς
δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν, he refers
to EE 1 x 9}, but the reference would be as good to
NE 1112 a 21 περὲ δὴ τῶν ἀιδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται... οὐδὲ
περὶ τῶν...ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ γινομένων εἴτ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ
φύσει, κτλ. (iii) On VI ii 2 (1139 ἃ 22) ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις
προαιρετική, Grant refers to EE 11 x 28%, but the reference
would be as good to 1106.b 36 Ἔστιν dpa ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις
προαιρετική κτὰ. (iv) On VI ii 2 (1139 a 23) ἡ προαίρεσις
ὄρεξις βουλευτική, Grant refers to EE 11 x 14%, but the refer-
ence would be as good to NE 1113 a 10 ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη
βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν.

(ὁ). Whenever Grant makes an illustratory reference to
NE without being able to refer to EE, the argument is in
favour of Aristotle’s authorship of νι. This is, however, very
often the case, e.g.:—(i) NE III ii 13 (1112 a 5) referred to in
the note’ on VI ii 2 (1139 a 24) Tov Te λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι, κτλ:
(ii) the first section of the NE referred to in the note‘ on
VI ii 4—5 (1139 a 31 seqq.) πράξεως μὲν οὖν, κτλ: (iii) NE
III iii 7 (1112 a 31) referred to in the note® on VI iv 4 (1140 a
13) ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ, KTA: (iv) NE 1 x 10 (1100 b 12) referred to in
the note® on VI v 8 (1140 b 28) σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι λήθη, κτλ:
(v) NEI vi 12 (1096 b 28) referred to in the note’ on VI xi 6
(1143 b 14) dupa.

(c) Grant often argues that changes in usage or develop-
ments in doctrine in vI as compared with the undoubtedly
Nicomachean books show that VI is not Nicomachean. But
Aristotle was quite capable of making such changes or
developments himself within the limits of his own treatise’.
Thus (a) with regard to changes in the usage of words

(1) Grant contends that the new use of the word
πολιτική (VI viii 3, see Grant, vol. ii p. 168) must be the
work of Eudemus—which is not necessary :

1 Vol. ii p. 150. 2 Vol. ii p. 155.
3 Vol. ii p. 151 (see also p. 174, note on δόξης δ᾽).

4 Vol. ii p. 152. 5 Vol. ii p. 157.
6 Vol. ii p. 162. 7 Vol. ii p. 181.

8 See my essay on ‘ Formal Accuracy.’

INTRODUCTION 13

(2) and that the same applies to the use of τέχνη (VI iv 3,
see Grant, vol. ii p. 157, note on οὔτε tovavrn)—but τέχνη
is certainly used, as I have shown elsewhere, in two quite
distinct senses within the limits of VI itself.

(8) with regard to developments in doctrine

(1) Grant supposes the section VI ii 6 (1139 b 5) οὐκ
ἔστι δὲ προαιρετόν κτὰ an addition to Aristotle’s list of the
marks of προαίρεσις made without special appropriateness
here, because Eudemus was vain enough to be ‘ glad to intro-
duce the above remarks’ But I have elsewhere shown that
this passage is thoroughly useful to the argument?, and is not
introduced simply to patch a previous gap at the next recur-
rence of the subject. Even if this latter theory were correct,
surely Aristotle might patch his own gap as well as Eudemus
for him: and why did Eudemus omit the point in dealing
himself with προαίρεσις ?

(2) On the discussion of εὐβουλία in chapter ix, Grant,
after observing® (what really tells against his theory) ‘There
is a great assumption here of the manner of Aristotle,’
remarks ‘There is an advance upon Aristotle’s account of
deliberation (Z7#. II ili) in two points, (1) the process is
illustrated here by the logical formula of the syllogism,
(2) there is a mention here of the faculty by which ends are
apprehended, which Aristotle had left unnoticed.’ To which
the answer is (A) there are the same omissions in Eudemus’
previous account of βούλευσις, and the supplemental remarks
in vI ix bear therefore the same relation to each previous
account: (B) it is in any case quite natural that these supple-
mental remarks should only be made where the context
renders them both pertinent and intelligible.

(4) Grant says‘ that σκοπός is a metaphor with Aristotle
but has lost its metaphorical associations with Eudemus, and
that the disputed books show its use in the Eudemian sense:
It is enough to refer to Stewart’s demonstration® that with

1 Vol. ii p. 153- 2 «Miscellaneous Notes’ ad locum.

3 Vol. ii p. 173. 4 Vol. ii p. 147.
5 See his ‘ Notes’ Book vi init.

14 INTRODUCTION

Aristotle also σκοπός is a dead metaphor. The distinction
Grant attempts to draw will not hold.

(ὃ Grant points out? that the medical illustration of
VI i is ‘repeated’ in EE vill iii 13. But it is just as reason-
able to suppose, with all the evidence that there is of the
detailed fashion in. which Eudemus copied Aristotle, that
Eudemus took his illustration in EE VIII iii 13 from its use
here by Aristotle.

(7) All the later editors agree that the formula of
VI i 2, 1138 Ὁ 25, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν,
οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές, is not a ‘protest against the indefiniteness
and relativity of Aristotle’s moral theory of ‘the mean’ and
‘the law?,’ as Grant believes.

(g) On NE Vi ii 5, 1139 a 35, διάνοια δ᾽ αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ,
ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική, Grant maintains that Eudemus
here is guilty of a confusion that Aristotle had avoided’.
But the author of vi had just before, in saying that ὄρεξις as
well as vods.or διάνοια is needed for προαίρεσις, clearly made
the distinction that Grant supposes him here to ignore. The
confusion that certainly does belong to the form of this state-
ment is thus due merely to formal carelessness and not to
any want of perception of the true doctrine. It is just as
likely that Aristotle should be guilty of such formal careless-
ness as that Eudemus should.

(4) Grant compares the list of terms given: in NE 1139
b 16 (vI iii 1) with that given in the Posterior Analytics
89 Ὁ 7 (I xxxiii 8), and finds evidence of difference of author-
ship in the difference of the two lists. The account he gives®
of the way Eudemus borrowed and altered the list from
Aristotle has only to be read through to be seen plainly to
be arbitrary and unsupported by evidence. There is nothing
to show that Aristotle’s list falls into three pairs to be sepa-
rately discussed. It is not true that the words διάνοια and
νοῦς are undistinguished throughout NE vi: there is the
clearest distinction between the νοῦς of VI vi (probably the

1 Vol. ii p. 147. 2 Vol. ii p. 152. 3 Vol. ii p. 153.

INTRODUCTION 15

sense in which νοῦς is spoken of in the passage in the
Analytics) and the νοῦς or διάνοια of VI ii. And though
Grant is right in saying that the list of vi iii contains a cross-
division, he is wrong in implying that this cross-division
ought not to be there, and that no cross-division exists in
Aristotle’s list in the Azalytics. The two lists are perfectly
consistent, and may well be by the same author: and even if
they were not consistent, greater formal inconsistencies than
this are often to be found between two passages both un-
doubtedly by Aristotle.

(2) In his note? on VI iii 3, 1139 b 27, ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι᾽
ἐπαγωγῆς Grant asserts that Eudemus makes a novel state-
ment in saying that science? is sometimes inductive. But
the passage 1139 b 27 does not say this, but only what is
said at the end of the Axalytics, that ἐπαγωγή is necessary to
provide the materials for science.

(2) In-his note? on VI xi 4, 1143 a 35, καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν
ἐσχάτων ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα Grant says ‘now comes in a piece of
confusion which is thoroughly Eudemian,’ etc. But (A) we
often find Aristotle guilty of the kind of confusion Grant
alleges to exist here, (B) the confusion does not really exist
here—Aristotle is merely pointing out the connection between
the two kinds of νοῦς to justify their having a common name.

(2) Grant observes that the phrase‘ ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή, used in
VI xii 5, 1144 8 5, is never found in the writings of Aristotle,
but is frequent in those of Eudemus. But of the five places
where the phrase occurs, three are in the disputed books, and
only two in the admittedly Eudemian: and the argument is
proportionally weakened in consequence. Accident may easily
account for the fact, if VI is by Aristotle. Moreover, in EE
vill iii Eudemus calls complete virtue not ὅλη ἀρετή but
καλοκαγαθία, and says that he has used the name already.
But the word does not-occur elsewhere in either of the two
treatises. It would thus seem likely that there is a lost
Eudemian equivalent of v1, in which what is called ὅλη ἀρετή

a Vol. li p. 155. 2 1,6, ἐπιστήμη.
* Vol. ii p. 179. 4 Vol. ii p. 183.

16 INTRODUCTION

in VI was called καλοκαγαθία : according to which view VI
must be by Aristotle. (Dr Jackson’s emendation ἣν καλοῦ-
μεν ἤδη καλοκαγαθίαν, is the result of a belief that ΝῚ is
Eudemian, and cannot be used as an argument in favour of
that view.)

Hitherto I have been trying to show that the reasons
given for their view by supporters of the Eudemian author-
ship of VI are inadequate. I have now to bring forward some
other facts that appear to tell in favour of the view I support,
that νι is, whether v and VII are or are not, a genuine part of
the Nicomachean treatise, and not only not the work of
Eudemus but actually the work of Aristotle. These facts fall
into two main groups:—(1) Those relating to the meaning
attached to the word φρόνησις elsewhere in the NE and the
EE. (2) The correspondence with NE vi of NE x and
EE VIII respectively.

I. Compare the passages in NE and EE where φρόνησις
is mentioned, and it will be seen that the Nicomachean books
are, in the meaning that they give to this important word, far
more consistent with NE vi than the Eudemian books are.

(a) Inthe undoubtedly Eudemian books :—

(i) In EE 1214 a 30—b 6 φρόνησις is opposed to ἀρετή
and ἡδονή, and stands for the τέλος of the intellectual life of
speculation as distinguished from the τέλη which are (1) the
practical life of public activity and moral virtue, (2) the life of
pleasure. This is not inconsistent with the wording of other
parts of the undoubtedly Eudemian books; but according to
NE VI φρόνησις is inseparable from ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, and it is not
φρόνησις but σοφία that belongs to the life of speculation.

(ii) In EE 1215 a 32—b 6 φρόνησις is in the same way
opposed to ἀρετή and ἡδονή, and here its sphere is more
clearly defined: it belongs not to the πολιτικός but to the
φιλόσοφος, who βούλεται περὶ. φρόνησιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν
θεωρίαν τὴν περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, and who is also said below
(1215 Ὁ 12—13) κοινωνεῖν θεωρίας τινὸς θείας. Anaxagoras,

1 χ248 10 (for ἐκαλοῦμεν»).

INTRODUCTION 17

whose view of the Good this phrase is meant to describe, is
shortly afterwards recorded as saying that the greatest reason
for living is θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ὅλον
κόσμον τάξιν.

(iii) In EE 1216 a 38, and

(iv) In EE 1218 Ὁ 34, the same use occurs: φρόνησις
has the same meaning, and is opposed in the same way to
ἀρετή and ἡδονή.

(v) Though at first sight EE 1220 a καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν οὐ
μόνον τοὺς δικαίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς συνετοὺς καὶ τοὺς σοφούς
seems to recognise the distinction of NE vi, and though it
does not really tell against it, yet the use of συνετούς as a
synonym for φρονίμους is plainly inconsistent with the special
meaning given to συνετός in NE ΥἹ x.

(vi) If the table of virtues and vices in EE 1220 ἢ 38—
1221 812 ἰ5 not a later interpolation, the inclusion of φρόνησις
among moral virtues as a mean between πανουργία and
εὐήθεια does not seem to look forward to NE VI: and even
the interpolation is hard to explain, as far as φρόνησις is
concerned, if NE vi was recognised as forming part of the
EE when the interpolation was made.

(6) In the undoubtedly Nicomachean books, on the
other hand, far greater consistency with NE VI is to be found,
as regards the use of the word φρόνησις, than in the un-
doubtedly Eudemian. Thus—

(i) NE 1096 b 23 τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς is,
owing to the context, quite non-committal on this point: and
since the passage is concerned with Platonic metaphysics the
word is not unnaturally used in its Platonic sense. The
evidence of the passage is thus negatively in favour of my view.

(ii) NE 1098 b 23 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις,
ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ: a careful distinction. of
φρόνησις from σοφία, and of both from ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, fully
consistent with the usage of NE VI.

(iii) NE 1103 a 6 σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν
διανοητικάς (sc. ἀρετὰς λέγομεν): a less convincing, but still
striking, anticipation of NE VL.

G.

18 INTRODUCTION

(iv) NE x is strictly consistent with NE vI (see 1178 a
16, 1180 a 22, 1180 b 28), except in the Platonic quotation
1172 b 30, where Plato’s usage of the word is followed. And
it'may be remarked that the same consistency is shown in
the use of σοφία: see 1177 a 23, 1179 a 30 and 32.

II. Compare the final results of the investigation reached
in NE x and in EE VIII respectively with the general tenor
and the particular results of NE vi. The final results in
question are contained in NE xX vi—viii and in EE VIII iti.
On the one hand, the final chapter of EE takes practically no
account at all of the conclusions of NE vi. The nature of
καλοκαγαθία or Perfect Virtue is determined wholly without
reference to φρόνησις or any form of intellectual virtue: it is
simply a combination of all-the moral virtues. Not only 15
intellectual virtue not put above moral virtue, but it is not
even mentioned. And as καλοκαγαθία, a purely moral ἕξις,
appears to be considered the ἕξις of the εὐδαίμων, so the
ἐνέργεια Of the εὐδαίμων is at least more moral than intel-
lectual, τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν. This phrase, truly
religious in its vague reverence, whatever it may mean, means
at any rate something very different from the θεωρία which is
the ἐνέργεια of the σοφός in NE vi. The highest of ἐπιστῆμαι
is indeed θεολογική according to Aristotle: but θεολογική is
not τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν. And what becomes, in
the Eudemian formula, of μαθηματική and φυσική, recognised
in NE vi and elsewhere as true parts of σοφίαν On the
other hand, NE x vi—viii makes the most satisfactory use of
NE vi. The distinction of true and secondary εὐδαιμονία as
θεωρία and πρᾶξις expressed in NE x is founded on the
carefully elaborated definitions of σοφία and φρόνησις in
NE VI, and agrees with the preference accorded to σοφία in
NE VI, 1141 a 19 κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων,
1143 Ὁ 34 χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὖσα (sc. ἡ φρόνησις) κυριωτέρα
αὐτῆς ἔσται. The statement 1177 a 17 ὅτι δ᾽ ἐστὶ θεωρητική,
εἴρηται, which has been thought to show that NE vi is not
Aristotle’s work, is quite consistent with NE vt if understood
to refer to the general doctrine of the book and not to a

INTRODUCTION 19

particular passage fixing the usage of the single word
θεωρητική". In fact NE Χ vi—viii is as unintelligible without
NE vi as EE viii iii is intelligible without it and even
unintelligible with it. This fact does not of course show
that NE v1 is the original Nicomachean book on the subject,
but it does show that NE VI either is or closely resembles
the original book, while EE vii can so well dispense with
any such argument as that contained in NE VI that it seems
doubtful whether the corresponding book for the EE was
ever written, though, as has been admitted, it was no doubt
designed. It is, then, very hard to believe that NE vr is
Eudemian: and there is no further obstacle in the way of
believing that it is Nicomachean, the genuine work of Aristotle
himself.

The importance of the conclusion that I have tried to
establish—that NE ΥἹ is really part of the Nicomachean
Ethics, and therefore was written by Aristotle—may easily
be over-rated, but is of course very considerable for anyone
who tries to elucidate the meaning of this book. Though it
is a book detached to a large extent by the nature of its
subject from all others except a part of the later Great
Ethics; though it is often as necessary as it is natural to
look no further. for the explanation of difficulties than some
other part of the book itself; though it is always dangerous to
interpret a passage in one Aristotelian work by a passage in
another; and though all Peripatetic philosophy hangs so
much together that such interpretation is almost equally safe
or dangerous, no matter who the author is actually found or
supposed to be: yet, as I have said, doctrine must be deter-
mined by context as well as context by doctrine, and the
view taken of the authorship of this book can never be a
matter of indifference. I hope, therefore, that I have done
enough to justify my explaining the general bearing of
NE vi as part of the Nicomachean and not as part of the
Eudemian work, and my giving this or that meaning to an

1 The probability that the words should be so understood is greatly increased
by the fact that the passage 1143 Ὁ 14—17 makes just this kind of reference.

2—2

20 INTRODUCTION

otherwise obscure passage because such meaning is con-
sistent with other parts of the Nicomachean treatise, whether
consistent with the Eudemian or not. The undoubtedly
Nicomachean books will for this purpose have greater
authority than the undoubtedly Eudemian. So little use
has to be made of NE ν in treating of NE vI, and so little
even of NE vil, that I have not thought it necessary to
multiply my labour three-fold by attempting to handle the
question of the authorship of NE v and vil. I am content
at present to allow that question to remain open: but
throughout my work I have assumed that Aristotle is the
author of at any rate the Sixth Book itself. If however
it should be thought that this assumption lacks adequate
support, I do not think that many of my contentions will be
invalidated on that ground alone.

SECTION II.

ARISTOTLE’S DOCTRINE OF INTELLECTUAL
GOODNESS.

A. INTRODUCTORY.

Two reasons are given in VI for the inquiry into the
nature of intellectual ἀρετή, and some trouble is caused by
the want of any explicit statement of connection between
them. The first is the necessity of completing our knowledge
of moral ἀρετή. It is not said in so many words that we
cannot know what moral ἀρετή is till we know what intel-
lectual ἀρετή is. But it is said that we cannot know what
moral ἀρετή is until we know what that ὀρθὸς λόγος is by —
which the μέσον in any given case is always determined. It
is later shown that this ὀρθὸς λόγος is the ἀρετή of the λόγον
ἔχον part of the soul, or more properly perhaps of the λόγον
éyov part of the soul in its good condition, part of whose
work, or the work of a part of which, is to determine the
moral μέσον as aforesaid. It thus appears, what was not
formally apparent at the time, that the discussion of intel-
lectual dpery—the ἀρετή, that is, of the λόγον ἔχον μέρος---
was directly useful for the immediate purpose of making
more explicit the definition of moral ἀρετή. This object is
attained not only by fully describing the function of the
ὀρθὸς λόγος in so far as it is concerned with moral ἀρετή, but
also, though less directly, by showing that not all ὀρθὸς λόγος
has to do with moral ἀρετή, by carefully distinguishing that
which has to do with it from that which has not, and by
describing in detail not only φρόνησις, which has to do with
it, but also σοφία, which has not. Directly or indirectly, the

22 INTRODUCTION

whole of the discussion of vi furthers this first object. But
there is a second object, which is stated quite clearly at the
outset—as complete a knowledge as possible of what intel-
lectual ἀρετή is, of its various kinds and _ their relative
excellence. The attainment of this object must of course
contribute directly to the attainment of the main object of
the Ethics, the knowledge of what the greatest good for man
is. For that depends on knowing what the best and com-
pletest ἀρετή is, which in its turn depends on knowing clearly
and in detail what the several ἀρεταί are. In the absence
or assumed absence of a priori evidence, moral ἀρετή and
intellectual ἀρετή are equally likely to be best and completest,
and so the nature of both must be equally clearly understood.
The importance of vi is that it completes the discussion of
the one and says all that there is to say about the other.

Now .it does not follow that the same handling of the
subject will forward the above-mentioned two objects to the
same extent. If it is desired to find out how far and in what
way intellectual ἀρετή has to do with moral ἀρετή, the rational
division of intellectual ἀρετή will naturally be into that which
is and that which is not concerned with human πρᾶξις or
responsible action. But it does not follow that this is the
most natural division to make when considering intellectual
ἀρετή in and by itself: and when in the second chapter intel-
lectual ἀρετή is so considered, a different division does in fact
appear to be made, into that which has to do with μὴ
ἐνδεχόμενα and that which has to do with ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως
ἔχειν. The class ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν appears to be a far
larger one than the class πρακτά, the class μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα
ἄλλως ἔχειν a far smaller one than the class μὴ πρακτά.
What is more, there are certain indications in vI that those
ἐνδεχόμενα that are not mpaxrd are to some extent taken into
account.

(1) The name λογιστικόν is given (1139 a 12) to the
second part of the λόγον ἔχον, instead of the name βουλευτικόν,
for no obvious reason, and in spite of the risk of confusion
with the Platonic use of λογιστικόν as meaning λόγον ἔχον.

INTRODUCTION 23

Probably in order not to exclude ἐνδεχόμενα μὴ πρακτά, which
βουλευτικόν would do, since βούλευσις is of πρακτά only.

(2) The sentence τοῦ δ᾽ ἐνδεχομένου ἄχλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι
καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν (1140 a I) suggests by its form that
a class of ἐνδεχόμενα is thought of though not mentioned that
is neither ποιητόν nor πρακτόν but simply θεωρητόν. Other-
wise we should expect τοῦ δ᾽ ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν τὸ μὲν
ποιητόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ πρακτόν.

(3) οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν
οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν (1140 ἃ 14) marks off τὰ κατὰ φύσιν
from τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης and so from τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν.
Now τὰ κατὰ φύσιν are the objects of non-practical θεωρία:
they form the subject matter of a great part of Aristotle’s
research. From this passage they appear also to be considered
as ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν.

(4) The conclusion λείπεται ἄρα... κακά (1140 Ὁ 4—6) is
not the result of a proof by exhaustion: λείπεται only means
‘it must follow that...” as elsewhere. The validity of the
conclusion depends on the fact that φρόνησις has already
been shown to be (because βουλευτική) περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν,
and not that every other field for intellectual ἀρετή has been
mentioned and rejected—voids and σοφία have spheres not
yet mentioned at all. This statement does not, then, exclude
the taking into account of non-practical θεωρία τῶν évdexo-
μένων.

(5) 1140 b 26 θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή (sc. ἡ φρόνησις), τοῦ
δοξαστικοῦ: ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν
καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. This suggests strongly that non-practical
θεωρία is taken into account as being part of the activity of
the λογιστικὸν μέρος. For whereas λογιστικόν included the
meaning βουλευτικόν, δοξαστικόν does not, and is not an
appropriate name for the part of the soul that deliberates
and is concerned with wpaxta. But the giving of the name
δοξαστικόν here is plainly significant of something.

This being so, the question is, which of the two divisions
is followed in distinguishing—as is done at 1143 b 14—
one group of intellectual ἀρεταί under the name σοφία from

24 INTRODUCTION

the other under the name ¢povnaiws? Is σοφία of μὴ évdex-
όμενα as opposed to φρόνησις which is of évdexdueva? Or is
σοφία of μὴ πρακτά as opposed to φρόνησις which is of
πρακτά (that is, θεωρητική as opposed to mpaxtixn)? On
the one hand σοφία is said (1177 a 18) to be θεωρητική, and
the description, which follows this statement, of its claims to
be the best ἀρετή applies as well, a priori at least, to a ἕξις
concerned with ἐνδεχόμενα as to one. concerned with μὴ
ἐνδεχόμενα, whereas it is plain that φρόνησις can neither in
VI nor X be considered as non-practical. Moreover φυσική,
which must be capable of meaning the science of τὰ κατὰ
φύσιν, is recognised both in VI (1142 a 17—18) and elsewhere?
as being one branch of σοφία, coordinate with metaphysics
and mathematics: and according to 1140 a 15 (already
quoted) φυσική must be considered as having to do with
ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, though the treatise called the PAyszcs
is pure metaphysics. In this view, then, σοφία may be con-
cerned with ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, such as have nothing to
do with πρᾶξις : and in this view σοφία is distinguished from
φρόνησις as θεωρητική from πρακτική, and may be the ἀρετή
of part of the λογιστικόν μέρος as well as of all the ἐπιστη-
μονικόν : So that the distinction of chapter i is followed and
not that of chapter ii, But on the other hand σοφία is
defined as being νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη (1141 a 19), both of
which are expressly said to be of μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα only: and as
being ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων, and necessary truth is more
τίμιον than contingent. It must then be conceded that σοφία
in the strictest sense is of μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα only, and only in a
qualified sense, if at all, of ἐνδεχόμεναΣ But even ἐνδεχόμενα
are only considered with the object of discovering general
principles, which are eternally true (and not like the principles
of φρόνησις relative to the person and occasion) except for
the interference of τὸ αὐτόματον. Now τὸ αὐτόματον can
never be the subject of any exercise of intellectual ἀρετή, for

1 Metaphysics 1064 Ὁ τ τρία γένη τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί, φυσικὴ
μαθηματικὴ θεολογική, 1025 Ὁ 21 οὔτε πρακτικὴ (sc. ἡ φυσική) οὔτε ποιητικὴ,
26 θεωρητική τις ἂν εἴη.

2. Metaphysics 1005 Ὁ 1 ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις ἡ φυσικὴ ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρώτη.

INTRODUCTION 25

it is quite unknowable by any θεωρία, just as the element of
τύχη cannot be estimated in BovAevors. In this sense it is
always the μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον that is the object of θεωρητική and
so of copia: and on the other hand all the ἐνδεχόμενον that,
as such, is the proper object of the exercise of intellectual
ἀρετή, is πρακτικόν: for the regular operations of nature are
only properly considered in so far as they are μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα,
and τὰ τύχῃ and τὰ αὐτόματα are not properly considered at
all. By thus reasoning the classes of μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα and
ἐνδεχόμενα may be made to coincide, in so far as they are
the objects of good intellectual activity, with the classes of
θεωρητά and mpaxra respectively. It is probably thus that
Aristotle reasoned in his own mind, but as he has openly
recognised neither the essential difference between the two
classifications nor the steps that must be taken to make the
corresponding classes coincide, his reasoning was evidently
far from clear. One source of confusion to him was probably
the Platonic doctrine on this subject. According to Plato,
the ideas are μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα (to use Aristotle’s phrase) and
the phenomena ἐνδεχόμενα, there is ἐπιστήμη of ideas and
δόξα of phenomena: which doctrine the terms ἐπιστημονικόν
and δοξαστικόν in VI suggest that Aristotle bears in mind and
is not willing wholly to reject. But the division of intellectual
ἀρετή into θεωρητική and πρακτική is wholly un-Platonic, and
at the same time it is the division essential to Aristotle’s
ethical theory, as the great conclusions of X vi—viii prove.
Thé way is now cleared for as careful an examination as
can be made of Aristotle’s view of intellectual ἀρετή in detail.
From what has just been said it follows that intellectual ἀρετή
is of two main kinds and two only. For all proper objects of
intellectual activity are of two main kinds and of two only:
either μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν and at the same time μὴ
πρακτά, or else ἐνδεχόμενα ἄχλως ἔχειν and at the same time
πρακτά. This distinction must correspond exactly to that
between the intellectual activities themselves, the parts or
faculties of the soul that possess these activities, and the
ἀρεταί or good permanent qualities of the parts of the soul:
1139 a 16 ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον. For according to

26 INTRODUCTION

Aristotle’s psychological theory, the thinking soul is poten-
tially the same as the objects of thought, as δεκτικὸν τοῦ
εἴδους ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης : therefore whatever distinction exists
between the objects of thought must exist also in the thinking
soul. The ἀρετή of the one part of the soul Aristotle calls
σοφία, of the other part φρόνησις. This nomenclature does
not prevent the subdivisions of either σοφία or φρόνησις being
quite properly called ἀρεταί themselves: nor does it prevent
the -use of the name φρόνησις in a narrower sense: neither
does it indicate a distinction essentially more radical than
that made between ποιητική and πρακτικὴ ἀρετή, or than that
made between νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη. But it does indicate just
the distinction which is of prime importance as regards the
settlement of the great question of the Ethics, What is the
greatest good for man? the distinction upon which, for this
reason, the whole discussion of VI is founded.

B. ola OR THEORETIC WISDOM.

Σοφία is defined twice (1141 a 19, 1141 b 2) as νοῦς
καὶ ἐπιστήμη and as having for its object τὰ τιμιώτατα τῇ
φύσει. Its nature is defined partly by statements made about
it as a whole single thing, but chiefly by the description given
of its two component parts. It will be convenient first to
examine these parts separately, and then to see how they
combine into one whole, and what peculiar qualities the
whole possesses as distinguished from its parts.

᾿Επιστήμη Aristotle defines as that ἕξις of the soul that
gives rise to the attainment and possession of necessary truth
by means of syllogistic reasoning. The premisses of the
syllogism must be true and necessary, the reasoning must be
correct, and the conclusion in consequence true and necessary.
᾿Επιστήμη does not, it is afterwards pointed out (1140 b 34),
itself lead to the formation of true premisses, except in so far
as they are the conclusions of previous syllogisms: but the
premisses being given and being correct, it leads to the
drawing of true conclusions from them. It would be neces-
sary to describe in detail the syllogizing process, but that

INTRODUCTION 27

this has already been done in another treatise in a different
connection. The Prior Analytics described the nature of
correct syllogizing with great fulness, and the Posterior
Analytics equally fully described the conditions under which
correct syllogizing leads to truth. In determining the ἔργον
τῆς ψυχῆς to which the ἀρετὴ τῆς ψυχῆς called ἐπιστήμη
gives rise, it is thus only necessary to refer to the Axalytics.
Since however the Axalytics have nothing to do with the
ethical point of view, it is necessary to insist on the relation
of the ἐνέργεια to the ἕξις, for the fact that the ἕξις can only
be defined in terms of the ἐνέργεια makes the two liable to
be confused with each other. But even in the Axalytics the
relation of the two is noticed: as may be seen from the
wording of the passage Analytics 99 Ὁ 15—19 Περὶ μὲν οὖν
συλλογισμοῦ Kal ἀποδείξεως, τί Te ἑκάτερόν ἐστι καὶ πῶς
γίνεται, φανερόν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιστήμης ἀποδεικτικῆς"
ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν. (1.6. from the point of view of the Axalytics.
But this separate mention shows that from some other point
of view they can be regarded as different.) περὶ δὲ τῶν
ἀρχῶν, πῶς τε γίνονται γνώριμοι Kal Tis ἡ yvwpifovca ἕξις,
ἐντεῦθέν ἐστι δῆλον προαπορήσασι πρῶτον. ΑΙ] Aristotle
does in the chapter on ἐπιστήμη to clear up this point is to
declare ἐπιστήμη to be a ἕξις in the defining formula 1139 Ὁ
31: otherwise the description is partly of the objects of the
ἐνέργεια and partly of the nature of the ἐνέργεια itself, in each
case merely though accurately recapitulating the results of
either the Analytics or the Metaphysics. The objects of the
activity of ἐπιστήμη are μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐξ
ἀναγκῆς ὄντα ἢ γινόμενα (see 1140 a 14 οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ
ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν), ἀίδια, ἀγένητα καὶ
ἄφθαρτα. The ἐνέργεια itself is κατὰ διδασκαλίαν καὶ μάθησιν,
ἐκ προγινωσκομένων, συλλογισμός, ἀποδεικτική, ἐκ γνωριμω-
τέρων τοῦ συμπεράσματος (see Burnet or Stewart for the
references): and the remark καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν
τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς refers to such a passage as Analytics 71 Ὁ 20
ἐξ ἀληθῶν τε...καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων...καὶ προτέρων Kai
αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος with the justification of this defini-
tion that follows. The whole of the doctrine of the Axalytics

28 INTRODUCTION

is drawn upon and assumed to be known: and there is no
inconsistency with the Azalytics either in matter or in form:
ἐπιστήμη it is true is here regarded as necessarily ἀποδεικτική,
while in the Axalytics ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική is distinguished
from ἐπιστήμη ἀναποδεικτική (99 Ὁ 16, 71 Ὁ 20, 88 b 36, and
specially 72 b 19), but this difference of expression appears
to be openly recognised, and the consequent danger of mis-
understanding averted, by the words 1139 Ὁ 18 εἰ δεῖ
ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν, which
suggest that ἐπιστήμη ἀναπόδεικτος is only to be called-
ἐπιστήμη by a ὁμοιότης, and not strictly’.

The subject of ἐπιστήμη, then, presented few difficulties
to Aristotle, and need present few to us. The position of
νοῦς is very different, and it is not easy to feel certain of
what Aristotle supposed νοῦς to be. There is no elaborate
description of νοῦς elsewhere to which we can refer to supple-
ment its scanty treatment in vI: the testimony of ‘other
treatises is small in quantity, and moreover highly obscure
and wanting in consistency. Two passages in VI, 1139 b 26—
31 and the sixth chapter, supply certain undoubted facts to
go upon. The premisses in the syllogisms of ἐπιστήμη
cannot, it is said, be themselves reached by syllogism (1139
b 30, 1140 b 35). This is not strictly accurate, for as a
matter of fact the conclusion of one syllogism may become
a premiss in another. But syllogism is in any case only the
immediate and not the ultimate means of forming true
premisses: carry the chain of reasoning far enough back,
and some premiss is certain to be reached which is not the
conclusion of any syllogism that can be made: so that the
validity of all syllogistically reached conclusions depends
entirely on the validity of certain propositions wholly inde-
pendent of syllogism. They must be as general, as knowable,
as true, in fact as possessed of all the essential qualities of
syllogistic premisses, as any subsequent premisses reached by
syllogism can be. Some intellectual activity must be con-
cerned with the production of these, some intellectual ἀρετή

1 I do not of course mean to imply that the reference is to this particular
ὁμοιότης : all loose uses of ἐπιστήμη are excluded by it.

INTRODUCTION 29

lead to truth about them. The name of this ἀρετή it is not,
Aristotle thinks, hard to determine, for νοῦς seems the only
name that is dignified enough to serve, except σοφία, which
must be held to include ἐπιστήμη and so is too general in mean-
ing. Much the same argument, only omitting the point about
σοφία, leads to the selection of the same name for the same
thing, Axalytics 100 Ὁ 5—12, where the reason is not as in
VI vi disguised under the veil of a proof by exhaustion!. The
name then is easily determined: but the nature of the ἀρετή
is harder to fix: it depends, as has been-said, on that of the
évépyeca—what is the ἐνέργεια by which ἄμεσοι προτάσεις are
truly stated? @ewpla κατ᾽ ἐπαγωγήν, or induction: for there’
is no other possible. Now the nature of ἐπαγωγή has been
set forth in the Axalytzcs (99 Ὁ 20 foll.) and reference is
made to the Azalytics for fuller information about it. But in
spite of the great practical use that Aristotle made of the
method of induction, and his theoretical recognition of its
value and of Socrates’ importance? as its introducer, he never
worked it out in detail, and the little he did do for it is very
far from satisfactory. His conception of it has to be gathered
from a number of scattered passages rather than from any
single exposition. The simplest and best account of it comes
in the ZYopics, where it is said to be one sort of διαλεκτικὸς
λόγος, and is opposed to συλλογισμός. This account is
equally applicable to scientific ἐπαγωγή, from which Aristotle
would probably distinguish it as being (1) less exhaustive,
and taking a smaller number of τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα into account,
(2) less founded on facts, because the καθ᾽ ἕκαστα need not
be really true so long as the opponent is ready to concede
their truth. With this view of induction, which is substantially
the modern one, all the references to ἐπαγωγή in Aristotle
agree, with one exception. A certain fact being given as
true in a number of particular instances, the inference is

1 Disguised merely : because the original selection of five names, on the com-
pleteness of which the validity of the proof depends, was made on the ground of
the dignity and goodness which is in common language associated with these
names, and with these alone except for such as have a plainly specialised meaning.

2 Metaphysics 987 Ὁ 1—4.

8 Topics 105 ἃ 13—19 ἐπαγωγὴ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν...ἄριστος.

30 INTRODUCTION

made that it is true in all the other particular instances also,
and this inference.is stated in a general formula applicable to
all instances. The single exception to this view is of course
the extraordinary chapter in the Avalytics, 68 Ὁ 15—37,
where Aristotle tries to express the inductive process in
ἃ syllogistic formula, and produces an argument entirely
different from that of ordinary induction. The words 68 b 28
ἡ yap ἐπαγωγὴ διὰ πάντων (sc. τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον) cuts at the
root of the ordinary inductive theory, the whole point of which
is that induction is not διὰ πάντων τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, because
it is inconvenient or impossible to examine αὐ the καθ᾽
ἕκαστα, but διὰ τινῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον. The assumption that
what is true of particular instances that have been examined
is true of all the other particular instances that have not been
examined is very different from the assumption that all the
particular instances have been examined. Aristotle fails. to
see this, and his συλλογισμὸς ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς is thus merely a
formula for turning a proposition referring to a number of
particulars separately into a proposition referring in general
terms to precisely the same particulars collectively. For-
tunately this curious and unsatisfactory passage can be nearly
neglected in trying to understand what Aristotle really meant’
by ἐπαγωγή : it certainly does not express what he means
as a rule. This is plain from the continual opposition of
ἐπαγωγή to συλλογισμός, as in 1139 Ὁ 27 here, Analytics
42 a 3, 68 Ὁ 30—37, Topics 105 a 16, 157 a 18: to ἀπόδειξις,
as in Analytics 81 a 40, 92 a 35—38, Physics 252 a 24 ἢ
ἐπαγωγὴν ἢ ἀπόδειξιν φέρειν, Metaphysics 992 Ὁ 31—33,
1025 Ὁ 14 (where a certain kind of ἐπαγωγή is said not to
supply ἀπόδειξις) and similarly 1064 a 8: to λόγος, as in
Parts of Animals 646 a 30, ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς being there
opposed to κατὰ τὸν λόγον. But neither these passages nor
any of the many others where ἐπαγωγή is mentioned show
Aristotle to have clearly grasped the essential feature of
induction, that it may be from few particulars or from many
but is essentially not from all, and that it can never lead to
theoretical certainty no matter from how many particulars it
may be, but only to a very high degree of probability.

INTRODUCTION 31

Dialectical inductions he would no doubt admit lead only to
probable results, like dialectical deductions. But ἐπαγωγή as
the process by which νοῦς provides the ἀρχαί for θεωρία κατ᾽
ἐπιστήμην is held to lead to results that are absolutely certain
and not merely certain enough for all practical purposes: for
the essence of σοφία is the complete theoretical exactness
and certainty of all the conclusions to which it leads, and the
ἀρχαί of ἐπιστήμη must be more certain than any of the
propositions deduced by ἐπιστήμη from them. That ‘such
certainty is unattainable Aristotle would have seen if he had
investigated the nature of ἐπαγωγή more fully: as it was he
plainly failed to see this. That ἐπαγωγή is the process by
which the ἀρχαί of ἐπιστήμη are found through the ἀρετή of
νοῦς is stated in two places only, and then not in so many
words but only by means of neighbouring statements incon-
sistent on the surface and only to be reconciled by the
supposition mentioned. The passages are of course well
known: 1139 ἢ 28—31 together with VI vi, and Axalytics
100 b 3—5 and 5—17. The conclusion is unavoidable. The
precise relation of νοῦς to ἐπαγωγή has indeed been the
subject of some misunderstanding: Stewart, while right in
rebutting the charge of inconsistency! strangely brought by
Grant against the above pairs of passages, is hardly right in
‘distinguishing νοῦς, as that which sees what is common in a
number of particulars presented, from ἐπαγωγή, 85 the process
in which the particulars are presented?: for a mere succession
of particular presentations, without any attempt to derive a
universal from them, is not an ἐπαγωγή. >Eaaywyn implies the
statement of the καθόλου conclusion as well as-céthe “καθ᾽
.€eaota premisses {se to call them), just as συλλογισμός
implies the statement of the συμπέρασμα as well as of the
two prernisses. ’Ezraywyn is to νοῦς just what συλλογισμός is
to ἐπιστήμη. Just as it is only when συλλογισμός produces
a true conclusion that the corresponding ἕξις of the intellect
is ἐπιστήμη, 50 it is only when ἐπαγωγή produces a true
conclusion that the corresponding ἕξις of the intellect is

1 ive. material as opposed to formal inconsistency.
2 Stewart ‘ Notes’ ii 51 (on 1141 ἃ 7).

32 INTRODUCTION

νοῦς. Just as ἐπίστασθαι = ὀρθῶς συλλογίζεσθαι, so νοεῖν
(in the sense in which it corresponds to νοῦς here) Ξε ὀρθῶς
ἐπαχθῆναι.

But there is a further difficulty. In neither of the two
passages in VI already referred to that deal with vots as
leading to the knowledge of the ἀρχαὶ ἐπιστήμης, nor in any
other place where this vods is mentioned, is the nature of
these ἀρχαί made at all clear. The immediate ἀρχαί of a
syllogism are undeniably the two premisses, which are pro-
positions: but the three terms (ὅροι) contained in the two
premisses may also be considered ἀρχαί, not only of the
premisses but of the syllogism itself, and at first sight it
seems that these may be the ἀρχαί referred to, and that νοῦς
may lead not to the making of καθόλου propositions but only
to the conception of καθόλου terms. Some such view as this
has been very generally accepted by commentators. It may
seem supported by the wording of 1142 a 25 ὁ μὲν yap νοῦς
τῶν ὅρων and 1143 a 35 ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων...τῶν πρώτων
ὅρων...ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ
πρώτων: for the normal meaning of ὅρος is not ‘definition’
or any kind of ‘ proposition’ but simply ‘term.’ Further in
Analytics 100 a 15—b 3 the example given of the operation of
νοῦς by induction is the formation from such conceptions as
Καλλίας of such conceptions as ἄνθρωπος, and from these
again of such conceptions as €@ov: which seems to exclude:
the view that νοῦς forms propositions. The words καθόλου
and καθ᾽ ἕκαστον are of course applicable equally to proposi-
tions and to terms. The opening of VI vi certainly implies
that νοῦς isnot werd λόγου, which Prof. Burnet takes to mean
that νοῦς apprehends: its object directly and not by any. sort.
of reasoning. He refers to Meraphysics Iosi Ὁ 24. ‘This
passage reads thus: ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς θιγεῖν καὶ φόναι (οὐ
γὰρ ταὐτὸ κατάφασις καὶ φάσις) τὸ δ᾽ ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν.
ἀπατηθῆναι γὰρ περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ
συμβεβηκός. There is also the passage, which Prof. Burnet
does not quote, Psychology 430 Ὁ 26 ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν φάσις τι
κατά τινος, ὥσπερ ἡ κατάφασις, καὶ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς πᾶσα"
ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πᾶς, GAN ὁ τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἀληθής,

INTRODUCTION 33

καὶ ov τὶ κατά τινος : which refers to the same facts, though
with a broader use of the word φάσις. The view thus sup-
ported is nevertheless incorrect. It is true that induction of
general conception from particular conceptions is not only
possible but inevitable, and that the condition of soul in
which such induction is well done may be considered an
intellectual ἀρετή. It is true that the example of induction
given at the close of the Azalytics (100 a 15 above referred
to) may be and probably is an example of this kind of induc-
tion. And it may be true that this kind of induction is
thought of as at least included in the induction referred to in
νι. But the following facts show that the inductive function
of vods spoken of in VI is to make propositions and not
merely to apprehend terms.

(1) The formation of the propositions that serve as the
premisses of the syllogisms of ἐπιστήμη is otherwise not taken
into account—surely a serious omission.

(2) νοῦς is described along with the other four ἀρεταί at
1139 Ὁ 17 as ᾧ ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι,
and though φάναι need not imply making ἃ proposition,
καταφάναι and ἀποφάναι always must.

(3) In Analytics 72 a 7—24 the ἀρχαὶ ἀποδείξεως are
described as being propositions ; they are ἀποφάνσεις, ἄμεσοι
προτάσεις, whether θέσεις or ἀξιώματα, ὑποθέσεις or ὁρισμοί.

(4) ὅρος is often used to mean ὁρισμός and even πρότασις.
See Bonitz sub vocem. But even if ὅροι, in the passages
quoted above, means ‘terms,’ the meaning may easily be that
νοῦς leads to propositions containing these ὅρου.

(5) The passage quoted Analytics 100 a 15—b 3 does not
exclude other kinds of induction than the one of which an
example is there given. And that example may be of the
formation not of ὅροι or terms but of ὁρισμοί or definitions,
which are of course propositions.

(6) Prof. Burnet’s example of an immediately-appre-
hended ἀρχή is the principle of contradiction. This is an
ἀξίωμα, and an ἀξίωμα is one kind of proposition. But plainly
a false ἀξίωμα can be made: the cognition of a proposition,

G. 3

34 INTRODUCTION

whether an axiomatic proposition or not, is not θιγεῖν (see
Burnet’s note, p. 266, ad locum). The passage from the
Metaphysics: distinctly refers to ἀσύνθετα (= ἀδιαίρετα,
detached concepts): but an ἀξίωμα, like any other pro-
position, is σύνθετον. So too the parallel passage quoted,
Psychology 430 Ὁ 26, refers to ἀσύνθετα only.

(7) Practical νοῦς, which is said (1143 Ὁ 3) to be τῆς
ἑτέρας προτάσεως, and so is plainly considered to lead to
propositions of some kind, is there co-ordinated with the νοῦς
of σοφία in such a fashion that the latter is evidently con-
sidered there as also leading to propositions.

It is.then the work of νοῦς to form, from καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
propositions, καθόλου propositions by the method of induction.

So much then for ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς considered separately
in themselves. And now let the combination of the two,
called σοφία by Aristotle, be considered, so far at least as
this can profitably be done before dealing with φρόνησις,
contrast with which best makes the nature of σοφία clear.

The definition arrived at in 1141 a 19 and Ὁ 2 is νοῦς καὶ
ἐπιστήμη ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων
τῇ φύσει. In the argument leading to this it is important to
‘distinguish two different points. (1) The name σοφία in its
particular or qualified uses is given to various forms of intel-
lectual ἀρετή on the ground of ἀκρίβεια : the more ἀκριβής a
person is at any particular thing, the more σοφός he is as
regards that thing. Therefore the name σοφία without quali-
fication will most appropriately be given to the intellectual
ἀρετή that possesses most ἀκρίβεια, no matter what that
ἀρετή may be, nor what may exactly be meant by ἀκρίβεια.
(2) Because ἀκρίβεια has a certain meaning, it is argued that
the ἀκριβεστάτη of intellectual ἀρεταί must be a compound of
νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη, no matter whether this compound be
called σοφία or by some other name. The force of this
argument turns on two facts, the meaning of ἀκρίβεια, which
is not explicitly declared, and the nature of νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη,
which has already been set forth. The word ἀκρίβεια must

1 1051 Ὁ 24.

INTRODUCTION 35

then be examined. From its general use, and. from the
analogy of the sculptor in this passage, it may be said, I
think, to include the three notions of accuracy, completeness,
and stability. It is the second of these notions that seems to
be to the front in the connecting argument δεῖ dpa τὸν σοφὸν
μὴ μόνον Ta ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς
ἀληθεύειν. But the first also applies, for unless the premisses
of ἐπιστήμη are accurate the conclusions are inaccurate, and
ἐπιστήμη without νοῦς cannot secure the accuracy of its
premisses: and the third applies, for it is only accurate and
complete knowledge that is ἀμετάπειστος. From this argu-
ment the conclusion follows that the ἀκριβεστάτη of intellectual
apetrai must be the compound of νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη: but it
has already been shown that the ἀκριβεστάτη of intellectual
ἀρεταί is copia: therefore copia is the compound of νοῦς and
ἐπιστήμη. It must be carefully observed that τῶν τιμιωτάτων
is a fresh point, and not part of the conclusion, in spite of the
casual way in which it is appended to the formula which
really zs the conclusion of the previous argument. That σοφία
is τῶν τιμιωτάτων has to be proved, and is in fact proved in
the following passages 1141 a 20—22, a 33—b 2: and it is
this point on which stress is laid in the repeated definition of
σοφία 1141 Ὁ 2—3.

Σοφία then is ἃ ἕξις τῆς ψυχῆς, compounded of two ἕξεις :
for ἐπιστήμη has been said to be ἃ ἕξις, and νοῦς can clearly
be inferred to be one.

For νοῦς is in VI vi treated as on a level with ἐπιστήμη and
φρόνησις, both of which are expressly called ἕξεις. Also
compare 1139 b 12—13 καθ᾽ ds οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει
ἑκάτερον (sc. μόριον) αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν, with what follows,
15 ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει, κτλ, where οἷς τε καθ᾿ ἃς ἕξεις by
implication. The vagueness οἱ οἷς here is parallel to the
vagueness of οἷς in VI vi εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν, κτλ, which is
to be similarly explained. Also in 1143 a 26 νοῦς is a ἕξις.
and though it is νοῦς πρακτικὸς that is there most thought of,
νοῦς θεωρητικὸς is mentioned and regarded as parallel with
νοῦς πρακτικός (only in another sphere) and therefore equally

with νοῦς πρακτικός a ἕξις.
3—2

36 INTRODUCTION

Like the ἕξεις of which it is composed, the nature of the
ἕξις σοφία can best be described by reference to its ἐνέργεια.
The method of this ἐνέργεια is already plain from what is
known of the methods of the ἐνέργειαι of νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη.
The quality of ὠκρίβεια (which may be said to attach to the
ἐνέργεια of σοφία as well as to the ἕξις) is peculiar to the
compound as distinguished from the ingredients, illustrating
the general principle that the qualities of a whole are not
necessarily the sum of the qualities of its parts.

So much we already know of σοφία; and this is all true
to some extent of every kind of σοφία, even of the inferior
kinds less properly called σοφία. But what is the subject-
matter of copia? what can be said of this subject-matter
besides that it is τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως eve? (1) It must
be τὰ τιμιώτατα τῇ φύσει, for other intellectual ἀρεταί are
concerned with man and his interests only, and man and his’
interests are not the noblest things in the world that are
objects of thought. (2) Using the results of the Physics
and Metaphysics we may divide the subject-matter of σοφία
into three main parts:

(2) χωριστὰ ἀκίνητα, the subject-matter of πρώτη φιλο-
σοφία or θεολογική ;

(ὁ) ἀχώριστα ἀκίνητα, the subject-matter of μαθηματική ;

(¢) ἀχώριστα κινητά, the subject-matter of φυσική".

This division is not formally made in VI, not because it is
less important than the division of φρόνησις according to
subject-matter in VI viii, but because it has been made
elsewhere, whereas that of φρόνησις can only be made appro-
priately in the Ethics: the reason is thus the same as the
reason for not discussing ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς more fully in VI.
But 1142 a 17 μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ᾽ ἂν σοφὸς δ᾽ ἢ
φυσικὸς ov plainly assumes the division in question to be
familiar and understood.

? See in particular Metaphysics 1026 a 1 3—23, where θεολογική is said to be,

e compared with μαθηματική and φυσική, itself τιμιωτάτη and περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον
γένος.

INTRODUCTION 37

(It may be noted here that the division of σοφία into νοῦς
and ἐπιστήμη corresponds to that of φρόνησις into φρόνησις
proper, εὐβουλία, σύνεσις, γνώμη, νοῦς πρακτικός, etc.: while
the division of σοφία into θεολογική, μαθηματική, φυσική,
corresponds to that of φρόνησις into πολιτική with its sub-
divisions, οἰκονομική, φρόνησις περὶ ἕνα καὶ αὐτόν.) Further
consideration of the nature of σοφία must be deferred till
φρόνησις has also been examined in detail.

C. ΦΡΟΝΗΣῚΙΣ OR PRACTICAL WISDOM.

a. In general.

The word φρόνησις is used in VI in four senses. Common
to all is the meaning ‘dper of the intellect leading to the
knowledge of truth as far as concerns human action.’ The
four senses are as follows: (a) In the narrowest of the four
φρόνησις is merely said to lead to the knowledge by each
man of what is good for himself as distinguished from other
people (ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα φρόνησις). (4) φρόνησις as
distinguished from εὐβουλία is the ἀρετή that leads to the
comprehending and retaining of practical truth as distin-
guished from the searching for it and finding it—this will be
shown later in my examination of εὐβουλία. (c) φρόνησις as
distinguished from τέχνη is the ἀρετή that leads to truth
about πρακτά as distinguished from ποιητά. (dz) In the
broadest of the four senses φρόνησις is the ἀρετή that leads
to truth about all human action whether πρᾶξις or ποίησις.
It is in this last and broadest sense that φρόνησις is opposed
to copia (1143 Ὁ 14), as the ἀρετή of the whole of the
λογιστικὸν μέρος, and as concerned with all ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως
éyew that are the proper objects of any intellectual activity
at all. It is in this broadest sense that it will here to begin
with be examined.

This broadest sense is that which is intended (a) in
chapter vii where σοφία is opposed to φρόνησις, 1141 a 20—
b 22; (8) in chapter viii, 1142 a 11—30; (γ) all through
chapters xii and_ xiii, where all the finer distinctions of

38 INTRODUCTION

intellectual ἀρεταί are completely ignored. It is in this sense
also that φρόνησις corresponds to the διάνοια ἡ ἕνεκά Tov καὶ
πρακτική of chapter ii, whose virtue φρόνησις is, and which is
there distinctly stated to deal with ποίησις as well as πρᾶξις
(1139 b 1 αὕτη yap καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει" ἕνεκα γάρ Tov
ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, κτλ). This broadest sense is, then, the
prevailing sense of.the book: but the others are not counted
less correct in their places, not even the narrowest one founded
on a mistaken judgment of fact. It may moreover be allowed
from the outset that in discussing this subject the author often
finds no occasion to distinguish this broadest sense from the
next broadest in which τέχνη is excluded, and that most of
his remarks apply equally well to φρόνησις in this rather
narrower sense.

To begin with, certain facts concerning the general ar-
rangement of this book may be noticed as having a special
interest in their application to the handling of φρόνησις. The
method of discussion in the latter part. of chapter i and in
chapter ii suggests, in the light of what follows, that from the
outset φρόνησις and codia—as they are afterwards called—are
thought of as the two main divisions of intellectual ἀρετή.
The whole book appears to have been carefully planned: the
author keeps carefully before him his intention to make
these two divisions and to’give them these names. But on
a first reading not only is there no plain indication of the
general use-of these names until we reach 1143 b 14, but
there is not even anything to show that intellectual ἀρετή is
going to fall into the two groups which these names denote.
The division made in the latter part of chapter i is formally
‘quite independent of the division made in chapter ii, except
for a very rough connection given in the few words 1139 b 12
ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον----καθ᾽ ἃς
οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν, a
connection that is in any case not justified by the argument
of chapter ii. Chapter iii makes an entirely fresh beginning
(a fact indicated by the opening sentence 1139 b 14 ᾿Αρξάμενοι
οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν), neglecting the results

1 1142 8 9, cOmpare 1141 Ὁ 30—316

INTRODUCTION 39

of the first two chapters as a source of information, though
using some of the formulae of those chapters. Only after
discussing the various intellectual ἀρεταί in detail, minor as
well as major, does Aristotle make a synthesis of them into
two main groups: then and then only can the application of
the latter part of chapter i and of chapter ii be seen, and not
till chapter xiii is the earlier part of chapter i shown to be
connected with the rest of the book. As for φρόνησις itself, the
ὀρθὸς λόγος of the early part of chapter i is φρόνησις, the ἀρετὴ
τοῦ λογιστικοῦ μέρους οἵ the later part of chapter i is φρόνησις,
the ἀρετή of the πρακτικὴ διάνοια (giving rise to λόγος ἀληθὴς
in harmony with ὄρεξις ὀρθή) of chapter ii is φρόνησις : but it
is not seen till much later that either of these three things is
φρόνησις, nor that the three are thus identical with each other.
Φρόνησις is introduced in chapter v quite independently of all
the results of chapters i and ii: the thing is defined, and the
name justified as applied to the thing: then varieties of
φρόνησις are distinguished as regards both subject-matter and
method of activity: then these varieties are all shown to be
connected, and the name φρόνησις for the first time plainly
conferred on all alike and on the synthesised whole: it is
shown that this φρόνησις is the ἀρετὴ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ! : finally
it is shown that φρόνησις is that λόγος ἀληθής which, according
to chapter ii, harmonises with ὀρθὴ ὄρεξις, and the ὀρθὸς λόγος
which, according to the earlier part of chapter i, determines
the moral mean.

Now though the connection of the latter part of chapter t
with chapter ii is not shown at the time, it is possible, and
will be useful, to point out at once what that connection is.
These two sections of the discussion make two divisions of
the intellectual part of the soul, the first metaphysical, the
second psychological: or rather ‘both are psychological, but
the first alone has a metaphysical basis. Chapter i divides
things; by a metaphysical axiom, into necessary and con-
tingent—the exact meaning of this division I have discussed

1 Cf. 1143 Ὁ 16 ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίον ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα (sc. ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ
φρόνησι5) with the division of the διανοητικὸν μέρος into ἐπιστημονικόν and λογιστικόν
at 11398 II. 7

40 INTRODUCTION

elsewhere?; and then, on the psychological principle that like
is known by like—the meaning of this also I have explained
in another place—infers a corresponding distinction in the
part of the soul that knows these things and in the ἀρετή of
the soul that leads to such knowledge: to the parts of the
soul are dogmatically assigned the names ἐπιστημονικόν and
λογιστικόν respectively. Chapter ii takes a different line.
Whatever the greatest good for man may be, knowledge of
truth and goodness of action are, it asserts, specifically human
ends. Consider the parts or processes of the soul by which
these ends are attained. It is reasoning (νοῦς or διάνοια) that
leads to truth. Now it is plain from observation that some
reasoning has nothing to do with action, so that its goodness
or badness is independent of the goodness or badness of any
action, while other reasoning has everything to do with action,
so that its goodness or badness is inseparably bound up with
the goodness or badness of the action with which it has to do.
Action, we learn, is caused by προαίρεσις or purpose, which
is, as the Athics has already shown, a combination of
reasoning with ὄρεξις or desire. Therefore the goodness or
badness of action must depend on the goodness or badness of
both reasoning and desire. The reasoning that has to do
with action is, like other reasoning, only a means to an end.
But whereas other reasoning attains its end, which is truth, if
it is good in itself, reasoning that has to do with action does
not necessarily attain its end by being good in itself, but only
by also harmonising with good desire: indeed it cannot in
practice ever be called good in itself, because it is in practice
inseparable from desire, and the goodness of its relation to
that desire is, as it were, an essential part of its own goodness,
Now the nature of this relation it is, Aristotle perceives,
important to define. From the purely psychological (as
distinguished from the ethical) point of view, it must be
noted that the reason and the desire must concern the same
things, or there is no purpose at all: and in corresponding
ways, or there is no purpose either—xatddaovs (attraction of
the reason, affirmation) must coincide with δίωξις (attraction

1 See also Prof. Stewart's ‘Notes’ ii 9 (on 1138 a 6).

INTRODUCTION 41

of the desire, appetition) about the same thing, or else
ἀπόφασις (repulsion of the reason, negation) must coincide
with φυγή (repulsion of the desire, avoidance) about the same
thing’ From the ethical point of view it must be added,
that if there is to be not merely purpose but good purpose,
true κατάφασις must coincide with right δίωξις, or true
ἀπόφασις with right φυγή: to put it generally, true λόγος
(reasoning) must coincide with right ὄρεξις (desire). These
two requisites—one for all προαίρεσις, the other for good
προαίρεσις, Must not be confused: Aristotle distinguishes
them, though not with formal clearness: the first is indi-
cated by the words 1139 a 25—-26 καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι
τὴν δὲ διώκειν, the second in 1139 ἃ 24 τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ
εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν. The latter is elaborated at the
end of the book in the discussion about the relation of
φρόνησις (the ἀρετή that produces true λόγος) to ἠθικὴ ἀρετή
(the ἀρετή that produces right ὄρεξις).

In considering the nature of action certain distinctions
at once present themselves quite independently of any exami-
nation either of the way in which προαίρεσις causes action or
of the relation of the elements of προαίρεσις to each other.
(1) Actions differ in what may be called their sphere, as περὶ
πόλιν, περὶ οἰκίαν, περὶ αὑτὸν καὶ éva. This classification
will be considered later: here it need only be noted that the
intellectual ἀρετή that helps to cause good actions must be
correspondingly divisible. (2) Actions also differ in their
own nature as being either doing (πρᾶξις) or else making
(ποίησις). This latter division, and Aristotle’s treatment of
it, I proceed to consider at once: noting that the two divisions
just spoken of are cross-divisions, and that the corresponding
divisions of intellectual ἀρετή are also cross-divisions accord-
ingly.

While πρᾶξις or doing is really different from ποίησις or
making, there is (Aristotle holds) a certain relation between
them—zroinous is essentially a means to πρᾶξις. Good πρᾶξις
is more directly a means to Happiness, the supreme end, than

1 It may be gathered that Aristotle holds προαίρεσις to be properly positive, and
the combination of ἀπόφασις and φυγή not really to constitute προαίρεσις.

42 INTRODUCTION

good -rroinats is: good ποίησις is only a means to Happiness
because it is a means to good πρᾶξις. It is useless to be able
to make things well unless one knows how to use them when
they are made. (Aristotle does not recognise the existence
of anything that is made as a good thing in itself, no matter
how beautiful it may be: and he appears in his treatment of
τέχνη to be severely utilitarian, if he is to be understood as
meaning that nothing made by man is even good for the
effect it produces on the mind unless that effect is the means
to good subsequent action. This can hardly be his view: he
must be thinking here of the productions of craftsmen rather
than of artists, of the great majority of things made that are
useful rather than of the minority that are delightful or noble
or meant for pure contemplation.) The intellectual ἀρετή
that leads to good ποίησις is therefore subordinate to that
which leads to good πρᾶξις. Just as λόγος in προαίρεσις is
not really good unless it is both good in itself and also in
harmony with right ὄρεξις, so ποίησις is not really good unless
it is both good in itself and also leads to right πρᾶξις. (It
follows that, indirectly but really, good ὄρεξις is necessary for
good ποίησις) At the same time there is this genuine
distinction between ποίησις and πρᾶξις, that neither is a
species of the other—zroinois is not πρᾶξίς tes. In ποίησις
the activity and the result are different, in πρᾶξις they are
the same: πρᾶξις and πρακτόν are identical, ποίησις and
ποίητόν are different. Hence the ἀρετή that leads to good
ποίησις is correspondingly distinct from the ἀρετή that leads
to good πρᾶξις. It is convenient to say first what more there
is to be said_about the ποιητικὴ ἀρετή.

Its name τέχνη is given to it by Aristotle simply in
accordance with ordinary usage. Of its nature little more
need be said here, nor does Aristotle himself say much: not
that there was not much to say on the subject, but that the
main purpose of the discussion, which he keeps steadily in
view, would not be greatly helped by his saying it. Things are,
he maintains, always made as the result of reasoning—the
practical syllogism may be ποιητικός (examples of this are to
be found in the treatise on the Motions of Animals 701 a 16

INTRODUCTION 43

ποιητέον μοι ἀγαθόν, οἰκία δ᾽ ἀγαθόν, ποιεῖ οἰκίαν εὐθύς, 18 οὗ
δέομαι ποιητέον, ἱματίου δέομαι, ἱμάτιον ποιητέον)---ἀπὰ things
are well made as the result of good reasoning : the ἀρετή is
therefore of the reasoning part, intellectual, μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς.
All ποίησις must have to do with ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, and
implies the coming into existence of a thing by external
agency and not by its own. Therefore τὰ κατὰ φύσιν are not
ποιητά, for they grow of themselves: they are indeed not
Strictly ἐνδεχόμενα, for they are ws ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, invariable
except for the interference of chance, τὸ αὐτόματον. ἸΠοίησις
is in a way connected with chance, τύχη: the accidental
results of human actions are caused by τύχη: and τύχη
affects the results of ποίησις even more than it affects the
results of πρᾶξις. But whereas in φύσις the only variable
element is that of chance, ποίησις (like πρᾶξις) is itself
variable, as well as subject to the interference of chance the
external variant. Aristotle takes no account of the things
that are the results of the joint operation of φύσις and τέχνη,
such as a crop of corn for example: no doubt because such
points, though interesting in themselves, can throw no light
on the main inquiry. ‘

Φρόνησις proper, as distinguished from τέχνη, is the intel-
lectual ἀρετή that leads to good πρᾶξις, as distinguished from
good ποίησις. The following reasoning will convey a fuller
general notion of what this ἀρετή is, and will also justify the
giving of the name φρόνησις to it:—Good πρᾶξις, it has been
shown, is caused by intellectual ἀρετή in agreement with moral
ἀρετή: for good λόγος and good ὄρεξις about the same thing
combine to form a good προαίρεσις which gives rise to a good
πρᾶξις. Reasoning that leads to πρᾶξις is βούλευσις περὶ τὰ
ἀγαθά, or deliberating about and deciding what ought to be
done: the good reasoning that leads to good πρᾶξις is good
βούλευσις : the ἀρετή that leads to such good reasoning is the
ἀρετή whose activity is εὖ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τὰ ἀγαθά. From
this it follows, popular usage being our guide, that φρόνησις
is the proper name for this ἀρετή. For according to popular
usage the φρόνιμος about a particular end is the man who εὖ
βουλεύεται about the good thing to do as means to that

44 INTRODUCTION

particular end, and so the φρόνιμος in general is the man who
εὖ βουλεύεται about the good thing to do as means to the
general end. So φρόνησις may be defined as the intellectual
ἀρετή that leads to knowledge of the good things to do as
means to the great end for man, which is ed ξῆν or εὐπραξία
or εὐδαιμονία.

It is plain that to know what the means to any end are
it is necessary to know what the end itself is: and so the
φρόνιμος must know what Happiness is before he can know
what the means to Happiness are. It does not indeed follow
that φρόνησις is the ἀρετή that leads among other things to
the correct statement of the proposition that Happiness is
so-and-so: but such a correct statement must by some means
or other be made if φρόνησις is to do its work. When
Aristotle says 1141 Ὁ 14 οὐδ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τοῦ καθόλου
μόνον ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν, he implies that
τὸ καθόλου γνωρίζειν is essential, though not the only thing
essential, to φρόνησις. How the statement of the καθόλου is
made, and in what sense φρόνησις can be said to make or
help make it, must be discussed later.

But it may be asked now, What is this proposition? It
is of course the great conclusion of the tenth book and of the
treatise, which may be thus expressed—% εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὸ
τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστόν ἐστε θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια THs ψυχῆς κατὰ
σοφίαν, ie. κατὰ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει.
Upon this general proposition all the reasoning of the truly
φρόνιμος must ultimately be founded, though it does not
follow that in practice he will always take this most general
form of it directly into account. This general proposition is
the καθόλου that according to 1141 b 14 it is necessary for
the φρόνιμος to know, and the fact that modified forms of it
may in practice rightly and usefully be substituted for it does
not prevent its being the ultimate basis of all.

But actions are always particular. Unless therefore a
man can apply his general principle to each particular action,
as occasion for action arises, his knowledge of that general
principle will be useless. This Aristotle distinctly recognises,

1 See 1095 a 19 for the synonymous nature of these expressions.

INTRODUCTION 45

and he plainly draws the conclusion that a knowledge of the
nature of particular actions is essential to the φρόνιμος : and
further, that it is better to know how to do particular good
things and be ignorant of all general principles of good action
than to know these general principles but be unable to apply
them so. as to act well in any particular instance, though to
know both is obviously much the best! The relation of the
knowledge of the particular to the knowledge of the universal
is not, however, a simple one, since all actions do not bear
equally directly on the final end, and indeed no particular
action appears to bear quite directly on the final end at all.
A particular act must be a means to the final end because it
is a means to some particular end which is a means to the
final end: thus a particular piece of exercise is a means to
Happiness because it is a means to health and health is a
means to Happiness. Now the physician (who possesses
φρόνησις κατὰ μέρος, the kind called ἰατρική) regards a piece
of exercise as a means to health and to health merely, but
the φρόνιμος ὅλως regards it as a means to Happiness : yet,
it would appear, only as an indirect means to Happiness, for
he cannot neglect to consider the particular end, health;
though he does not consider health z¢#e end, as the physician
gua physician does, but only as az end in relation to particular
pieces of exercise ; and in relation to “ke end, Happiness, not
as an end at all, but simply as a means. It may be objected
that certain acts bear on no particular end but only on the
final end directly, such as δίκαια καὶ καλά and the activities
according to the moral ἀρεταί generally, with which in par-
ticular φρόνησις is said to be concerned: 1143 b21 ἡ φρόνησίς
ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ, 1144 a 11
πρακτικωτέρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων.
This is true, if moral activity be the final end, as for some
persons perhaps it must be: but it is not the ideal final end—
that is θεωρία κατὰ σοφίαν, to which moral ἀρετή is only a
means, co-ordinate, as regards the final end, with health and
the like. But in any case it is plain the φρόνιμος ὅλως is not
concerned with moral actions only. Πολιυτική, which is

1 rrgrb 21.

46 INTRODUCTION

φρόνησις or the highest part of φρόνησις (see 1140 Ὁ 7—10), is
said in the first book to estimate the goodness of all other
ἀρεταί and the desirableness or objectionableness of the
corresponding activities: 1094 a 28 τίνας yap εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἑκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ
μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη (sc. ἡ πολιτική) διατάσσει" ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς
ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν
οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικήν. The same fact is indicated in ΥἹ by the
addition at 1143 Ὁ 22 of ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ to δίκαια καὶ καλά:
ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ is nearly equivalent to συμφέροντα ἀνθρώπῳ,
and these are not for anyone moral activities only, So that
altogether it is plain that φρόνησις ὅλως is not of a different
class of actions from those with which the φρόνησεις κατὰ
μέρος are concerned, but is of all particular actions, all of
which are considered as related to the final end, ultimately,
though it may be very indirectly and through a long series of
intermediate ends. It does not follow that we need to know
all the intermediate steps: as regards health, for instance, we
do not need to know all the steps to health ourselves—the
physician indeed must know them, but for his patient it is
enough to be told the particular things to do, and to trust his
doctor for their being means to the end, health: 1143 b 32
βουλόμενοι yap ὑγιαίνειν οὐ μανθάνομεν ἰατρικήν. There are
however reasons why as regards moral virtue everyone should
know all the steps: we cannot be morally good without
knowledge in the way we can be healthy without knowledge,
and cannot place ourselves, to save trouble, in the hands of a
moral physician. This question however will be discussed
and explained later.

All the above is either plainly expressed in the text of
VI, or can be directly and easily inferred from it. But in
considering the doctrine of the final end and of the-means
thereto, a new question arises, the importance of which does
not seem to have been grasped by Aristotle himself; and so
it is not easy to tell how he answers or would have answered
it, A thing may be a means to an end in either of two

1 See also 1140.a 26 φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βονλεύεσθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ
ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα.

INTRODUCTION 47

senses, 85 component part of it, or as wholly external to it.
To take a trivial example, fire and basin and cloth are means
to a pudding ‘in the latter sense, suet and flour and currants
in the former. Or again, Happiness being considered as the
end, the contemplation of beautiful pictures may be considered
rightly or wrongly as a means to this end in the component
sense, the going to picture galleries as a means to it in the
external sense: the journey may be painful, or unhealthy, or
otherwise bad in itself, or at least not good in itself, and yet
it may be good as a means to an end that is entirely different
from and external to itself. The only place in VI, or perhaps
indeed anywhere, where Aristotle appears to feel this dis-
tinction is 1144 a 3—6 ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἡ
ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν"
μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ
ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα (if this reading is right). The usual expla-
nation of this passage, that after ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια we ought to
understand the words ὑγέειαν ποιεῖ, and suppose the ἕξις of
ὑγίεια to be opposed to the ἐνέργεια of ὑγίεια, lays too much
stress upon, and implies a difficult and unlikely antithesis
between, τῷ ἔχεσθαι and τῷ ἐνεργεῖν : it also destroys the
point of μέρος yap οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς. Two other expla-
nations may be given. (1) Understanding ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ
after ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια as above, we may take the meaning
to be that the health of any part of the body is a means to
the health of the whole body (μέρος οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ὑγιείας).
(2) Or, as I think better, understand after ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια
the words εὐδαιμονίαν ποιεῖ, when the argument becomes
perfectly simple. ἰατρική, the meaning will then be, is an
external means to ὑγίεια, but ὑγίεια a component means to
εὐδαιμονία, and σοφία and φρόνησις are component means to
it in the same way. The next sentence goes on to show that
φρόνησις is also an external means: and 1144 a 9—II τοῦ δὲ
τετάρτου μορίου, «Td, which might be supposed to tell against
the above interpretation of a 3—6, merely asserts that ὑγίεια
{the ἀρετή of τὸ θρεπτικόν) is not an external means to
Happiness: for to be an external means implies πρᾶξις, and
τὸ θρεπτικόν is involuntary, and so without πρᾶξις, in all its

48 INTRODUCTION

functions. Here then is a recognition of the distinction
between component and external means: it is not recognised
as a general principle, but as embodied in certain particular
instances, which was as far perhaps as Aristotle ever succeeded
in thinking it out. Now as regards the question, In which
sense is φρόνησις held by Aristotle to give knowledge of the
means to Happiness? different opinions have been held and
expressed by previous commentators. Stewart thinks the
means are regarded as component}, and looks on φρόνησις as
the virtue by which a man perceives the harmony and adjust-
ment of the various elements in the good character, moral
and intellectual, as a whole. But the usual view is the other,
that the means are external and independent : the particular
act is always, it is thought, considered by Aristotle as a means
of the external kind to an end wholly distinct from it. I
have attempted to indicate my own view, that the two notions
of means are really combined in the sixth book's definition
of φρόνησις, or—as it would be truer to say—that they were
never properly distinguished from each other, but were both
confusedly taken into account, artificially unified by their
possession οὐ a common name.

This question is closely connected with another, one of
the most fundamental in the whole book, the relation to each
other of moral ἀρετή and φρόνησις. Its treatment is much
confused by the way in which it is introduced in chapter xii.
That chapter opens by asking of what use σοφία and φρόνησις
are, how they are means, that is to say, to εὐδαιμονία the end.
Two answers are given that apply alike to σοφία and φρόνησις
(1144 a I—3 and 3—6). A third follows, which applies to
φρόνησις only: φρόνησις is said to be a means to εὐδαιμονία
because of its necessary connection with moral ἀρετή, on the
joint operation of which with φρόνησις the proper performance
of man’s ἔργον depends. This connection, it is said, requires
very careful examination®: and indeed it is intricate, and it

1 See for instance his note on 1144 Ὁ 16 ‘This clear consciousness of the moral
order is the fully formed ἕξις of φρόνησις᾽ : also the last section of his note on
1144 a 6 (ii 100), and the middle paragraph on p. (ii) 76, note on 1142 a 28.

2 1144 a 22 λεκτέον δ᾽ ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον.

INTRODUCTION 49

later appears! that false views have previously been taken of
it. The attack and defence metaphor that is used at the
opening of the question—certain enemies of φρόνησις de-
nouncing it as worthless, the author on the other hand
undertaking to defend it as of great value—tends to obscure
the fact that what.is here sought is still precise definition, of
φρόνησις and of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή and of their relations to each
other. And there is the peculiar difficulty, not due to any
defect of treatment, that we are required to define the relation
of two things neither of which can be perfectly defined itself
until the relation between the two has been to some extent
determined.

It has been said that good προαίρεσις or purpose is
two-fold, and this in two senses. It is the combination of
ὀρθὸς λόγος with ὀρθὴ ὄρεξις, and it implies the comprehension
of the end to be attained and also of the means whereby to
attain it. Now some people, such as Socrates, have said that
good λόγος or reasoning is all that is wanted for good
προαίρεσις and πρᾶξις, 530 that all moral goodness is φρόνησις:
while others say that good ὄρεξις is all that is wanted for
good προαίρεσις, so that φρόνησις is not wanted at all.
The former say that everyone is agreed on what the τέλος is,
and that the whole point is what τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος are, and
that people disagree on this, the wise with the foolish. The
latter say that everyone naturally sees what τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος
are, and that the whole point is what the τέλος is, and that
people disagree on this point, the virtuous with the vicious.
Both views, Aristotle holds, in their aim at simplifying the
notion of προαίρεσις are wrong: the true view is that mpoai-
ρέσις is essentially two-fold, is the result of the activity of the
ἄχογον (ὀρεκτικόν) and of the λόγον ἔχον (λογιστικόν) together,
and that it may be wrong as the result of wrongness in either
λόγος or ὄρεξις. It was one of Aristotle’s great services to
science and philosophy that he did much to destroy the
previously accepted assumption of the simplicity of psycho-
logical phenomena.

1 1144 Ὁ 1¥—30.

50 INTRODUCTION

The reasoning that leads to προαίρεσις is syllogistic. The
major premiss in a syllogism of this kind is a statement that
such-and-such things ought to be done. It may, it is true,
be expressed in the form that so-and-so is the end and ought
to be attained. But such a proposition is not fit to be the
major premiss of a syllogism whose conclusion is a proposition
that a particular action A ought to be done: for it makes
the whole syllogism take the following form—

X is the end,
but A is the means to X,
therefore A ought to be done:

which though true is not clear or cogent reasoning, for there
is doubt about the precise significance of the major premiss.
In fact the above single syllogism is really a combination of
two syllogisms—
I. X is the end,
A is the means to X,
therefore A is the means to the end.

2. The means to the end ought to be done,
A is the means to the end (proved),
therefore A ought to be done.

But as a matter of fact the proposition ‘XY is the end’ is

equivalent’ to the proposition ‘the means to X ought to be

done’: they are the same thing stated from different points

of view. The general formula for the practical syllogism may

therefore be stated both accurately and clearly as follows—
The means to the end X ought to be done,

but A is the means? to the end YX,
therefore A ought to be done.

The formation of any conclusion such as the above at once
causes the particular ὄρεξις of doing the action A, which
ὄρεξις, combining into a single though complex state of mind
with the aforesaid reasoning, constitutes the προαίρεσις of
doing the action A: whereupon the πρᾶξις or doing of the

" For practical purposes : I do not, of course, mean that the two propositions
signify the same thing.

® This does not, of course, imply that 4 is the only means to the end α΄,

INTRODUCTION SI

action 4 naturally follows in due course. Now this particular
ὄρεξις of doing the action A cannot arise unless the general
ὄρεξις, of doing the class of actions of which 4 is one, is
already present. The major premiss of the syllogism is the
statement of this general ὄρεξις : if the ὄρεξις is right, the
major premiss is true. Right ὄρεξις is the good activity of
the ἄλογον, whose good ἕξις is ἠθικὴ ἀρετή. It is then ἠθικὴ
ἀρετή that makes the major premiss of the practical ey oar
true. This is plainly the doctrine of 1144 a 31-30 οἱ γὰρ
'συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν..-περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς: and
it is also the doctrine of the pessage on cenoosury and
φρόνησις, 1140 Ὁ 11—20 ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν al «ἡ κακία
φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς. ᾿
| Φρόνησις is, however, concerned with the formation of the
major premiss, in conjunction with moral ἀρετή. Just as
theoretic νοῦς by ἐπαγωγή forms universals from particulars
to serve as the premisses for theoretic deduction, so practical
νοῦς by ἐπαγωγή forms universals from particulars to serve as
the premisses for practical deduction: 1143 Ὁ 4 ἀρχαὶ yap
tov οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται. ἐκ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου"
τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ νοῦς. The intel-
lectual ἐπαγωγή goes along with moral ἐθισμός : the repeatedly
doing or wishing to do a thing gets one into the habit of
doing or wishing to do it, and repeated particular judgments
that the actions A! A? 413, etc., are good combine into the
universal judgment that all actions of the type A are good.
The moral habituation and the intellectual induction are not
indeed separable in practice: but they are separable logically.
The statement, then, that moral ἀρετή ‘makes the end right’
(114447 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις
τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον) must be modified to this extent. And since
the actual stating of any proposition is an intellectual and
not a moral act, the actual stating of the τέλος as the major
premiss of the practical syllogism must be the work not of
moral ἀρετή but of φρόνησις.

The passage 1140 b 11—20 relating to σωφροσύνη and

1 sc. τὰ ἔσχατα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα.
* Cf. also 1144 a 20, 1145 a 5.

52 INTRODUCTION

φρόνησις throws some light on the subsequent doctrine that
moral ἀρετή makes the end right. Σωφροσύνη there is said
to do just what moral ἀρετή later is said to do: to préserve,
namely, the correctness of the od ἕνεκα or end in view. There
is a certain danger of confusion in this connection, because
σωφροσύνη is not in general identical with moral ἀρετή, but is
one among others of the many moral ἀρεταί.

It seems possible to state Aristotle’s view of the difference.
between the respective relations to φρόνησις of σωφροσύνη.
and ἠθικὴ ἀρετή somewhat as follows. The various moral!
virtues cause men to desire various good activities: and
φρόνησις shows how the good activities are means to the
supreme good activity of happiness. This φρόνησις may o
may not be highly developed: but one thing is necessary in
any case, if it is to have free play—that the soul shall not be
led astray by pleasure or pain. For the desire of pleasure
and the shrinking from pain obtrude’ themselves as the
supreme end in place of the real supreme end of Happiness !
and so, however flourishing the several moral virtues may be,
or rather the several moral virtuous instincts, there can be no
power of ordering them with a view to the attainment of that
supreme end which is not in view at all so long as the desire
of pleasure or the shrinking from pain takes its place. Thus
σωφροσύνη clears and keeps open the field in which φρόνησις
and the ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί maintain their mutual relations and act
and re-act upon each other. It is the indispensable preliminary,
and though it cannot be said itself to be quite independent of
intellectual virtue—for like other moral virtues it is a μεσότης
that is ὡρισμένη λόγῳ Kal ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος dpicecer—yet it is
peculiarly the result of ἐθισμός from earliest youth: 1119 a 25
ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾷον πρὸς αὐτὰ (sc. the temptations to ἀκολασία),
1103 Ὁ 23 οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ
νέων ἐθίζεσθαι ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν, 1104 Ὁ 8
περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή" διὰ μὲν γὰρ
τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν διά τε τῶν λυπῶν τῶν καλῶν
ἀπεχόμεθα: διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων (ὡς ὁ Πλάτων
φησίν) ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ" ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ
παίδεια αὕτη ἐστίν.

INTRODUCTION 53

It is perhaps possible to distinguish two views of σω-
φροσύνη in a way that will clear up this question. σωφροσύνη
may be regarded as that ἕξις in which a man never allows his
moral action to be influenced either by desire of pleasure or
by avoidance of pain: or it may be regarded as that ὅξις in
which he takes pleasure and pain in the right things, at the
right time, to the right amount, and so on. It is when looked
at in the former way that σωφροσύνη bears its peculiar
relation to φρόνησις, and so to moral virtue generally, includ-
ing itself as looked at in the latter way: and it is in the
former way that it is looked at in this passage, 1140 11---20.
It is then not a mean but an absolute state: not depending
on φρόνησις, Dut securing room for the activity of φρόνησις.
Viewed in the second way, σωφροσύνη simply takes its place
along with the other moral virtues, is like the others a mean
state, is subject to the determination of the ὀρθὸς λόγος, and
refers more especially to the bodily pleasures and pains},
whereas in the first view it seems to refer to a// pleasures and
pains. In the same way ἀκολασία has the double meaning of
‘consistent pleasure-seeking’ (the absolute vice, opposed to
the absolute virtue which is σωφροσύνη in the former sense,
that which prevents the activity of φρόνησις and destroys all
conception of the true end) and ‘bodily intemperance’ (one of
the extremes corresponding to the μέσον which is σωφροσύνη
in the latter sense).

If we now return to the distinction that I have drawn
between ‘external’ and ‘component’ means to an end, it will
appear that φρόνησις is with equal propriety said to lead to
the knowledge of the means to the great end for man, in
whichever sense ‘means’ is understood. With regard to
external means this is particularly obvious: but it is also
true of component means: what I take to be Professor
Stewart’s view has truth in it, as well as the opposing view
that is maintained, as it seems, by the majority of critics.
Suppose θεωρία κατὰ σοφίαν to be admitted to be the great
end for man. External means to this end will be such as

1 χχ18 ἃ 4 περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς (ἡδονὰΞ) εἴη ἂν ἡ cwppootvy...a 24 ὧν καὶ τὰ.
λοιπὰ ζῴα κοινων εἴ.

54 INTRODUCTION

reading a certain book or talking to certain people: it is
evidently φρόνησις that will give rise to the knowledge of
these means. Component means will be particular acts of
θεωρία κατὰ σοφίαν such as the apprehension of a geometrical
proposition or demonstration. These particular acts may be
performed when the mind is on the whole, as far as they are
concerned, in the stage of induction and habituation, and so
without reference to any universal principle stating that
θεωρία κατὰ σοφίαν is the greatest good, for no such principle
is as yet accepted. But the same sort of acts may be per-
formed when the mind is in a developed state, when moral
ἀρετή and φρόνησις have acted upon and completed each
other, when the main universal principle of action has been
formed along with such other less universal principles as may
be convenient in practice to save perpetual conscious reference
to the main principle, and when practical propositions are
stated as the conclusions of deduction by applying the
universal principle (in its ultimate or in some derived form)
to particular circumstances. In the latter cases it is φρόνησις,
and φρόνησις alone, that causes the knowledge that a particular
act is one of a. good class of actions and so a component
means to the end which is (in some sense) the aggregate of
such actions. The particular form of the practical syllogism
that is suitable to reasoning about component means may be
stated thus—

The end is an aggregate of actions of the class A (i.e.
every action of the class A is a component means to
the end, and therefore ought to be done),

but A is an action of the class 4,

therefore A ought to be done.

An instance of the syllogism of the component means is
indicated 1147 a 31, ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα
γεύεσθαι... ἡ μὲν οὖν χλέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο. The second syllogism
there mentioned, and the phenomenon of ἀκρασία, are not to
the point now: but incidentally this passage. exhibits the
scheme of a good practical syllogism of the component meané.
The major premiss is not stated properly, but is equivalent

INTRODUCTION 55

to δεῖ μὴ γεύεσθαι τῶν μὴ ὑγιεινῶν : the minor premiss is
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν: the conclusion is δεῖ μὴ
γεύεσθαι τούτου, or δεῖ φεύγειν τούτου. Here it is clear that
the means to the end is component: for it is the avoidance of
"8. particular unwholesome thing that is regarded as the means
to the avoidance of unwholesome things in general which is
the end. The perception that a particular thing is an instance
of a class is obviously a purely intellectual act: such per-
ception when right is obviously due to intellectual not to
moral ἀρετή.

In chapters xii and xiii the relation to each other of
φρόνησις and ἠθικὴ ἀρετή is explained by the introduction
of two new conceptions, δεινότης and φυσικὴ ἀρετή. The
difficulties raised thereby are less than is commonly supposed.
In a note on terminology I have pointed out that the circular
argument summarised in 1144 Ὁ 30—32 δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν
εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως,
οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς is verbally circular, and
only verbally. But the substance of the doctrine of δεινότης
and φυσικὴ ἀρετή must be examined rather more closely.
The nature of Aristotle’s views on this subject may be best
stated in the following formal fashion:

Human life involves the repeated occurrence of προαίρεσις,
whether good or bad προαίρεσις. Though reasoning about
practical matters may occur without desire, and desire may
occur without practical reasoning, yet as a rule they combine
to form προαίρεσις ; and it is only in so far as they do so
combine that they are ethically important and are properly
said to be good or bad. But they are logically separable, and
their qualities are logically separable, even when considered
as in practice combined. Λόγος or reasoning may be con-
sidered in itself as good or bad: ὄρεξις or desire may be
considered in itself as good or bad. Adyos when combined
with ὄρεξις remains the same in itself, it may be said, neither
better nor worse than before: and the same may be said of

1 The major premiss here does not of course state the great end for man: it is
a καθόλου proposition, but less καθόλου than the main universal principle of action
from which it is or may be syllogistically derived.

56. INTRODUCTION

ὄρεξις when combined with λόγος. But observation shows
how often it happens that (4) λόγος good in itself combined
with ὄρεξις bad in itself produces a worse whole (the προαίρεσις)
than is produced by Adyos bad in itself combined with the
same ὄρεξις bad in itself, and also (6) ὄρεξις good in itself
combined with λόγος bad in itself produces a worse whole
(the προαίρεσις) than is produced by ὄρεξις bad in itself
combined with the same λόγος bad in itself. In the former.
case the result is effectual villainy, which is worse than
ineffectual villainy: in the latter case the result is (for
instance) effectual fanaticism, which is worse than ineffectual
fanaticism. Now it appears that the goodness or badness of
λόγος and ὄρεξις in themselves cannot be their real goodness
or badness: (i) on the general ground that λόγος and ὄρεξις
are really only means to the end προαίρεσις (the immediate
cause of πρᾶξις) and that the character of the end must
determine the real character of the means: (ii) because it
seems absurd that, other. means being constant, a means that
leads to a bad end should really be a better thing in itself
than a means that leads to a good end or less bad end. It
therefore follows that the real goodness or badness of λόγος
and ὄρεξις is determined in part by the character of the end
to which they lead: and as the character of the end is deter-
mined by the character in itself of one of the means combined
with the character in itself of the other means, it follows that
the character of the λόγος in itself determines the real character
of the ὄρεξις and the character of the ὄρεξις in itself determines
the real character of the λόγος. Now the goodness of the
λόγος in itself Aristotle calls δεινότης, and the goodness of
the ὄρεξις in itself he calls φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ (sc. ἠθική). Suppose
then the λόγος and the ὄρεξις both good in themselves, then
δεινότης and φυσικὴ (ἠθικὴ) ἀρετή are present: combination
with φυσικὴ (ὐθικὴ) ἀρετή makes δεινότης into φρόνησις,
and “combination with δεινότης makes φυσικὴ (ἠθικὴ)
ἀρετή into κυρία (ἠθικὴ) ἀρετή. This is simply the above
truth stated in a special terminology, and with reference to
the ἕξεις rather than to the activities. A certain notice is
taken of the perverted προαιρέσεις and the corresponding

INTRODUCTION 57

perverted ἕξεις, which may be fully and symmetrically stated
thus—

1. Combination with φυσικὴ ἠθικὴ κακία makes δεινότης
into πανουργία (an intellectual vice),

2. Combination with δεινότης makes φυσικὴ ἠθικὴ κακία
into κυρία ἠθικὴ κακία,

3. Combination with φυσικὴ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή makes stupidity
into intellectual fanaticism or the like,

4. Combination with stupidity makes φυσικὴ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή
into moral fanaticism or the like.

It only remains, as regards this question, to decide whether
Aristotle regards δεινότης and φυσικὴ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή as ἕξεις
or as merely δυνάμεις, a point that is obviously of some
importance when we attempt to decide the relations of
δεινότης to the ἕξις φρόνησις and of φυσικὴ ἀρετή to the ἕξις
κυρία ἀρετή. On the one hand δεινότης is introduced as a
δύναμις 1144 a 23, and in a 29 φρόνησις is said to be the
corresponding ἕξις. But φυσικὴ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή is apparently a
ἕξις (1144 Ὁ 9) as is further suggested by Ὁ 13 ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις ὁμοία
οὖσα τότ᾽ ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετή. Now there seems no reason
why, if δεινότης is not an intellectual ἕξις, φυσικὴ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή
should be regarded as a moral ἕξις : nor conversely why, if
φυσικὴ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή is a moral ἕξις, δεινότης should not be
‘regarded as an intellectual ἕξις. It also appears that the uses
of ἕξις and δύναμις are not always carefully distinguished,
cf. 1143 a 25 Εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι ai ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι
with a 28 (referring to the same things) πᾶσαι γὰρ ai δυνάμεις
αὗται. Probably Aristotle was dimly aware of what the truth
seems to be, that regarded in themselves both δεινότης and
φυσικὴ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή are ἕξεις, for their qualities in themselves
are fixed: but regarded with reference to each other and
with reference to the end to which they are means, they are
δυνάμεις, capable of having further given qualities good or
bad according to the quality of what they are combined with.
To take a simple illustration of my meaning—a dress may
have some qualities that are or resemble ἕξεις, such as white-
ness or beauty, and others that are δυνάμεις, such as comfort

58 INTRODUCTION

or utility—for it is only useful, for example, if there is someone
(and that the right sort of person) to wear it. In the same
way δεινότης and φυσικὴ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή have certain absolute
qualities which are ἕξεις and certain relative qualities that are
δυνάμεις.

At the end-of vr Aristotle finds himself in a position to
answer the question propounded at the beginning of the
book, What:is the ὀρθὸς λόγος that determines the μέσον that
constitutes moral dper7j? His answer can at this point be
satisfactorily discussed, though nothing has yet been said of
his treatment of the subdivisions and minor forms of φρόνησις:
for the latter subject has no direct bearing upon the point
now to be examined.

First it must be noticed that the function of λόγος in
determining the moral μέσον is a narrower one than that of
φρόνησις with regard to action generally. This would be true
even if activity in accordance with moral ἀρετή were the
greatest good for man. For there are many external means
to that end which it would be the duty of φρόνησις to deter-
mine, the determining of which is not the same function as
the determining of the moral mean itself: this latter is rather
the determining of the component means. But as a matter of
fact activity in accordance with moral ἀρετή is, we learn from
the tenth book, not the final end, but a means to the final end,
which is θεωρία κατὰ σοφίαν. There are means to this final
end, other than good moral activity, which it is the work of
φρόνησις to discover and know: and in so far as φρόνησις has
this other work to do, it is not the determinant of the moral
μέσον, nor of any μέσον at all. So that when it is said
1144 Ὁ 27 ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν,
the meaning is not that φρόνησις is nothing else but ὀρθὸς
λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, but that it is this, as well as being
something else besides.

With this safeguard it ney now be asked how φρόνησις is
held to determine the moral μέσον. Now the final end θεωρία
κατὰ σοφίαν is something quite different from good moral

1 Not of course that absoluteness and: relativity are per se the ἀἰξεπρυϊςμίης,
marks of ἕξις and δύναμις respectively.

INTRODUCTION 59

action, and good moral actions are therefore not component
but external and independent means to the end. The good-
ness of such actions depends on the extent to which they are
means to the end: those moral actions that best lead to the
end are ipso facto best in themselves. Therefore in describing
a good moral state and good moral action as being μεσότης
and μέσον between extremes of excess and defect, it is implied
that the quality of μεσότης or mean-ness attaching to a moral
state or action is the same thing as the quality of being the
best means to the end. In fact ‘being a μεσότης᾽ and ‘ being
the ἕξις that best leads to the final end θεωρία κατὰ codiav’
are practically equivalent expressions and are both accurate
descriptions of moral ἀρετή. But whereas the latter is signi-
ficant in itself, the former is a mere abstract formula, so that
the latter explains the former and not the former the latter.
The full explanation is not of course given in VI, because VI
only finishes the provision of materials for the conclusion in
which the final end is defined, and it is only in x that the
conclusion is actually drawn and justified. But except for
this the question at the beginning of VI is fully answered in
this book. To the question tis ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος ; the
answer is φρόνησις. The σκοπός on which the φρόνιμος keeps
his eye, the ὅρος whereby he ὁρίζει, have yet to be found: but
whatever the σκοπός and ὅρος may be, it is now known what
the vague metaphors expressed by these terms really signify.
To keep one’s eye on the σκοπός, to measure by means of the
ὅρος, signifies to consider precisely what the final end is, and
to fix the μέσον accordingly between excess and defect signifies
to decide what moral states or moral actions are the best
means towards the attainment of that final end. VI gives an
explanation fully but implicitly that x makes explicit and

perfectly clear.

B. The varieties of Practical Wisdom.

Aristotle’s account of practical intellectual ἀρετή as a
whole having now been adequately examined for the present,
I proceed to consider the distinctions that he draws between

60 INTRODUCTION

various sorts of this ἀρετή: for he devotes a large part of VI
to drawing these distinctions, and this part of his teaching
contains several obscurities that must be removed if possible.

The book makes in all three different divisions of φρόνησις.
(1) That into φρόνησις proper (πρακτική) and τέχνη (ποιητική)
has already been discussed. (2) The second division has to
do with the sphere of action rather than with the kind of
action: that namely into πολιτική, οἰκονομία, φρόνησις περὶ
αὑτὸν καὶ &va—practical intellectual ἀρετή as it concerns the
whole country, a single household, the individual thinker him-
self. These two are plainly cross-divisions, though Aristotle
does not point the fact out: the differences described in the
second division are not however affected by those described
in the first—e.g. πολιτικὴ ποίησις is different from οἰκονομικὴ
ποίησις precisely as πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις is different from οἰκονομικὴ
mpa&is—so that the fact of the cross-division raises no diffi-
culties. (3) The third division is more obscure than the
second, and it is in a sense, at least for the purposes of the
Ethics, more important. It is founded on differences of
intellectual activity itself rather than on differences in the
nature or sphere of the actions to which the activity leads.
(Here again is a cross-division, crossing the other two: and
again, though for clearness’ sake it is worth while to point the
fact out, the fact is not important enough to make Aristotle
wish to mention it. Both the second and the third divisions
are of φρόνησις in the broadest sense of the word, that namely
in which it ἄρχει τῆς ποιήσεως and so includes τέχνη.) The
third division includes the heads εὐβουλία, εὐστοχία, ἀγχίνοια,
σύνεσις, γνώμη, νοῦς πρακτικός : with a suggestion of φρόνησις
in a narrow sense as opposed to all of these.—The second
division will here be handled first.

Aristotle appears to have had two reasons for making
in vi the division of φρόνησις into πολιτικὴ οἰκονομία and
φρόνησις περὶ αὑτόν. (1) He has used, and will use, the
terms φρόνησις and πολιτική in very different senses from
those in which they are usually understood. This involves
the danger of confusion in his hearers’ and readers’ minds; a
danger that is best prevented by clearly stating what the

INTRODUCTION 61

popular uses of the two words are; which statement, again,
is best made by the classification of the divisions of φρόνησις
on the principle here adopted: for it is shown that the names
φρόνησις and πολιτική when used in their popular senses
properly belong to certain species of φρόνησις that are by this
classification brought to light. At the same time Aristotle’s
own uses of those two words are justified, because it is shown
that the popular uses are based on a misconception of facts,
and though it is safe and even desirable to retain those popular
uses so long as the facts are not misconceived, yet it is not
only allowable but desirable to introduce new uses based upon
the actual facts. (2) Aristotle naturally wishes to describe as
explicitly as he can the nature of practical intellectual ἀρετή,
just as he has been anxious in the preceding four books to
describe as explicitly as he can the nature of moral ἀρετή.
Now from the particular point of view that is here taken, that
of the spheres of action belonging to different kinds of practical
intellectual ἀρετή, he finds himself saved the trouble of being
very explicit in this place: for the Polztics will have to deal
in detail with both οἰκονομία and πολιτική, while φρόνησις
περὶ αὑτόν is not only (1) less important than the other two
(for man is essentially a πολιτικὸν ζῷον), and closely bound
up with the other two (for 1142 a 10 οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ
οἰκονομίας οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ πολιτείας), but (2) it is actually dealt with
more than the others in books II to V and VII to IX of the
Ethics. What is, however, really wanted in this book is some
indication of the connection of the Poéztics with the Ethics as
regards this question, and this want is supplied by simply
making the division here considered, which the Podztics will
afterwards explain in detail. The case is parallel with that
of ἐπιστήμη, in which, as I have shown, explicit description,
though formally necessary to the completeness of the argument,
can practically be dispensed with, because the Amalytics and
the Metaphysics between them have explicitly described
ἐπιστήμη already, so that all that is wanted is the ethical
connection, which is given accordingly.

Chapter viii begins the division by stating the relation of
πολιτική and φρόνησις, both words being used in Aristotle’s

62 INTRODUCTION

own broad sense. From what immediately follows, as well as
from VI as a whole and indeed from the £¢hics as a whole, it
appears that πολιτική is one kind of φρόνησις. The statement
i might have been put in the clearer form adopted for the

δ “ distinction of ζητεῖν and βουλεύεσθαι in 1142 ἃ 31, so as to
read ἡ ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις διαφέρουσιν" ἡ yap πολιτικὴ
φρόνησίς τίς ἐστιν: for this is the doctrine meant to be

γ᾽ conveyed. Πολιτική is identical with ἡ περὶ πόλιν φρόνησις
of the next sentence, as etymology is supposed to show with-
out further explanation: φρόνησις comprehends πολιτική
along with οἰκονομία and φρόνησις περὶ αὑτόν. ἸΠολυτική is
the only one of the three divisions of φρόνησις that is, for the
present purpose, found to need further subdivision. It has
two main sub-divisions, the ‘architectonic’ νομοθετική and
the ‘cheirotechnic’ aodutiexn—for the name πολιτική, which
properly applies to the architectonic as well as the cheiro-
technic φρόνησις περὶ πόλιν, is popularly restricted to the
cheirotechnic. This narrower cheirotechnic voActi«n is further
subdivisible into’ βουλευτική (in the very narrow sense of
‘parliamentary’ wisdom) and δικαστική. Such is the division
of φρόνησις according to spheres of action.

In making this division it is found necessary to explain
the meaning of the distinction between νομοθετική as archi-
tectonic and πολιτική (in the narrow sense) as cheirotechnic.
The epithets imply the metaphor that best explains the
difference between the two. The ἀρχιτέκτων gives commands,
the χειροτέχνης carries them out in practice. The commands
of the ἀρχιτέκτων are general (καθόλου), the χειροτέχνης has
to consider the special circumstances (καθ᾽ ἕκαστα), and apply
the general to the special to form the conclusion, which is
itself special, the proposition that a particular thing (ἔσχατον)
ought to be done. In politics the ἀρχιτέκτων is the legislator
(ψομοθέτης), whose commands are laws (νόμοι), which are
καθόλου, taking no account (as the Politics repeatedly? points
out) of καθ᾽ ἕκαστα or special circumstances. The administra-
tion of the laws is in the hands of the political χειροτέχναι,
the practical politicians (πολυτικοί or πολιτευόμενοι) Who apply

1 See for instance 1286 ἃ 9.

INIRODUCTION 63

the καθόλου principle of the νόμος to the special circumstances
and form a particular conclusion as to what ought to be done,
which is embodied in a ψήφισμα. The ψήφισμα is καθ᾽
ἕκαστον or ἔσχατον: it is not the thing to be done, but the
legal proposition stating what the thing to be done is. It is
therefore not accurately described in 1141 b 27 as πρακτόν:
but probably there was at this point confusion in Aristotle’s
mind between the two notions τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα περὶ τοῦ
πρακτοῦ and τὸ yap ψηφισθὲν πρακτόν, or he may simply
be using the word πρακτόν carelessly for πρακτικόν. Τὸ
ψηφισθέν, a particular action, is ἔσχατον in two senses (1) it
is the ἔσχατος ὅρος of the practical syllogism, (2) it is the
Zast thing arrived at in the analysis of practical delibera-
tion.

It has been said that misconception of fact is at the
bottom, and recognised by Aristotle to be at the bottom, of
the narrow popular uses of φρόνησις and πολιτική. The
wrong belief that has led to the narrow use of φρόνησις is
that it is really better to look after one’s own private interests
than to take part in the government of the country. The
wrong belief that has led to the narrow use of πολιτικὴ 15 that.

_the practical executor of a design really deserves more credit
for it than the designer does. Of these two wrong beliefs
the first is definitely corrected 1142 a 9—IO καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ
ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ πολιτείας. The
second it is not thought worth while to correct explicitly:
the way it is referred to implies that the error is obvious,
1141 b 26 ἡ ὡς τὰ Kal’ ἕκαστα TO κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική
πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνους λέγουσιν.

It is just worth while in conclusion to point out that τὸ
κοινὸν ὄνομα does not mean the same thing at 1141 Ὁ 26 and
at 1141 b 31, for owing to the form in which the first state-
ment of the chapter is made there is a slight danger that
πολιτική and φρόνησις should be taken to be co-extensive
and only differing in point of view (like concave and convex
in the same curve). At b 26 the ὄνομα πολιτική is κοινόν to
all practical intellectual ἀρετή that is περὶ πόλιν: at Ὁ 31

1 See my article in the C. 2. Feb. 1905, p. 17 § 8.

64 INTRODUCTION

the ὄνομα φρόνησις is common to all practical intellectual
ἀρετή whatsoever.

The third classification of φρόνησις into the varieties
εὐβουλία, σύνεσις, etc., is made, and is treated with considerable
fulness, also for two reasons. (1) It is desirable to make the
meaning of φρόνησις explicit in this direction too, discussing
it from every point of view that will help its real nature
to be understood. Now in treating of the varieties in the
intellectual activities themselves rather than in the spheres of
those activities, practically no help can be derived from any
other treatise, except here and there as in the case of ἀγχίνοια.
It is therefore not enough to give the bare heads of this
classification and assume that they will be or have been
elsewhere explained in detail: but as with the moral ἀρεταί,
so with these practical intellectual ἀρεταί, as full an explana-
tion as is needed must be given, and given here. Hence the
comparatively ‘full treatment that this class of intellectual
ἀρεταί receives. (2) Certain words in current use, either by
people in general or by philosophers, seem to be names for
practical intellectual ἀρετή, or for parts of it. To prevent
confusion the proper meaning of these words must be fixed.
If they, or any of them, are synonyms of φρόνησις, the fact
should be noted: if not, their meanings must be distinguished.
As it happens, there are—Aristotle finds—real distinctions
between different kinds of practical intellectual activity, and
between the corresponding ἀρεταί, to which these names
properly belong. The-regular usage of these words is a guide
to the real distinctions they denote, and at the same time is
the justification of the usage by which those distinctions are
denoted by the names in question. Aristotle has all the
ordinary Greek thinker’s reverence for language as a divine
creation and a guide to reality.

(a) EvBovdia. Since εὐβουλία is described by Aristotle
in chapter ix in terms that apply, almost without exception,
quite well to φρόνησις, there is some difficulty for us about
determining the difference he makes between them. Εὐβουλία,
it is perfectly clear, is the ἀρετή that corresponds to the good
activity εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, and this is said to be the peculiar

INTRODUCTION 65

activity of the φρόνιμος : 1140 a 25 δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ
δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι κτὰ, 1141 bg τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου
μάλιστα τοῦτ᾽ ἔργον. εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι. All that
distinguishes εὐβουλία from ἐπιστήμη, εὐστοχία, ἀγχίνοια,
δόξα, ὀρθότης δόξης, distinguishes φρόνησις from the same
things. The threefold character of εὐβουλία---οὗ δεῖ, ὥς, ὅτε
—belongs to φρόνησις also, it seems: and the distinction of
ἁπλῶς and πρός τι certainly applies to both alike. They are
only distinguished formally in one place, the last sentence of
chapter ix: and this passage, vague enough otherwise, is made
obscurer still by the impossibility of feeling sure whether οὗ
refers to συμφέρον or τέλος. All the editors except Professor
Burnet seem to agree in referring οὗ to τὸ τέλος, and try to
explain away in various fashions the apparent contradiction
of the sentence, so understood, with the later statement that
φρόνησις is τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος. The objection to this is not so
much that the contradiction is unexplainable as that it is in
fact unexplained by Aristotle himself. There is no gram-
matical reason why συμφέρον should not be the antecedent of
οὗ. If it is so, and the sentence states that εὐβουλία is ὀρθότης
ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος while φρόνησις is ἀληθὴς
ὑπόληψις τοῦ συμφέροντος πρὸς τὸ τέλος, it is plain that very
little help can be got from the wording of this sentence
towards understanding the difference between evSovdia and
φρόνησις: and as has been said, the rest of the chapter
describes εὐβουλία for the most part in terms that apply
equally well to φρόνησις, as far as can be gathered from the
accounts of φρόνησις given elsewhere in the book. Certain
hints may be gathered from stray passages in the chapter,
but it does not seem possible to state with any confidence the
real nature of the difference conceived by Aristotle to exist
between φρόνησις and εὐβουλία.

In the first place, εὐβουλία is not called a ἕξις : and though
this of itself does not prove that it is not considered by
Aristotle to be one, yet there are indications that whereas a
ἕξις is a permanent quality, εὐβουλία is thought of as a quality
sometimes present and sometimes absent. A careful distinc-
tion is drawn between the activity of the mind as searching

G. 5

66 INTRODUCTION

and inquiring into the truth of something, and the activity
of the mind as having finished the search and being in
possession of the truth as the result, or at any rate of some
conclusion believed to be the truth: and it is inferred that the
corresponding qualities of the mind are similarly distinguish-
able. The same point is made in the three statements
(1142 Ὁ 1I—14)

(1) δόξης δ᾽ ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια,

(2) ὥρισται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν,

(3) καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη:
with which contrast the statements about εὐβουλία,

(1) οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία,

(2) διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται (τὴν εὐβουλίαν ὀρθότητα εἶναι),

(3) ὁ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ τι καὶ Χογίζεται" ἀλλ᾽ ὀρθότης

τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς.

Emphasis is laid on the time to be taken over the delibera-
tive process corresponding to εὐβουλία : a certain amount of
time must be taken, δεῖ yap βουλεύεσθαι Bpddews (1142 Ὁ 5),
but not too much (b 26—28). Εὐβουλία thus seems to be
regarded as a quality of the searching, unsatisfied, inquiring -
mind. But the mind is not always engaged in the activity of
searching: and when it is not, the quality of εὐβουλία does
not seem to be considered to attach to it: the quality comes
and goes with the activity. But φρόνησις is a quality of the
satisfied as well as of the inquiring mind. It is the part of
the φρόνιμος to possess and to reflect upon and to be stating
to himself those φάσεις, ὀρθαὶ δόξαι about τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς
τὸ τέλος, to which previous deliberation has led him. This is
implied by saying (1142 Ὁ 33)-that φρόνησις is the ἀληθὴς
ὑπόληψις of the συμφέρον : ὑπόληψις implies φάσις (ie. κατά-
φασις or ἀπόφασις), whether that φάσις is the result of
knowledge or of mere opinion, and is true or untrue. This is
also suggested by 1140 b 26 δυοῖν δ᾽ ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς
τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, Oarépou ἂν εἴη ἀρετή (sc. φρόνησις), τοῦ
δοξαστικοῦ" ἤ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν
καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. On the other hand the notion of φρόνησις
clearly includes that of εὐβουλία just stated : for the activity

INTRODUCTION 67

εὖ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is more plainly and oftener
attributed to the φρόνιμος than the activity ὀρθῶς δοξάξειν
περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. So that εὐβουλία must, it seems, be dis-
tinguished from φρόνησις as part from whole: in fact it might
be said ἡ εὐβουλία καὶ ἡ φρόνησις διαφέρουσιν: ἡ yap εὐβουλία
φρόνησίς τίς ἐστιν---ποἱ however of course φρόνησις κατὰ
μέρος, but a part or aspect of φρόνησις ἁπλῶς. The very close
connection of εὐβουλία with φρόνησις that this view involves
helps to account for the formal carelessness in the omission of
εὐβουλία from the list of ἕξεις εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι (1143 a 25):
for whatever is true in that connection of φρόνησις is a fortiori
true of εὐβουλία.

(8) Σύνεσις. The main point about σύνεσις is contained
in the words 1143 a ὃ ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν"
τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μὴ τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν" ἡ δὲ σύνεσις
κριτικὴ μόνον : and in the words ἄλλου λέγοντος (1143 a 15).
Σύνεσις is quite detached from ὄρεξις and so from προαίρεσις:
that this is implied by κριτική appears tolerably plain, if the
evidence of a later work can be accepted as testifying to an
earlier usage, from Animal Motion, 700 Ὁ 18—24, where ra
κινοῦντα τὸ ζῷον are enumerated, διάνοια φαντασία προαίρεσις
βούλησις ἐπιθυμία: ταῦτα δὲ πάντα, it is said, ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν
καὶ ὄρεξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ νῷ
χώραν ἔχουσιν: κριτικὰ γὰρ πάντα...βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς
καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὄρεξις, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ
ὀρέξεως. Φρόνησις on the other hand, as has been fully shown
already, though not composed of ὄρεξις, depends for its peculiar
character on its relation with ὄρεξις : the man who never makes
a προαίρεσις cannot be φρόνιμος, but he may (theoretically
speaking) be συνετός. The connection of the notion of κριτική
with that of ἄλλου λέγοντος is made in the Parts of Animals
639 a4 πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρῖναι
εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων. . «πλὴν
τοῦτον μὲν περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικόν τινα νομίζομεν εἶναν
ἕνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα, τὸν δὲ περί τινος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης.
The last words throw some light on the special sense of περὶ
τὰ πρακτά in which σύνεσις is said in VI to be περὶ τὰ πρακτά.
It is admitted (1143 a 12—13, 16—18) that σύνεσις may be

5-2

68 INTRODUCTION

concerned with the objects of ἐπιστήμη (in the strict sense of the
word ἐπιστήμη), that is, with μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, which
are μὴ πρακτά. But Aristotle sees reason to reject such a usage
of the word σύνεσις, or at least to recognise as particularly
definite and appropriate the usage introduced here, that namely
of σύνεσις as πρακτική. He does not justify this by saying
that ordinary usage regards σύνεσις as πρακτική: on the
contrary, he says that the usage of σύνεσις as μὴ πρακτική is
the original one and is still common (a 16 ἐντεῦθεν κτλ, a 17
λέγομεν yap TO μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις): his proceeding
is therefore purely arbitrary as far as can be seen, but probably,
though he does not say so, the usage of σύνεσις as πρακτική
had by his time become the more common in ordinary
speech.

The συνετός, it appears, does not himself deliberate. He
listens to the reasoning set forth by others who have de-
liberated: he comprehends the meaning of their syllogisms,
and he forms at the end an opinion that they are right, or that
they are wrong, as the case may be. But he does not, qua
συνετός, go beyond this—he does not use what he has heard
from others, or the opinion at which he himself arrived, to
construct a practical syllogism with a conclusion that is
ἐπιτακτικόν, stating something that he ought to.do. The man
who does go on to do this is not, in so far as he does so,
συνετός but φρόνιμος. The object of the συνετός, the end of his
peculiar activity, is in the words of chapter ii ἀλήθεια only and
not ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ, though it ἐς
ἀλήθεια περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν. There are then two distinguishing
marks of σύνεσις : (1) its activity consists in judging the
results of the deliberation of others, (2) its activity does not
end in an ἐπιτακτικόν conclusion of the form ‘I must do this.
Its relation to φρόνησις is only vaguely indicated by the words
1143 a 6 διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
τὸ αὐτὸ σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις. This would be quite consistent
with holding σύνεσις to be a kind or part of φρόνησις according
to the formula of 1142 a 31 already quoted several times.
And this it may be allowed to be, and to be considered by
Aristotle to be, if one considers, as no doubt Aristotle did to

INTRODUCTION 69

some extent, that to judge the deliberations of others one
must in a way go through all the steps of their deliberations
in one’s own mind, and also that, since the advice of others
may and in practice often does guide people in the forming of
their conclusions as to what ought to be done, the. critical
activity of the συνετός may lead ultimately to ἐπίταξις though
immediately only to κρίσις.

(y) Γνώμη. The whole passage dealing with this subject
is so badly stated that it is hard to believe Aristotle had his
meaning at all clear in his own mind. The Great Ethics has
a very clear section! dealing with ἐπιείκεια, and with γνώμη
or rather εὐγνωμοσύνη, which are related as moral ἀρετή and
intellectual ἀρετή, and are in fact a special case of moral ἀρετή
and φρόνησις as treated in chapters xii and xiii of VI: but it
is not possible to read the clearness of that passage into the
confusion of this one. It may be noticed that γνώμη is κριτική,
like σύνεσις : it is therefore distinguished from φρόνησις (which
is ἐπιτακτική) in the same way. It is not however said to be
distinguished from φρόνησις as being ἄλλου λέγοντος κρίσις,
whether this distinction is intended or not. On the other
hand it is distinguished from φρόνησις in a way in which
σύνεσις is not, for while the πρακτά with which σύνεσις has to
do are the whole class of πρακτά and so are coextensive with
the objects of the activity of φρόνησις, the πρακτά with which
γνώμη is concerned are only a part of the whole. Any sort
of πρᾶξις that is πρὸς ἄλλον may give an opening for ἐπιείκεια
(1143 a 31 τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν
τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον), but it must be πρὸς ἄλλον, and not every
πρᾶξις that is πρὸς ἄλλον necessarily gives an opening for
ἐπιείκεια. The result of this is that γνώμη also may fairly be
considered a kind or part of φρόνησις : different from it, but
as the part is different from the whole.

(8) Νοῦς πρακτικός. The word νοῦς is, up to chapter xi,
used to mean either of two different things: (1) the whole
διανοητικὸν μέρος of the soul, or the activity of that μέρος ;
(2) the ἀρετή of the ἐπιστημονικὸν μέρος of the διανοητικὸν
μέρος, which leads to the statement of universal invariable

1 1198 Ὁ 24—11099 ἃ 3.

70 INTRODUCTION

undemonstrable truths by correct induction from appropriate
particular true propositions. A third use is considered in
chapter xi co-ordinate with the second, and related to the first
as the second is related to the first. An example of this use
is given by the phrase νοῦν ἔχειν, which means ‘to be sensible,’
‘to have good sense about some practical matter of conduct.’
For practical deductive reasoning, as for unpractical, premisses
are required that cannot ultimately be deduced from previous
propositions of a more general kind. The ultimate major
premiss of practical reasoning is the statement of the οὗ ἕνεκα
or the final end of action. Analogy would lead us to suppose
that this καθόλου proposition is formed by induction from
καθ᾽ ἕκαστον propositions, just as the καθόλου propositions
that relate to μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν are formed by
induction from καθ᾽ ἕκαστον propositions. This does in fact’
appear to be the case; the phenomena of ἐθισμός or habituation
are well-known, and habituation is not only a kind of moral
induction itself but is accompanied by an intellectual process
that is inductive in the strict sense. By doing particular good
things a man acquires the habit of doing such things asa rule
—this is a moral induction: by believing particular things to be
good he acquires the general belief that all such things are
good—this is an intellectual induction. This is precisely .
expressed by the two lines 1143 Ὁ 4—5 ἀρχαὶ γὰρ...αὕτη δ᾽
ἐστὶ νοῦς. Νοῦς πρακτικός is the intellectual ἀρετή that leads
to particular true judgments about practical matters—of the
type ‘this action A is good’—being generalised by induction
into universal true judgments and finally into the grand
universal judgment of the nature of the final end. The
particular true judgments must be made directly, just like
sensations: it may in fact be said that the making of them is
αἴσθησις of them (1143 b 5 τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν).
The details of the inductive process are not discussed here
any more than in chapter vi: it is not said whether only such
particular judgments are made as are useful for the induction
to the universal, or whether of all that are made a certain
number are selected as useful for the induction, or whether
the induction is the result of all particular judgments ever

INTRODUCTION γι

made. This omission is of course only one instance of
Aristotle’s failure to work out the theory of induction.
The account of νοῦς in the previous lines 1143 a 3 5—b 3
is obscure enough. The words καὶ yap τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ
τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστί go awkwardly with the preceding words
ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα: for they imply that νοῦς is
in one sense τῶν ἐσχάτων in being τῶν πρώτων ὅρων, and in
the other sense τῶν ἐσχάτων in being τῶν ἐσχάτων. The
word ἔσχατα can hardly mean different things in the two
sentences ; the formal awkwardness involved in supposing a
change would be as great as the material difficulty in the
argument otherwise. The best way out of the trouble is to
suppose that in the words a 36 τῶν πρώτων ὅρων νοῦς ἐστί,
which refer to non-practical induction, the results, the universal
propositions, which are ἀκίνητοι πρῶτοι ὅροι, are mentioned,
and the materials of the induction, the particular propositions,
ἔσχατα, are not mentioned : while in the following words, a 36
καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστί, the universal propositions, the
. statements of the οὗ ἕνεκα, are not mentioned, and the materials
of the induction, the particular propositions, are mentioned :
whereas in Ὁ 35 ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα, it is the
particular propositions that are the materials for the inductions
which are mentioned as applying to both sorts of induction.
The second difficulty is raised by the words καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας
προτάσεως. ‘H ἑτέρα πρότασις it is hard to take as meaning
anything but the minor premiss of the practical syllogism.
But the stating of this minor premiss lies entirely outside the
process of induction. In itself it is the intellectual expression
of an action of direct perception or sensation (cf. 1142 a 26--- 30),
and it is made as an element of deductive and not inductive
practical reasoning. It does not involve a moral judgment at
all. The major premiss zs a moral judgment—‘ Such-and-such
actions ought to be done’ or ‘ Such-and-such is the end’: but
the minor premiss is not—‘The action A is such an action’
or ‘The action A is the best means to that end.’ Yet the
following words (1143 Ὁ 45), as I have already pointed out,
clearly refer to the major premiss and to the particular
judgments from which by induction the major premiss is

72 INTRODUCTION

derived. It is perhaps best to suppose that stress is laid
on the feature common to the propositions that form minor
premisses and those that are the materials for induction—
namely, that they are not universal but particular pro-
positions: both the ἕτεραι προτάσεις and the ἀρχαὶ τοῦ οὗ
ἕνεκα are ἔσχατα. This is at any rate the fact required to be
shown for the purpose of the argument, which is to show that
νοῦς is τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα. Practical νοῦς has to do
with particular contingent (ἐνδεχόμενα) propositions, as distin-
guished from theoretic νοῦς which has to do with particular
invariable (ἀκίνητα) propositions; the common property of
both kinds of νοῦς is that they have to do with particular
propositions. The use of these particular propositions as
material for induction is not exactly common to both: for
while θεωρητικὸς νοῦς always so uses them, πρακτικὸς νοῦς 50
uses them only sometimes, in forming the practical universals
that are major premisses of practical syllogisms, and at other
times uses them in deductions as minor premisses. The words
Kal τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως" ἀρχαὶ yap τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται
may be paraphrased—‘ Such propositions are used as minor
premisses in practical syllogisms and also as materials for
forming the statements of the end of action that are used as
major premisses in practical syllogisms.’ The same explanation
must be given of the difficult passage 1142 a 25—30, where
φρόνησις, in so far as it is αἰσθητικὴ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, is said to
correspond to νοῦς θεωρητικός, and is evidently identical with
νοῦς πρακτικός Of 1143 b 2. This identification is made easier
by the fact that the guiding principle of the whole passage
1143 a 25—b 5 is the general sameness of φρόνησις and νοῦς
and other such qualities.

Practical νοῦς, then, is the intellectual ἀρετή that leads to
the making of true particular propositions suitable for, and as
means to, good practical induction or deduction. Thus it is
also φρόνησίς τις, one kind or part of the whole intellectual
ἀρετή that leads to truth about practical matters.

(e) Evoroyia and ᾿Αγχίνοια. These two good qualities
are briefly spoken of in connection with εὐβουλία. They are
like εὐβουλία (according to the explanation of εὐβουλία already

INTRODUCTION 73

given) in being qualities that belong to the mind as trying
to reach truth and not as having reached it. The general
characteristic of εὐστοχία is that it leads to rapid arriving at
some truth without any consciousness of intermediate steps of
reasoning. ᾿Αγχίνοια! is the particular kind of εὐστοχία that
leads to the rapid discovery of the reason for something with-
out any consciousness of intermediate steps of reasoning.
Such qualities can of course be exercised in theoretic as well
as in practical thinking, and if they are considered in chapter ix
as practical, it is because they are there being contrasted with
εὐβουλία which is necessarily practical. They are probably
mentioned partly to help to define εὐβουλία, partly to prevent
the loose use of either word as a synonym for φρόνησις, partly
to throw light on a distinct though not very important
variety of intellectual ἀρετή. In so far as they are concerned
with πρᾶξις they come, like εὐβουλία, under the general head
of φρόνησις.

D. THE RELATION OF INTELLECTUAL GOODNESS TO
HAPPINESS.

The main question of the Ethics, What is the greatest
good for man? is directly handled only in a comparatively
small part of the whole work. Before the end of the first
book it is found to depend on a number of other questions
that must first be answered, and it is not till the middle of the
last book that it is taken up again. Only here and there in
the intervening books are there signs of its being borne in
mind. Some such signs occur in VI, but not many: and there
are more references backward to the subject of VIin X vi—vili
—those important chapters in which the nature of Happiness
is fully and finally explained—than anticipations in VI of the
coming discussion in x. So that when it is asked, What has
intellectual goodness to do with happiness? and how does the
knowledge of what intellectual goodness is help to the know-
ledge of what happiness is? it is x rather than VI that

l See Analytics 8g Ὁ το.

74 INTRODUCTION

supplies the answer. It will ‘therefore be desirable, after
noticing one or two signs in VI that the main question is not
forgotten there, to consider the extent to which X vi—viii
refers to, agrees with, and depends upon the statements of VI.
By this means it will become clear how far these two discus-
sions may be taken together as presenting a consistent view
of the relation of intellectual goodness to happiness, and it
will be easier to see what that relation is.

The chief indications in ΝῚ that the main question of the
£thics is remembered are as follows:—(1) VI i opens with a
reminder that the final end for man has yet to be found.
Since moral goodness is relative to that final end and not
absolute, and since nothing that is relative to another thing
can be fully known until the other thing is known, the nature
of moral goodness cannot be fully known until the nature of
the final end is known. Not only the ὀρθὸς λόγος has to be
discovered, but also the σκοπός to which it refers, the ὅρος
τῶν μεσοτήτων. This σκοπός or ὅρος is of course Happiness,
the final end. (2) In opening the subject of intellectual
goodness Aristotle does. not indeed refer to the obvious
reason for doing so, that in order to answer the main question
we must know what the best and completest goodness is and
that therefore the nature of intellectual as well as moral
goodness must be understood. But ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ
οἰκεῖον (1139 a 16), and ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων
ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον (1139 Ὁ 12), are statements that recognise
the principle of I vii, where it is said that the way to learn
what εὐδαιμονία is will be to see what τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
is (1097 b 24). VI ii is an argument in exact accord with
this principle, for its object is to fix generally the ἔργον of
each part of the intellect. ᾿Αλήθεια, it declares, is this ἔργον:
and the final words, 1139 Ὁ 12 καθ᾽ ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις
ἀχηθεύσει ἑκάτερον (sc. νοητικὸν μόριον) αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν,
are simply a special application of the general statement of
1097 Ὁ 26 ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ. (3) Φρό-
νησις is according to VI περὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ ἀνθρώπῳ.
This.implies that φρόνησις leads to knowledge of the best
thing of all for man, and indeed in one place the use of the

INTRODUCTION ᾿ς

τ >

superlative expresses this doctrine openly: 1141 b 12 6
ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχα-
στικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. (4) The conception of εὐδαιμονία
as the end is introduced quite definitely in chapters xii and
ΧΗ: 1143 Ὁ 19 ἡ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρήσει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων
ἄνθρωπος, 1144 ἃ 3—S οὕτως ἡ σοφία (sc. ποιεῖ) εὐδαιμονίαν...
6 ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα : and the major premiss of
the practical syllogism is said to be a statement of the final
end: 1144 a 31 of yap συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν
ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος Kal τὸ ἄριστον.---Τῆε
above special passages show that in vI the scheme of inquiry
laid down in I is consciously adhered to, and the final discus-
sion of X anticipated. It is not hard to see that the general
tenor of VI is consistent with the main purpose of the E¢szcs.
The main question, What is Happiness? is taken up
in X vi in the following way. Certain results of I are re-
capitulated: that εὐδαιμονία is not a ἕξις but an ἐνέργεια,
that it must be good in itself and not a means to anything
else. In the light of the examination of ἀρετή that has
occupied a large part of the Evhics, it is pronounced that αἱ
κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις satisfy the above two conditions. The
suggestion that certain kinds of παιδία or amusement also
satisfy those conditions is examined carefully and rejected:
παιδίαι may be good as means, but not as ends: whereas ai
κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις are good as ends. Chapter vii carries
the argument further. The next step is again one that has
been taken already in I: it was there shown that if there are
more ἀρεταί than one, εὐδαιμονία must be ἐνέργεια according
to the best and completest ἀρετή : this conclusion is simply
repeated in X vii, 1177 a 12 εὔλογον κατὰ THY κρατίστην (SC.
ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐνέργειαν) : only it is now known,
what was not known before, that there are in fact more ἀρεταί
than one. The step after this, αὕτη δ᾽ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου, is a
new one: neither in I nor elsewhere has it been said that the
_goodness of an ἀρετή is proportional to the goodness of that
of- which it is the ἀρετή. This principle is however, if not
openly expressed, at least tacitly assumed in vi. The objects

1 Whether or not the principle is sound need not be discussed here.

76 INTRODUCTION

of the activity of σοφία are shown to be better in themselves
than the objects of the activity of φρόνησις : σοφία therefore
better than φρόνησις (1141 a 20, 1143 b 34): the part of the
soul whose ἀρετή is σοφία therefore better than the part whose
ἀρετή is φρόνησις (1145 a 6 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ᾽ ἐστὶ
(sc. ἡ φρόνησις) τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου). The
nature of τὸ ἄριστον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ἴ5 the next thing
described in X vii, in terms that evidently refer to the results
of a discussion of intellectual ἀρετή, which can be nothing else
than vi if that book—as I have elsewhere tried to show—is
Aristotle’s work and a genuine part of the L¢thics. The
ἄριστον μέρος is said (1177 a 13) to be either νοῦς or ἄλλο τι ὃ
δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ
καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὃν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ
θειότατον. The vagueness of this reference to the results of
vI is corrected in an external sort of fashion by the next
sentence: ὅτι δ᾽ ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται. It has been main-
tained indeed that the ἐνέργεια of the best part of the soul
has not, in spite of the assertion here, been said to be θεωρη-
τική: and it may be said that νοῦς is not in vi the name of
the part of the soul whose ἀρετή is copia and which is said to
be the best part of the soul. I shall now try to remove these
objections, to show that the θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἀρίστου
μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν is θεωρία κατὰ
σοφίαν according to the definition of σοφία in VI, and gene-
rally that X vi—viii is consistent with, and uses, the results
obtained in VI.

(a) It is actually implied, and that unmistakably, in Χ
vi—viii, that εὐδαιμονία is intellectual activity κατὰ σοφίαν.
Thus at 1177 a 23, arguing that the definition of εὐδαιμονία
just given satisfies the requirement that the happy life should
be a pleasurable one, Aristotle says ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν
ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν" δοκεῖ
γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν : here the use of
φιλοσοφία as a synonym of σοφία proves that σοφία means
here what it means in VI, for σοφία in VI and φιλοσοφία in
the Metaphysics have the same three divisions θεολογική
(σοφία in the narrow sense 1142 a 17) μαθηματική φυσικὴ

INTRODUCTION 77

(Ethics 1142 a 17—18, Metaphysics 1026 a 18—19), and so
are plainly the same thing. Again, at 1177 a 30—34, the
δίκαιος, the σώφρων, the ἀνδρεῖος, and the exponents of
practical ἀρετή. generally, are contrasted with the σοφός.
The term σοφός is also used of the θεωρητικός twice at the
end of chapter viii: 1179 a 29 πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλιστ᾽
ὑπάρχει, ἃ 32 ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ᾽ εὐδαίμων. As it is only in VI
that σοφός and σοφία are marked off as theoretic, it is plain
that X vi—vili makes use of the results there obtained.

(6) It is true that nowhere in VI is θεωρία κατὰ σοφίαν
in so many words said to be θεωρητική. But there is nothing
to show that Aristotle is laying stress on the actual use of the
term θεωρητικός when he says ὅτι δ᾽ ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ εἴρηται.
He may just as well mean that the activity of the best part
of the soul has been shown to possess certain qualities which
are (he now implies) expressed by the epithet θεωρητικός.
The θεωρητικὸς Bios was opposed in I (1095 b 19, 1096 a 4)
to the πολιτικὸς Bios, and as VI shows (indeed states) that the
πολιτικὴ ἀρετή is φρόνησις, it must imply that the θεωρητικὴ
ἀρετή is copia. Again, 1139 a 27 calls the non-practical
intellect θεωρητική, opposing it to the πρακτική: and the
inference that the activities of these two parts of the intellect
may be given the same epithets is not a difficult one.

(c) Itis true that in vI the best part of the soul, whose
ἀρετή is σοφία, is not called νοῦς. It is called τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν
in VI, or τὸ βελτίον μόριον, whereas νοῦς in VI is the name of
the intellect as a whole, or of one ἀρετή or one part of the
ἀρετή of the ἐπιστημονικόν, or in one passage (1143 8 25—
b 5) of one ἀρετή of the λογιστικόν, or (as at 1144 b 12 ἐὰν δὲ
λάβῃ νοῦν) of the ἀρετή of the λογιστικόν as a whole: but
νοῦς never in VI is used to mean τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν. But this
need cause no trouble. Νοῦς in X vii is probably used (in
much the same sense as in VI ii) to mean the intellect in
general, and is distinguished from the inferior part of the soul,
whose ἐνέργεια is πρακτική, in the same way as, in VI ii,
διάνοια αὐτή is distinguished from διάνοια conjoined with
ὄρεξις. And in any case the words (1177 a 14) εἴτε ἄλλο τι
show that Aristotle attaches no importance to the question of

78 INTRODUCTION

terminology, and is ready to employ a term of traditional
dignity where a term of dignity is wanted, even at the sacrifice
of consistent usage.

(d) A number of details in x vi—viii show agreement
with or dependence upon the doctrine of vI and the form in
which it is there expressed. (i) 1177 ἃ 15 ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ
καλῶν καὶ θείων agrees with the description in vi of the
objects of σοφία as τὰ τιμιώτατα (1141 a 20), τὰ θειότατα τὴν
φύσιν (implied by 1141 Ὁ 1), θαυμαστὰ χαλεπὰ δαιμόνια
(1141 Ὁ 6). (ii) The opposition of οἱ εἰδότες (1177 ἃ 26) to
of ζητοῦντες accords with VI, where σοφία is not said to lead
to good searching into truth, but to the contemplation of it
when known, which is regarded as a better thing: whereas
the goodness of φρόνησις is essentially productive of good
βούλευσις (a form of ζήτησις, as is said at 1142 a 31).
(iii) The relation between φρόνησις (which has in Χ the
precise meaning of practical intellectual ἀρετή given it in VI)
and ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, determined with great care in VI Xii—xXill,
is accurately recapitulated 1178 a 16—19, the previous dis-
cussion of it obviously assumed. (iv) Just as at the end of
VI φρόνησις is said to be a means to the production of σοφία
(1145 a 8 ὁρᾷ ὅπως γένηται), so the πολιτικὸς Bios is said to
be a means to the production of εὐδαιμονία (1177 Ὁ 12---15),
which is only another way of stating the same fact.

If the facts given above are enough to show what they are
intended to show, that vi-and x vi—viii are in the main
thoroughly consistent with each other, the way is clear for
considering how intellectual ἀρετή (the subject of VI) is
related to εὐδαιμονία (the subject of X vi—vili): for it is from
these two portions of the £¢#zcs that most or all of the avail-
able information about the relation in question will naturally
be obtained. The nature of intellectual ἀρετή in itself, the
proper subject of v1, I have examined already. The relation
of intellectual ἀρετή to εὐδαιμονία is now to be considered,
and for this purpose it will be necessary to look carefully at
certain of the arguments and conclusions of X vi—viii, where
the nature of εὐδαιμονία is set forth.

It must be observed that these chapters are taken up not

INTRODUCTION 79

so much with describing the particular activity, θεωρία κατὰ
σοφίαν, which according to them is εὐδαιμονία, as in making
good its claim to be εὐδαιμονία and disputing the claim of
other activities to share the distinction with it. What θεωρία
κατὰ σοφίαν is has been described in ΥἹ, for in describing the
ἀρετή that book described the ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν: and
VI in its turn, as has been remarked elsewhere, really only
applies the information set forth not there but in the Logical,
Metaphysical and Physical treatises. In the same way θεωρία
κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν, which together with πρᾶξις κατὰ τὴν
ἄλλην ἀρετήν makes, we are told, an inferior kind of εὐδαιμονία,
is not in the same three chapters described in itself at any
length, for it has been described in 11--ΥΊ, and vi1—1x and
the early part of xX have all helped to throw light on it: what
the three chapters X vi—viii have to do is to apply the results
of those books to show how far it is, and how far it is not, a
part of εὐδαιμονία the greatest good for man.

The nature of ideal εὐδαιμονία, as set forth in x vi—viii, is
not hard to see. It is, as the general definition of εὐδαιμονία
in I required that it should be found to be, a pure ψυχῆς
ἐνέργεια. It has not, properly speaking, anything to do with
any ἐνέργεια of the body or any other ἐνέργεια of-the soul—
that is, it is independent of all πρᾶξις and of all other kinds
of θεωρία: these are only connected with it as servants with
their master. It is, according to the doctrine that the best
part of a man constitutes his real self, truly human: for it is
the activity of the best part of the soul, the theoretic intellect.
If human beings were so constituted, and placed in such
conditions, that this best part of them could exercise its
activity equally well no matter what happened to all the rest
of them, there would be no need to carry the inquiry further :
no activity of mind or body; except the contemplation of
eternal truth, would be necessary either as an ingredient part
of happiness or as an external means to its production.

But it is in truth only in a rather mystical and unreal
sense that a man can be said to be the best part of himself
and that only: the very words in which the statement is
made show how inconsistent it is with the plain facts. Man

80 INTRODUCTION

is a composite being, composite of better and worse, and
whatever his happiness might be under ideal conditions,
under actual conditions it cannot be attained by cultivating
one part of himself, even though that be the best, to the
neglect of the other parts, even though these be in themselves
inferior. His soul is like a household made up of master and
servants: the master is the best part of the household, but
the happiness of the household will not be secured by neglect-
ing the well-being of the servants. The goodness of the
inferior parts of the soul, and their activity according to that
goodness, are necessary to the happiness of man, simply
because he is a composite being, the divine and the animal
intermixed. The question is whether the goodness and good
activity of the inferior parts should be considered actual
ingredients of the happiness of the composite man, or merely
external means to that happiness, made necessary by the fact
that man is composite. It will be easier to answer this
question after seeing as far as possible what Aristotle takes
the goodness and good activity of the inferior parts to be.
The goodness consists in a combination of moral goodness
with a certain kind of intellectual goodness, and its nature
has been accurately and fully described in the last two chap-
ters of vI. The consequent activity is good προαίρεσις or
purpose—the intention of doing certain good things that is
the result of the intellectual perception that they ought to be
done and the desire to do them. In a sense the making of
this kind of προαίρεσις is the whole good activity, and in a
sense it is incomplete. Aristotle recognises the difficulty of
deciding whether it is the purpose or the fulfilment of the
purpose that is really important and that determines the
happiness of man in so far as happiness depends on this part
of the soul: 1178 a 34 ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε πότερον κυριώτερον
τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης.
He returns answer, with more confidence than he gives
grounds for, τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη. This
happiness, then, is not a mere activity of the soul—it depends
on the activity of the body as well, if it is to be ‘complete.’
It does not, therefore, fulfil: the requirement of the definition

INTRODUCTION 81

in I that happiness should be an ἐνέργεια τῆς ψυχῆς, for that
definition implies that it should not be the ἐνέργεια of any-
thing but the soul, even in part: this inferior happiness does
not, in short, deserve the name of happiness as much as the
superior kind deserves it. This conclusion is indeed regarded
as sound not so much because of its abstract and logical
consistency with the definition reached in 1 as because it is
confirmed by a comparison of the qualities found to attach to
the two sorts of good activity in practice. The life of θεωρία
κατὰ σοφίαν, being set side by side with the life of θεωρία καὶ
πρᾶξις κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν, is found to be superior to it in
every point. It is pleasanter: it is more unbroken: it is
nobler in itself, as being the activity of the noblest part of
the soul: it is more independent of circumstances: it is more
final, that is, more desired for itself as an end and not as a
means to something else: it is more like what the life of God
must be conceived to be: it is more in accordance with the
divine will, if a divine will exists. All these advantages are
connected with the cardinal difference between it and its
rival, that it is pure activity of soul, its rival the joint activity
of soul and body.

To return now to the question, How far is the βίος κατὰ
τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν an end in itself? Is the happiness of the
servants in the household necessary because that happiness
is a necessary external means to the happiness of the master,
who is so situated that he must be a part of a household and
cannot dispense with the offices of his servants? Or is the
happiness of the servants necessary because they are an
integral part of the household, the happiness of which as a
whole, and not the happiness of the master only, is the final
end to be obtained, and because this happiness of the whole
household is really the sum of the happiness of its parts?
The fact is that Aristotle does not appear to have asked
himself this question, or to have clearly grasped the distinc-
tion that it involves. He was indeed dimly conscious of both
points of view at different times. Thus in vi he speaks of
φρόνησις and σοφία as being valuable in themselves as integral
parts of ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή and so of that happiness which is (it is

ο. 6

82 INTRODUCTION

obviously assumed) the activity naturally resulting from ἡ ὅλη
ἀρετή (1144 ἃ 3—6): thus putting σοφία on a level with
φρόνησις as a mere constituent part of a whole that is different
from and superior to either, and consequently putting the
Bios κατὰ σοφίαν on a level with the Bios κατὰ φρόνησιν,
requiring both to be combined, for the composite human
being, to produce that Bios κατ᾽ εὐδαιμονίαν which is better
than either separately. On the other hand at the end of VI
the inferiority of φρόνησις to σοφία, and the consequently
implied inferiority of the Bios κατὰ φρόνησιν to the Bios κατὰ
σοφίαν, we find stated in strong terms; this truth being
upheld in face of the fact that in actual life the φρόνιμος
gives directions to the σοφός, or the practical part of a man
to the theoretic part of him, and not vice versa. The wording
of Χ vi—viii is everywhere vague where this question comes
up. Thus 1177 b 27 οὐ yap ἣ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται
ἀλλ᾽ ἣ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει does not settle the question
as to how far a man should live οὕτως and how far 4 ἄνθρωπός
ἐστιν. Nor does the practical dogma χρὴ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται
ἀθανατίζειν (1177 Ὁ 31) settle the question as it appears to
do at first sight: for it gives no principle by which the ques-
tion πόσον ἐνδέχεται; can be answered. It tells no more
than the equally vague 1178 Ὁ 5 3 ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι
συζῇ, αἱρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν. The question
still remains, How far should a man in practice ἀθανατίζειν
and how far ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι (1177 Ὁ 31, 1178 Ὁ 7)? Casuistry
could present countless cases in which a conflict of duties
would arise, where ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι could hinder a@avarifew
and ἀθανατίξειν would hinder ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. But Aristotle
takes no account of the possibility of this. In the same way
he refuses to analyse the intellectual standpoint of those
persons who choose the πολιτικὸς Bios without any reference
to the θεωρητικὸς Bios. Actions are good, according to
Aristotle, in proportion as they lead to the θεωρητικὸς Bios
as the end. For the man who does not consider this to be
the end, and does not in any way aim at it as the end, what
standard remains to make any action better or worse than
any other? Aristotle evidently cannot make out that there

INTRODUCTION 83

is any standard. He would probably say that the πολιτικός
(in the sense of the man who rejects the ideal of the θεωρητικὸς.
βίος) is a man who does not order his conduct on scientific
principles, and must take his rules of conduct, in so far as he
has any, from those who do recognise the true standard,
and by reference to it know what actions are good and what.
are bad. The irrational life led by such a man is not that of
the true πολιτικός or φρόνιμος, who ὁρᾷ ὅπως ἡ σοφία γένηται,
who knows what is really good for man (i.e. what happiness
is), and who determines the moral mean by reference to that
happiness. Pericles knew what true happiness was: he did
not realise it by his own life, as Anaxagoras did, but he
knew, better than Anaxagoras, ‘the external means to it: he
could ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι better, though he could not déavarifew
so well. It is only in complete isolation from the ideal of the
θεωρητικὸς Bios that the πολιτικὸς Bios becomes irrational.
Such seems to be the logical outcome of Aristotle’s doctrine,
and there is nothing in X vi—viii to contradict this view; but
at the same time there is no sufficient evidence in those
chapters to show that Aristotle had clearly worked it out.
He probably followed to some extent the feelings of the
ordinary man in attributing to moral actions an independent
goodness of their own, and would allow the πολιτικὸς βίος to
possess a certain rationality and value even though it should
ignore or contemn the θεωρητικὸς Bios altogether.

The above arguments have attempted to define the rela-
tion of intellectual goodness to happiness conceived by
Aristotle so far as to show (1) that σοφία is the intellectual
ἀρετή which leads, under ideal conditions, to real happiness
of the best kind: (2) that since man is a composite being, the
conditions are not ideal, so that the possession of σοφία is
not in itself enough to ensure him happiness: (3) that ¢po-
ynow is the intellectual ἀρετή that combines with moral
ἀρετή (from which it is in practice inseparable) to form an
inferior kind of goodness that gives rise to an inferior kind
of good activity: (4) that this inferior goodness and good
activity cannot rationally be desired, nor indeed their nature
be understood, except as a means to the superior, though in

6—2

84 INTRODUCTION

practice they are often irrationally desired and attained for
their own sake: (5) that it is uncertain whether this inferior
goodness and good activity, when considered in their proper
light as means to the higher, should be considered purely
external means to a happiness of which they are themselves
no part, or rather themselves component parts of a happiness
which, as belonging to a being composite of better and worse,
must itself be composite of better and worse.

Expressed in less technical language, these conclusions
are more or less the following: (1) that the best way any
man can pass his life, circumstances permitting him, is in the
intelligent study of physics, mathematics and metaphysics:
(2) that the circumstances of human life will not allow any
man to pass his time in this way uninterruptedly: (3) that
the right practical conduct of life is, under the circumstances,
a necessity for every man: (4) that the rightness of practical
conduct really consists, though people do not always see this,
in the extent to which it favours the purely intellectual life:
(5) that it is uncertain how far such right practical conduct is
good in itself and a part of man’s happiness, and how far it is
merely a means to that intellectual life which alone is worth
having for its own sake.

It thus appears that the relation of σοφία to εὐδαιμονία is
far more direct than the relation of φρόνησις to εὐδαιμονία.
For whereas the activity that arises from σοφία is either
εὐδαιμονία itself or the best and most important part of
εὐδαιμονία, the activity that arises from φρόνησις is only one
element in that complex activity (ὀρθὴ προαίρεσις) which
itself must be combined with πρᾶξις to make a still more
complex activity (θεωρία καὶ πρᾶξις κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν)
which is either not εὐδαιμονία at all or is at best an inferior
and less important part of εὐδαιμονία. Again to make use
of less technical language, this may be stated as follows:
Philosophic wisdom gives rise to happiness far more directly
than practical wisdom. For the intelligent study of physics
mathematics and metaphysics is either the only thing a man
can do that is good in itself, or at least the best of the things
that are good in themselves. But practical wisdom is only

INTRODUCTION 85

useful because it combines with moral goodness to make
people wish to do right actions in practical life; and sucha
wish is only useful because it leads to the doing of those
right actions; and those right actions are either useless in
themselves, and only good because they lead to the intel-
lectual life, or else, at best, are less good in themselves than
the intellectual life.

HOIKQN NIKOMAXEIQON
Ζ

1138 b HOIKGON NIKOMAXEIOON Z

I

> Ν XN 4 ¢ > 4 ν ὃ lig ἃς
18 ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες OTL δεῖ τὸ
lal Ν Ἂς Ν »
μέσον αἱρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν,
εν 4
29 τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ws ὁ λόγος 6 ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλω-
n Ly, , ‘\
μεν. ἐν πάσαις yap ταῖς εἰρημέναις Leow, καθάπερ καὶ
an a c
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὃ
¥ o
Tov λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, Kal τις ἔστιν ὄρος
a > ἮΝ A \
TOV μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς Kat
a 3 - + ‘ ~ 3 θὸ λ ‘a 3, ὃ Ν
χε τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι OE
x ‘ > ἂν NA 3 x Z 24 \ id ἣ
τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές. καὶ
ΝΣ 7» 2 ΄ ἢ νι 9 x > ΄
γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη,
ἂν. ἃ 3 θὲ ἣν 3 “Ὁ 4 ἊΣ ν »ᾺἬ > ia ὃ un
τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, OTL οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω ὃὲει
lal > Ν ε ἊΝ ἣν ne Ἂς 4 XN » ε > ς
πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς
, om ἂς ὰ » »¥ ION EN > ὦ ΄,
30 λόγος: τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον,
a aA a A »
οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν
ν μὰ © 3 Ν ’ a Se ε , ¥ Pa, wn
ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει Kal ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ
\ Ν Ν ΩΝ lal 9 x ΄ > a >
καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι
An > va > ἢ 4 , s ὡς ε 5 Ἂς
34 τοῦτο εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς
λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.

K= Laurentianus L= Parisiensis O= Riccardianus

M=Marcianus 213 T'=vetus versio Bek=Bekker 1831

Byw=Bywater 1894 Sus=Susemihl 1880 (ed. altera curavit Apelt 1903)
(The readings of Fritzsche (1851) Grant (1874) and Ramsauer (1878) are the

same as Bekker’s unless otherwise stated : and those of Burnet (1900) the same as
Bywater’s unless otherwise stated.)

1138 19 μὴ Καὶ Byw: καὶ μὴ LM Bek Sus

33 ἀληθῶς K Sus Byw.: ἀληθὲς L M Bek
34 τίς ἐστιν K Byw: τίς τ᾽ ἐστιν 1, M Bek Sus

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 1138 Ὁ

I

We have said already that it is necessary to choose the 18
mean, and not the excess nor the defect : and since the mean
is fixed by Right Reason, let us examine this notion! With 20
all the qualities? that have been discussed—and indeed with
all other qualities? too—there exists some mark, as it were, to
be hit, upon which the possessor of Reason keeps his eyes,
and bends his bow more or less strongly accordingly: and
there is a standard for determining those mean states which,
we say, lie between excess and defect, and are fixed by Right 25
Reason.

Now such a statement is true, but not at all instructive:
Not only here, but in all other affairs that are regulated by
system, it is a true statement that we must not exert ourselves,
nor yet take our ease, either too much or too little, but to a
middle extent, and as much as Right Reason bids. But if a
man possesses only this-information he cannot thereby be any 30
wiser than before: he cannot know what sort of medicines,
for instance, he ought to apply to his body, if he is simply
told ‘Whatever the medical art prescribes, and according to
the directions of the man who understands that art’ In
the same way, with regard to the qualities of the mind, it
is necessary not only to make such a true statement as the
foregoing, but also to define exactly what Right Reason is, 34
and what the standard is to which this Right Reason refers.

2

1 sc. of Right Reason. 2 sc. good qualities, ἀρεταί.

90 ARISTOTLE »

1139a τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ
ἤθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν
ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς
πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμέω οὕτως. πρότερον per οὖν
ἐλέχθη δύ᾽ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον oer καὶ
57d ἄλογον: νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ExovTos τὸν αὐτὸν
Epouer διαιρετέον, καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ Abyor ἐχοντας
ἕν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ
μὴ ΡΟΝ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα" πρὸς
γὰρ τὰ τῷ "γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον
10 τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητά
τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω
δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν" “τὸ
γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βου-
λεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν: ὥστε τὸ
15 λογιστικόν ἐστιν ἕν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. ληπτέον
ἄρα ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις" αὕτη γὰρ
ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου. ἡ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ. πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον.

I]

al ΄ > 3 ἴω ita \ 7 id x
τρία δή ἐστιν ἐν TH ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως Kat

> , ΕΣ aA »” , > ε ¥
ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις. τούτων. δ᾽ ἡ αἴσθησις

> a > \ ΄ ~ mt A , ¥
20 οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως: δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν
Ν » , δὲ Ν “A ¥ δ᾽ Y τ ΑΝ ὃ ΄
μὲν ἔχειν, πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. ἔστι δ᾽ ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ
i Ν 3 , ἴω > > , 7 μὴ wv
κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτο ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή"
ν > > S26 αὶ \ 2 Ἂν & “ & x 4
ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ Tpoat-

” , lal x a > i ,
ρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτική, Set διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε λόγον
35 a oe Ν ἣν μὰ ΕΣ ΄ ¥ ε ΄
25 ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις
vf Ν Ν > ‘\ Ν . ΓΙ Ν ᾿ F

σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν.
ν a Sa € ἡ Ἂς. ε > a 4 a“ 7
αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική: τῆς δὲ

1139217 τρία δή Byw: τρία δ᾽ codd. Bek Sus
24 ταῦτα μὲν K Byw : ταῦτα Bek Sus: μὲν ταῦτα LO: ταὐτὰ coni. Apelt

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI ΘΙ

Now in classifying the excellences of the mind we said
that some were of the moral character’ and others of the 1139 a
intellect. Moral excellences we have discussed at length;
let us now discuss the others.

We must introduce the discussion with some psychology.
It was stated before that there are two parts of the mind, that
which has reason and that which has not: and now a similar 5
division must be made of the part which has reason. It may
be taken as an accepted fact that there are two divisions of
the soul that have reason, one with which we consider all
those existing things whose elements? are invariable, and
one with which we consider the things that are variable: for
the parts of the soul that are adapted for perceiving generically 10
different things are themselves generically different: since the
power which they possess of perceiving those things is due to
some kind of resemblance to and kinship with them. Of
these parts, the one may be called the scientific; and the
other may be called the calculative, for deliberation is the
same thing as calculation, and no one deliberates about things
that are invariable, so that one division of the part of the soul
that possessés reason may be called the calculative. 15

We must, then, discover what the best permanent condition
of each of these parts of the mind is: for this best permanent
condition is its excellence in each case.

The excellence of each part of the mind must depend
upon the special work which that part performs.

I]

Now there are in the mind three faculties whose work it is
to cause responsible action and knowledge of truth*: sense-
perception, intellect, and desire. Of these, sense-perception
can never‘ cause responsible action: this is shown by the fact
that the lower animals possess sense-perception, but are devoid 20
of the power of responsible action.

Assent and denial in intellect correspond to pursuit and
avoidance in desire. Since moral excellence is a permanent
condition of the mind as concerned with the purposing of
actions, and purpose is desire based upon deliberation: it
follows that if purpose is to be good, the intellect must be
truthful’, and the desire must be right, and the intellect must 25
assent to the same things as those which the desire pursues.
This kind of intellect, and this kind of truth, are concerned

1 i.e. of that part of the mind which has to do with the moral sphere.
2 oy ‘fundamental principles.’ 3 i.e. either or both of these in each case.

4 ive. directly (it may be the basis of νοῦς or ὄρεξι). 5 j.e. must a¢tazn truth.

92 ARISTOTLE

A ᾿ N A \ a N
θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς TO
> ἧς a 3 ΄ 3 Ν a) a , 3
εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος---τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι
ἴω lal A Ἂν
3. παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον' τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ δια-
Ἔ Ἂ ae
νοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχονσα TH ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ.
ζ΄. Ν 5 > AN , 9 ε ΄ ἰλλ᾽
πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις---ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις a
3 Ὃν ΚΡ ΄ ἧς, εξ Ν ΄ e ἂν i“
οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα--- προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις Kat λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά
κ᾿ y¥ > »¥ a ‘ ὃ , yo » 6 nA
τινος: διὸ οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ ἠθικὴης
2 ON Ψ ε ἼΑ 2 ΄ δ Ν᾽ ΄
35 ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις" [εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον
> ἊΨ ¥ # Ν 70 ΗΝ. x ὃ ,
ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὐκ éotw.] διάνοια
3 aN 29 SN > > ¢ ἂν ΄ \ ΄
δ᾽ αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἐνεκά του καὶ πρακτική.
1139 Ὁ αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει: ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ
a € an Ν 3 € a > XN / ΄
πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς (ἀλλὰ πρός τι καί τινος)
‘\ ἡ 3 ἧς Ἂν ΄ ε ἂν = - 4 ε δ᾽
τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν: ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἢ
an Ἄ
«ὄρεξις τούτου. διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ
. 3
ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. οὐκ
ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν. οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται
» la > A XN Fa 4 lal
λιον πεπορθηκέναι: οὐδὲ yap βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ yeyo-
3 Ν ZN “ > ΄ XN 2S , Ν Ν
νότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ. ἐσομένον καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ
εἶ 3 3 ᾿ \ / \ κα ἥν ὁ ,
γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι: διὸ ὀρθῶς ᾿Αγάθων
4 < + an Ν \ FA
10 μόνον yap av’TOUV και θεὸς OTEPLOKETAL,
ἀγένητα ποιεῖν aco’ ἂν ἢ πεπραγμένα.

> Cal 3 nm “ 7 > ii ‘3 »
ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον.

θ᾽ a > ΄ . > , Cae a
καθ᾽ as οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον, αὗται
ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

ΠῚ

> ΄ > ” in
ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν.
» N - ἥς ὦ a
15 ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι,
pd Ν 3 lal
πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν: ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνη-

1139 a 30 ἀλήθεια KO Byw: ἡ ἀλήθεια 1, Μ Bek Sus
34 εὐπραξία γὰρ...35 οὐκ ἔστιν seclusi

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 93

with action. The speculative kind of intellect, which is not
concerned with action nor with production, does its work
well and ill in reaching truth and falsehood respectively.
This reaching of truth, indeed, is the work of every part
of the intellect. But the part of the intellect that is 30
concerned with action does its work well when it reaches
truth that is in agreement with right desire.

The cause of responsible action (the efficient, not the final
cause) is purpose: and the cause of purpose is desire together
with intellect referred to some end. So that purpose cannot
exist without both intellect (νοῦς or διάνοια) and a moral con-
dition of the mind?: for in the sphere of action good action and
the reverse cannot exist without intellect and moral character. 35

But intellect by itself excites no action: it is only intellect
referred to some end, and concerned with action, that does so.
This kind of intellect concerned with action controls as well 1139 b
the intellect concerned with production. For every man who
produces a thing produces it with some further end in view:
the thing which is made is not an absolute end, but has
reference to, and belongs to, something else: whereas the
thing done zs an absolute end, for good activity is an absolute
end, and it is this at which desire of action aims.

Purpose, therefore, may be called either intellect based
upon desire or desire based upon intellect: and purpose as a ς
cause makes a human being®. Nothing:that has taken place
is purposed: nobody, for instance, purposes to have sacked
Troy: for no one even deliberates about what has taken place,
but only about what is in the future and may or may not
happen, whereas it is not possible that what has taken place
should not have taken place, so that Agathon rightly says

For even God lacks this one thing alone 10
To make a deed that has been done undone.

The reaching of truth, then, is the proper work of both
the intellectual parts of the mind. Therefore the excellence
of each part will be the quality that causes it to reach truth.

II]

Let us, then, make a fresh beginning, and consider these
excellences in a new way. Now it may be taken for granted 15
that there are five conditions of mind that cause it to reach
truth in what it affirms or denies: and these are called

1 1,6. the moral part of the mind, active, and in some condition or other.
2 i.e. it is the peculiar property of human beings (as distinguished from gods
and from beasts) to have purpose as the cause of their actions.

94 ARISTOTLE

ΕΝ
cal Ν # > id
σις σοφία νοῦς: ὑπολήψει yap καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται δια-
,
ψεύδεσθαι.
κε ἴων > a
ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ
3 ad Ἂς Ν > on a“ ε ΄
ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν.
΄ \ ε / a > ᾽ θ ἈΝ δέ θ
20 πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα, μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι
: : . ms
ἄλλως ἔχειν: τὰ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ
a 3
θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης
ov 5 εἶ es / 27 », x Ν > > ΄
ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. ἀΐδιον ἄρα: τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης
” ε A , 3927 Ν ἧς. πάρα > 2 ἃ ᾧ
ὄντα ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀΐδια. τὰ δὲ ἀΐδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα.

», BY a > , an > Ν LY 32 Ν
25ετι διδακτὴ πασα ETMLOTY μη δοκεῖ εἰναυ, Και ΤΟ ETLOTYTOV

wn

id J Ζ mt a ad
μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία,
yg “ “ Ἂν 3
ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν: ἣ μὲν γὰρ du

lal a Ψ ᾿ lal
ἐπαγωγῆς, 7 δὲ συλλογισμῷ. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχῆς
> ᾿ Ἂν, “ 4 ε Ἄ, ἧς 3 ~ τὰ
ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου.
> κα μὲ 3 Ν 3 a ε ΄ a. > »¥
30. εἰσὶν apa ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὃ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι
συλλογισμός: ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν
Ld > ΄ ν 5 3» ΄ 2 nN
ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, Kal ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς
ἀναλυτικοῖς: ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ
ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαΐ, ἐπίσταται: εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμ-
4 ay, 7
35 περάσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει THY ἐπιστήμην. περὶ
\ > \ ἃν
μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

IV

1140a τοῦ δ᾽ ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν
καὶ πρακτόν. ἕτερον δ᾽ ἐστὶν ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις (πισ-
τεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις): ὦστε

καὶ ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ

5 λόγου ποιητικῆς ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων'
οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξίς ἐστιν.

1139 20 μὴ LM Bek Sus Burnet : μηδ᾽ Καὶ Byw
25 ἅπασα Byw: ἡ ἅπασα Καὶ M: πᾶσα, Bek Sus Burnet

28 ἀρχῆς cum L scripsi: ἀρχή K M edd.
1140a § περιέχεται K 1, Ramsauer Sus Byw: περιέχονται M Bek

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 95

art}, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wis-
dom, and inductive reason: for supposition and opinion may
fail to reach truth.

What scientific knowledge is will be clear from the following
considerations. (We must use the word in its strict sense,
and not be led astray by its analogous uses.) We all hold 20
that what we scientifically know cannot vary: but when what
can vary is outside the range of our observation, we cannot
tell whether it exists or not. What is scientifically known
therefore exists of necessity. It is therefore everlasting: for
all things are everlasting that exist of absolute necessity.
And everlasting things cannot come into existence or perish.
It is held, moreover, that all scientific knowledge must be 25
taught, and that what is scientifically known must be learnt.
Now all teaching is based upon facts previously known, as we
also observe in the Analytics. It is done partly by induction,
partly by deduction. Induction leads to fundamental pro-
positions’, which are universals: deduction works from uni-
versals, There are therefore fundamental propositions, from
which deduction works, which cannot be reached by deduc-
tion: it is therefore induction that leads to them.

Scientific knowledge, then, is the quality of deductive
ability ; and it is all the additional things besides which in the
Analytics we define it as being: when a person reaches con-
viction in a certain way*, and the fundamental propositions‘
are known to him, then it is that he scientifically knows.
But® unless he is surer of his fundamental propositions than of
his conclusion, he will only have scientific knowledge in a 35
loose sense of the term’, This may be accepted as our
definition of scientific knowledge.

ῳ
ο

IV

The class of variable things includes what is made as well 1140 a

as what is done. Making and doing are two different things
—we are safe in believing ordinary people’s views on this
subject: and therefore also the intellectual quality that is
concerned with making is different from the intellectual quality
concerned with doing. So different, indeed, that neither is 5
even a part of the other: for doing is not making, and making
is not doing.

1 more exactly ‘artistic ability.’ 2 reading ἀρχῆς.

3 viz. as defined in the Analytics. | 4 sc. upon which this conviction is based.

5 lit. ‘for’ (sc. ‘and then only, for’).
6 i.e. he will have the form without the substance.

96 ARISTOTLE

s \ ¢ y
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη Tis ἐστι καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις
x rs δ 4.3 2 a » Fed 3 ἣν ν
μετὰ λόγου ποιητική, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις
3 x ΄ X y 3 Ce Ἂν 4 a >
ov μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἡ οὐ
Ν +. 4 » x ¢ Ἂς ΄ > aA
το τέχνη, TO αὐτὸ ἂν εἴη τέχνη Kal ἕξις μετὰ λόγον ἀληθοῦς
a * : x ON
ποιητική. ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ TO
τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχο-
3 > Ω > κ a
μένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ
lal 3 Ἂς Ν > on: it » Ν “ 3
ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ: οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ
a a
Is ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν
lal Ν » ὮΝ Ν >
κατὰ φύσιν: ἐν αὑτοῖς yap ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν.
“ gy 3
ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην
ποιήσεως ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ
N x 7 > ς 4 \ κς 4 ΄ Siow 4
τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ ᾿Αγάθων
φησὶ
20 τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.
ε \ > ΄ σ ¥ σ \ ΄
ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου
ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστιν, ἡ δ᾽ ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον μετὰ
λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως

»
EX ELV.

V

περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες
΄ a ΕἸ
25 τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι
Ν ΝΆ, ἴων
τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ
\ \ @ κ
καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ
x > , > Ν a Xx x μὰ a σ fat
πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. σημεῖον
δ᾽ ν Ν ‘ 4 ’ - ν -
OTL καὶ τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος
30 TL σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μὴ ἔστιν τέχνη. ὥστε
1108 11 καὶ θεωρεῖν codd. Bek Sus Byw: [καὶ] θεωρεῖν Muretus Coraes
Fritzsche Ramsauer
27 πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν K L Byw: πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἰσχύν M O

Sus: πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ ἰσχύν Bek
28 ζῆν ὅλως 1, Μ Sus Byw : ζῆν K Bek

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 97

: Now ability to build houses can be truly defined as an
intellectual quality concerned with making, and it is a kind
of art. And since there is no single art which is not an
intellectual quality concerned with making, and no such
quality which is not an art, the terms ‘art’ and ‘truth-reaching 10
intellectual quality concerned with making’ must be identical
in meaning.

All art is concerned with coming into existence, !and with
contrivance, and with! the consideration of how something
may come into existence which is capable of existing or not
existing, and the cause of whose existence is in the maker
and not in the thing made. For art is not concerned with
things that exist of necessity or come into existence of 15
necessity, nor yet with things that come into existence by
nature: for these latter contain the cause of their existence in
themselves.

Since making and doing are distinct, “and art is concerned
with making, it cannot therefore? be concerned with doing. |

Chance and art are in a way concerned with the same
things. As Agathon says

Art is beloved of Chance, and Chance of Art. 20
,

Art, then, as has been said, is ὅ6 truth-attaining intellectual
quality’, concerned with making. Its opposite, want of art, is
an intellectual quality, concerned with making, that fails to
attain truth. Both are concerned with the variable.

Vv

We shall get at the truth about practical wisdom by
considering what sort of persons we call practically wise.
Now it is held to be the mark of the practically wise man to 25
be able to deliberate well about the things that are good and
useful for himself: not what is useful for some special purpose,
not, for instance, what is good for his health or his strength:
but what is useful to him for a good life as a whole. This
usage is supported by the fact that when people calculate
well with a view to some particular good end, with which art
is not concerned, we call them practically wise about that 30
thing.

1 or [καὶ] ‘and artistic contrivance is.’
2 lit. ‘art must be concerned with making, and cannot.’
3 lit. ‘a quality with true reason.’

98 ARISTOTLE

. ᾽ 3
καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. βουλεύεται ὃ
“ Ν “ Ν >
οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδε-
a ν » ἥξ Ἂς, Ν
χομένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι. wot εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετὰ
a ¥ » ,
ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ᾽ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων
. » »
35 μὴ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν),
Xe 3 ¥ a ᾿ς get > > ré ἊΨ
1140 Ὁ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων,
> a
οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη
, ᾿ > ν
μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ᾽ ὅτι
ὁ 7 ‘ a , Ν ΚΣ" λ Ἂ κι 3 Ν
ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. λείπεται apa αὑτὴν
> ἘΝ 3 a x / \ ‘ X92 θ ,
5 εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ Ta ἀνθρώπῳ
A ψ x ΄ ᾿
ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος,
fal Ν , > ΕΝ »»» »Ά Ἂ 3 Ν ἢ > la
τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη: ἔστιν yap αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία
lal #
τέλος. διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα Kal τοὺς τοιούτους φρονί-
μους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς
το ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν: εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγού-
μεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς. ἔνθεν καὶ
τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς
“ζ \ , 14 δὲ ‘ a ε aN
σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν. σῴζει δὲ THY τοιαύτην ὑπόλη -
yw. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ δια-
τῳ Ἂς ε Ν bed ed “4 ν Ἂν. ‘3 ta
τς στρέφει TO ἡδὺ Kal λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι Td τρίγωνον δύο
3 Ἂς » Ἄ 3 »»» 3 Ν, ὅς Ἄ, XN δ᾿ ε
ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ
a a a °
μὲν yap ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα TA πρακτά'
τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι’ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται
3 4 ὑδὲ ὃ ox , μ᾿, IQ ἽΝ \ a ¢ oon
ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦτο αἱρεῖσθαι
20 πάντα καὶ πράττειν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς.
ν >» 5 £ ‘ ᾿ ν > μι. 2 > ~
ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ
‘ Ἂν Ξ θ a 2 θὰ la > Xx μ᾿ ἕω
περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης
1140 a 35 (πάντα γὰρ... ἄλλως ἔχειν), καὶ... ὄντων Michelet Fritzsche Bywater :
(πάντα γὰρ.. ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ... ὄντων) Bekker Ramsauer Grant
Stewart
1140 Ὁ 5 ἀληθῆ codd. Bek Byw: ἀληθοῦς Alexander in Metaph. 981 Ὁ 25,
Susemihl
14 καὶ λυπηρόν ΚΜ Byw : καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν L Bek Sus
15 δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει Byw: δύο ὀρθὰς ἴσας ἔχει pr. K: δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας

ἔχει L M Bek Sus
18 ἀρχή K M Byw: ἡ ἀρχή, Bek Sus

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 99

The man who is good at deliberating in general is
therefore the man who may be called practically wise in
general.

Now nobody deliberates about things which cannot vary,
or about things which it is not in his power to do.

Since, then, scientific knowledge is deductive; and since
deduction cannot lead to truth about those things whose
fundamental principles can vary—for everything about such 35
things can vary ; and since it is impossible to deliberate about 1140 Ὁ
things that exist of necessity :—practical wisdom cannot be
the same as scientific knowledge. Nor can it be the same as
art. It cannot be the same as scientific knowledge, because
what is done can vary: nor the same as art, because there is
a generic difference between doing and making.

It therefore follows that it is a truth-attaining intellectual 5
quality concerned with doing and with things that are good
and bad for human beings}.

For in making the end is other than the making itself:
but the end of doing cannot be other than the doing itself: for
doing well is itself the end?

We call Pericles, therefore, and persons like him, practically
wise, since they can discern. the things that are good for
themselves and for human beings ; we hold that those persons τὸ
can do this who know how to manage households and com-
munities.

(This is why we give self-control its name of σωφροσύνη,
that is, preserver of (σώζουσα) practical wisdom (φρόνησις).
The kind of opinion that self-control preserves is *that which
relates to the-sphere of practical wisdom”. For it is not every
kind of opinion that the pleasant and the painful destroy or 15
pervert : not, for instance, the opinion that the triangle contains
two right angles, nor the opinion that it does not: but only
opinions concerning what is done. For the initial causes* of
things done are the ends to which the things done are means:
and as soon as a man is ruined by pleasure or pain, he can
see no such end, nor can he see that he ought to choose
and do everything for the sake of that end and on account
of that end. For wickedness destroys the knowledge of such 20
causes.)

It must be true, then, that practical wisdom is a truth-
attaining intellectual quality concerned with doing and with
the things that are good for human beings.

1 these two sentences clearly ought to be transposed.
2 more literally ‘such as has been mentioned.’
3 sc. initial ‘final’ causes.
. 7—2

100 ARISTOTLE

3. ¥ \ > XN

μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν: Kal ἐν μὲν
2 3. ὃ ἃ ε , ε ,΄ Ν δὲ /

τέχνῃ 6 ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν

«@ iA ‘ ‘ DY 3 , onnr Ἂν σ > ,

ἧττον, ὥσπερ Kal περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν OTL ἀρετὴ

ἐς na > ¥ ~ lal lal

25 Tis ἐστι Kal ov τέχνη. δυοῖν δ᾽ ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς

A » " > ΄ κα a.

τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, TOU δοξαστικοῦ

» ΕΣ ve

ἢ τε yap δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἢ

, , lal

φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον: σημεῖον
Y 4 -

δ᾽ ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστιν, φρονήσεως

3 3 »
308 οὐκ ἔστιν.

VI

> Ν δὲ € > , ‘ “A θόλ 3 Ἂ, ς ON
ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις
‘\ lal Ἂ 3 , » 3 Ν δ᾽ 3 Ἂς, lal 3 ὃ “
καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ᾽ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν
‘\ ΄ 3 7 not λό Ἂς € 3 ᾿ lal
καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου yap ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς
ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη
3» , a & XN & > Ἂς > ὃ ΄ a δὲ
35 οὔτε φρόνησις' τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἱ δὲ
’, > ‘ Ν > , »¥ . ¥
II4laTvyydvovow οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν.
3 Ν ay - a ¥ “ Ἂς cid y > £
οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἔστιν: τοῦ yap σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων
ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέ.
ποτε διαψευδόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδε-
ς χόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ
σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται
εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται
νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

1140} 21 ἀληθῆ K L Bek Byw: ἀληθοῦς M T Alexander Sus
29 μὲν τῆς codd. Byw: τῆς μὲν Τ' Bek Sus

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI IOI

Moreover, one may speak of an excellence of art, but not
of an excellence of practical wisdom: and in art the man who
goes wrong intentionally is better than the man who goes
wrong unintentionally, but in the sphere of practical wisdom he
is worse, just as he is worse in the sphere of moral goodness.
It is therefore plain that practical wisdom is an excellence
which is not art. 25

Of the two parts of the mind that possess reason, practical
wisdom is the excellence of one, namely, of the opinionative
part: *for opinion is concerned with what is variable, and so is
practical wisdom.

But yet practical wisdom is not a purely intellectual
quality. And a proof of this is the fact that a purely
intellectual quality may be said to be ‘forgotten, while
practical wisdom cannot be said to be forgotten. 30

VI

Scientific knowledge is a way of conceiving which is
concerned with universals and with things that exist of
necessity ; and there must be fundamental principles for what
is reached by deduction, and for all scientific knowledge
(since scientific knowledge involves reasoning). Now these
fundamental principles of what is scientifically known cannot
be reached either by scientific knowledge or by art or by
practical wisdom: for what is scientifically known must be 35
reached by deduction, while art and practical wisdom are 1141a
certainly concerned only with what is variable. Moreover,
these fundamental principles cannot be reached by philosophic
wisdom : for the philosophically wise man must prove certain
things by deduction.

Now if it is true that there are four conditions of mind
which enable us to reach truth, and never to fail to reach
truth, either about invariable or about variable things—scientific 5
knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, inductive
reason: and if out of these four it cannot be any one of three
by which we reach the fundamental principles in question
(the three being practical wisdom, scientific knowledge, philo-
sophic wisdom): it follows that it must be inductive reason
by which we reach those fundamental principles.

1 sc. ‘and this name ofzxzonative is the right one to give to this part of the
mind here.’

102 ARISTOTLE
VII

ἴω “a > ¥
τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις
@ , Ν N Ν
το τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ
a x > >A τῇ
Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο
5 a 9% 3 ‘ / 2 ΄ >
σημαίνοντες THY σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν" εἶναι
φ Ἂς 3503. ¥
δέ τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τι
Ὁ 7 la > aA 4
σοφούς, ὥσπερ Ounpds φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ
+ > ἂν ἃ x a \ / Ὧν Ὁ > nan
15 τὸν δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἂρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὔτ᾽ ἀροτῆρα
οὔτ᾽ ἄλλως τι σοφόν.
4 a ν 3 , λ a 3 ἣν x τῆς.
ὦστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἢ
᾽, oy: + Ἂς Ἂν, Ν a ἊΝ s ~ > ~
σοφία. δεῖ apa τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν
ἰδέ > μ᾿ Ν Ἀπ in > Ν i: 0 4 a ἊΨ
εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστε εἴη
λ ε ΄, an ν 9 ΄ Ψ "Ἢ ¥
av ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα
a ȴ
20 ἐπιστήμη TOV τιμιωτάτων. ἄτοπον yap εἴ TLS τὴν πολι-
¥ > \
τικὴν ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ
ΕΣ an ~ »” 5 Ἂς
τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ
ε Ἂς XN Ν > Ν μ4 3 , a | -
ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσιν,
‘XN XN x XN > ᾿ . *%, + # Ν ~ * ᾿Ξ
τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ ταὐτὸν ἀεί, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταὐτὸ
, a ¥ / ν᾿ Μ᾿ X x Ν ex
25 πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον δὲ ἕτερον: τὰ yap περὶ αὑτὸ
ἐκ > a >
ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν φησὶν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ
3 cod ν ἢ id x Ὗ “ eg ΆΡ , ie
ἐπιτρέψει αὐτά. διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν
Ey Ψ N ἧς, εκ , ¥ ΄Ἱ ΄
εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν
προνοητικήν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία
Ν ε λ Ν ε 5 , > x Ν Ἄ, Ν 3 Ν
3. καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή: εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ
€ Lal > Υ͂Ν ᾿,΄ Ν ¥ ἣν > ‘
αὕτοις ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφίαι: ov yap
cad Ἂ; Ἂς ε ΄ ἴω
μία περὶ τὸ ἁπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρα περὶ
11418 17 ἀκριβεστάτη Καὶ M Byw: ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη 1, Bek Sus
25 τὰ γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸ Byw: τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸ codd. Bek Rassow: τὸ γὰρ
περὶ [αὑτὸ] Burnet: τὰ γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸν Coraes Susemihl
τὸ εὖ ΚΤ, Sus Byw: εὖ M Bek Rassow
26 φησὶν K Byw: φαῖεν L M: φαῖεν ἂν Bek Rassow Sus Bicieks
φασὶν Busse (Hermes xviii 137)
ἐπιτρέψει K Sus Byw: ἐπιτρέψειεν L O: ἐπιτρέψειαν M Bek

Rassow: ἐπιτρέψειαν ἂν Burnet
αὐτά K L Bek Sus Byw: ἑαυτούς M Rassow

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 103

VII

The word σοφία (philosophic wisdom) we apply, in the
sphere of the arts, to the character of those who are most
perfect? in their arts. Thus we call Pheidias σοφός as a to
sculptor, and Polycleitus σοφός as a statuary. Here, then, we
mean nothing more by the word σοφία than excellence in art.

But we hold that certain people are σοφοί in general, not
about some particular thing: not as Homer says in the
Margites ‘wise in anything else’—

‘Him had the gods not made a wise digger, nor yet a wise 15

ploughman,
Nor wise in anything else.’

It is plain, therefore, that σοφία (philosophic wisdom) must
be the most perfect of the means of knowledge. Hence
the philosophically wise man must not only know deductions
from his fundamental principles, but also reach truth about
those principles. Therefore philosophic wisdom must be a
combination of ‘inductive reason and scientific knowledge,
what may be called the perfected knowledge of the loftiest
subjects. ?For it is absurd for anyone to suppose that political 20
wisdom or practical wisdom is the noblest kind of knowledge,
since a human being is not the finest thing in the world.

Now if it is true that the wholesome and the good are one
thing for human beings and another thing for fish, while the
white and the straight are the same thing for all: all must
agree that the philosophically wise also is the same thing for
all, but the practically wise one thing for one and another
thing for another. For men give the name of ‘practically
wise’ to what can discern properly the various affairs that
concern itself, and it is to such a creature that they are ready
to entrust the conduct of those affairs. Therefore people even
say that some of the lower animals are practically wise; such
namely as plainly have the power of foresight about their
own. lives.

And ‘it is clear too that philosophic wisdom and political
wisdom’ cannot be the same thing: for if people are going to 30
give the name ‘philosophic wisdom’ to the wisdom that is
concerned with what is good for themselves, there will be a
number of kinds of philosophic wisdom. For there cannot be
a single such wisdom, concerned with the good of all living
beings as a whole: there must be a separate wisdom con-

iS}

5

1 ἀκριβής seems to include the notions of ‘exact,’ ‘complete,’ and ‘ stable.”
2 sc, The loftiest subjects, I say: for....

104 ARISTOTLE

"ὦ lal »
ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ pia περὶ πάντων TOV ὄντων.
an .
εἰ δ᾽ ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οὐδὲν
Ἂ,
1141 διαφέρει: καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν
, τ , , > OL. ie ΄ ,
φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά ye ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν.
2 Ἀ ἴω 3 , a 4 ε , 32 Ἂς \N 2 ΄
ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη
καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει. διὸ ᾿Αναξαγόραν
᾿ an 3
5 καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους ὃ
» > 9 ¥ 3 a N ,
ov φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα
ε ων Ἂ νΝ Ν Ἂ. Ν Ν ἊΝ Ἂς
ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ
Ἂς

8 δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ᾽, ὅτι οὐ τὰ
= , > bs lal
ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.

Ἑ X , ‘ Ν > , Ν \ δ »”
ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα Kai περὶ ὧν ἔστι
΄ ~ Ν ΄ ΄ ἄς ¥

10 βουλεύσασθαι: τοῦ yap φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτο ἔργον
εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, βουλεύεται δὲ οὐδεὶς

5, cal a 4 ¥ » o> 9 %. 4
περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ᾽ ὅσων μὴ τέλος τι
ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ᾽ ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος
ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ
x / 3503 5 Ν ς / na / ,

15 TOV λογισμόν. οὐδ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον,
3 * a Ἄ ἣν > Ὁ £ X\ f ε
ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν: πρακτικὴ γάρ, 7

Ν ~ Ἂς Ἂς > oF % ν»» > > ,
δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ Ta καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες
eos Qs ᾿ NX > a + ε
ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ
» > Ν 3 ,ὔ ν Ν a » iq XN
ἔμπειροι: εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ

20 ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ᾽
ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια [ κοῦφα καὶ) ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει
μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική: ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω

1141 big ἀγνοοῖ K Bek Sus Byw: ἀγνοεῖ 1, M Michelet Ramsauer

20 [κοῦφα καὶ] Trendelenburg Ramsauer Susemihl Stewart Bywater :
κοῦφα καὶ Bekker Burnet: κρέα καὶ conj. Rassow

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 105

cerned with each’: unless there is also? a single science of
healing for all existing things.

Our argument? is not affected by the objection that a
human being is the highest of all animals. The fact is that
there are other beings whose nature is far more divine than
the nature of human beings: for example, to mention those
most fully revealed to us, the bodies of which the universe is 1141 Ὁ
harmoniously composed.

From what has been said, therefore, it is plain that philo-
sophic wisdom is the combination of scientific knowledge
with inductive reason, and that it concerns those things whose
nature is most exalted. Consequently we call Anaxagoras
and Thales and such persons philosophically wise, but say 5
that they are not practically wise, whenever we find them
ignorant of what is good for themselves: and we say that the
knowledge which they have is rare, and wonderful, and hard
to attain, and divinely splendid, but at the same time useless,
because they do not seek to know the things that are good
for human beings.

But practical wisdom is concerned with the affairs of
human beings, and only with such things as can be the
objects of deliberation. For we consider that good delibera- 10
tion is pre-eminently the work of the practically wise man:
and no one deliberates about things that cannot vary, nor
about things that are not the means to some end, and that
end a good that can be achieved: and the good deliberator in
general is the man who can in his calculation reach the best
of achievable goods for man.

Practical wisdom does not lead to the knowledge of 15
general principles only: it is necessary. to know particular
facts also*: for practical wisdom is concerned with action,
and action depends upon particular facts. Hence some men
without knowledge® can act more effectively than others
with knowledge’, especially those who have experience. If
a man knows that light meat is digestible and wholesome,
but does not know what kind of meats are light, he will not 20
restore one’s health; it is the man who knows that poultry
is digestible who is more likely to do this. But practical
wisdom is concerned with action: we ought therefore’, if we

1 i.e. with the good of each kind of living being.

2 sc. (which obvioysly there is not). : ;

% sc. the argument that philosophic wisdom is more lofty than practical or
political wisdom.

4 sc. in order to be practically wise.

5 i.e. the knowledge of universals.

8 sc. in order to be practically wise.

106 ARISTOTLE

ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ᾽ ἄν Tis Kai ἐνταῦθα ἀρχι-
τεκτονική.

VIII

Ἂν. ν Ne \ ye 4 ε > oN ‘
ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ Kal ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν
g ἢ ΤᾺ ‘ay 3 2s > δι lan δὲ .1 aN
25 ἕξις, TO μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν
a x ε 5 Ἂς , ré a δὲ ε Ἂς
ἢ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἢ δὲ ὡς τὰ
θ᾽ ig %, εἶ » ἊΨ ¥ 4 δὲ
καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική: αὕτη δὲ
Ν Ν 7 ‘XN x s Ἂ, c XN
πρακτικὴ καὶ Bovdreutixy τὸ yap ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς TO
ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνον λέγουσιν" μόνοι
30 γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ
φρόνησις μάλιστ᾽ ἐΐναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα. καὶ ἔχει
ν Ν * μὰ , > a δὲ a Ἂς >
αὕτη TO κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις: ἐκείνων δὲ ἢ μὲν OLKO-
Δ a ἧς a aA εν ΄ Ν 4 a Ἂς
νομία ἣ δὲ νομοθεσία ἣ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἣ μὲν
Ἂς a \ i ἣν x, > xX dh
βουλευτικὴ ἣ δὲ δικαστική. εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη
γνώσεως τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι: ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν"
Ἅ. a £ Ν Ν εν > Ἂν Ν rs ra
1142a καὶ δοκεῖ 6 τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος
> ε Ἂς x # εἶ > #
εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ TokuTpaypoves: διὸ Εὐριπίδης

πῶς δ᾽ ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἠριθμημένον στρατοῦ
5 ἴσον μετασχεῖν ;

τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας πλέον...
lal % Ν ε Fel 3 , Ν »» an tal
ζητοῦσι yap τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο δεῖν
΄ Ed ΄ > lal ὃ a 3 ἂν Ν vA
πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθεν τὸ τούτους
3 » a> »
φρονίμους εἶναι: καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι TO αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ
3 ἢ 3 a. ἋΡ la ¥ Ν Ν ε “A “ a
10 οἰκονομίας οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ
lal 4 XN ἊΝ > ον “
διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον. σημεῖον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρη-
‘ XN
μένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ
1141} 25 φρόνησις seclusit Scaliger, Susemih]
26 τὰ seclusit Stewart, Burnet
28 μόνον Καὶ M Sus Byw: μόνους L Bek Burnet,
34 τὸ αὑτῷ K Bek Sus Byw: τὸ τὰ αὑτῷ 1, M Coraes Fritzsche :
corruptum putat Ramsauer

11424 1 67a περὶ], Μ Bek Sus Byw: ὁ τὸ περὶ pr. K Burnet
4 ἠριθμημένον KT Byw: ἠριθμημένῳ 1, M Bek Sus

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 107

cannot have both kinds of knowledge, to have the latter rather
than the former?

But here too? there must be a supreme directing form of
wisdom.

VIII

Political wisdom and practical wisdom are in practice the
same quality, though the words do not really mean the same ὡς
thing. Of the practical wisdom that is concerned with the
state as a whole, the supreme directing kind is legislative
wisdom, the kind concerned with particular occurrences has
the name, political wisdom, which is common to both. This
latter is concerned? with action and deliberation: for the
parliamentary enactment is a thing to be done‘, like the
particular action. Hence people say that it is only those who
deal with particular occurrences who ‘take part in politics’:
for it is only these who perform actions, like workmen in a 30
trade.

It is also held that practical wisdom is most properly the
kind that concerns a man’s own single self: and this kind is
given the name, practical wisdom, which belongs to all the
kinds. The other kinds are household wisdom, legislative
wisdom, and political wisdom ; and the latter includes parlia-
mentary and judicial wisdom.

To know what is good for one’s self must certainly be one
kind of knowledge; but it is very different from other kinds ;
and people hold that the man who knows and occupies himself 1142 a
with his own concerns is practically wise, and that the
politicians are restless meddlers; thus Euripides says—

My practice wisdom? when I might have been
At peace, accounted one among the many,
Equal with others?... 5
They that aspire too high, and strive too hard...
Such persons aim at their own good, and suppose that to be a
man’s chief duty. It is, therefore, this opinion that leads to
the statement that these men are practically wise. And yet
no doubt one’s personal prosperity cannot exist without
household and political wisdom. 10
Further, the proper way of managing one’s own affairs is
not easy to discover and requires much learning. A proof of
this statement is the fact that young men may become good
at geometry and mathematics and in such matters philo-
1 ie. the knowledge of particular facts rather than that of general principles.
2 sc. in practical as in philosophic wisdom.

% i.e. specially concerned.
4 1.6. it is a statement of the thing to be done.

108 ARISTOTLE

an 3 3 A
γίνονται Kat σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ᾽ οὐ δοκεῖ
+ il > 9 x wn > Ψ , 3 ε
γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἢ
a 3 ἃ, Ἂν
15 φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δὲ ἔμπειρος
» lal lal =
οὐκ ἔστιν--- πλῆθος yap χρόνου ποιεῖ THY ἐμπειρίαν.
ἴω Ἂ
ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς
an » 9 Ν
μὲν παῖς γένοιτ᾽ av, σοφὸς δ᾽ ἢ φυσικὸς ov. ἢ ὅτι τὰ
μὲν δι ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ᾽ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας:
Ν Ἂς x > ΄ ε , > Ν Z la δὲ
20 καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ
Ν ΠΣ; 5» », »ὕ το ε # a *. * 46
τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον ; ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ TO καθόλου
> ee β λ 4 θ x» Ν XN θ᾽ ν 2 x ὰ Ψ
ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον: ἢ γὰρ ὅτι
πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύ-
μα 3 ε ᾽ 3 > ΄ ig
σταθμον. ὅτι δ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν"
25 τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται: τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν
ἥν ae > , \ Ἂς a ihe “ aed
τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ TH νῷ: ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν
7 a 9 » , a Ν nA > , & > ¥
ὅρων, av οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἢ δὲ TOD ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν
> » cal
ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ᾽ αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ᾽ οἵᾳ
cd , τ x 3 = 7 Ἂν ¥
αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον Tpiyw-
f ἣν > Lal > > 9 »“ »
30 νον" στήσεται yap κακεῖ. ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις

ba 3
ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δὲ ἄλλο εἶδος.

ΙΧ

τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει: τὸ γὰρ
βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ
εὐβουλίας τί ἐστιν, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ

3 is A »” la > a X\ Ν δὰ »
εὐστοχία ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος. ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν"
1142 Ὁ ov γὰρ ζητοῦσι περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἡ δ᾽ εὐβουλία βουλή τις,
ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽

1142 8 14 ὅτι καὶ τῶν K L Sus Byw: ὅτι τῶν M Bek
28 ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς seclusit Bywater, nec tamen Burnet
30 7 Kedd: 4L MT: ἢ ἡ conj. Burnet

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 109

sophically wise, but do not seem to become practically wise.
The reason is that practical wisdom is concerned with practical
facts, which become known through experience, whereas a
young man has no great experience, since it is only the
progress of time that can produce experience.

Indeed, it may also be asked, Why, then, may a boy be
good at mathematics, but not at metaphysics or natural
science? No doubt the reason is that mathematics deals with
abstractions, whereas the first principles of metaphysics and
natural science cam only be reached by. experience, and young
persons do not believe these with conviction, but merely
repeat them, whereas the real meaning of mathematical first
principles is quite plain. ~

Moreover, error may occur in deliberation either with
regard to the universal or with regard to the particular: one
may say either that all heavy water is unwholesome or that
this particular water is heavy.

And it is plain that practical wisdom is not - scientific
knowledge: for it is, as has been said, concerned with par-
ticulars, since actions are always particulars.

It corresponds therefore to inductive reason: for inductive
reason leads to axioms of which no demonstration is possible,
while practical wisdom deals with particulars, of which there
can be no scientific knowledge, but only sense-perception, not
the perception of the several senses, but that whereby in
mathematics we perceive that the particular figure before us
is? a triangle: for here too? one must come to a stop some-
where. This perception* however is rather sensation than
practical wisdom, but it is a different species of sensation
from the other one mentioned‘

IX

Now search and deliberation are not the same thing:
deliberation is a particular kind of search. We ought also to
ascertain what deliberative excellence is, whether it is some
kind of knowledge, or opinion, or success in conjecturing, or
some other kind of thing.

It is, in the first place, not knowledge: for people do not
search for what they know already: but deliberative excellence
is a kind of deliberation’, and the .man who deliberates
searches and makes calculations. Neither, again, is it success

1 sc. for instance, % i.e. in mathematics as in problems of conduct.
3 i.e. that in problems of conduct.

4 i.e. the sensation of the several senses.

> perhaps βουλή may be translated ‘deliberative quality’ here.

30

1142 Ὁ

110 ARISTOTLE

Ν ’ ε 3 ’
εὐστοχία' ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἢ εὑστοχία,
Ν , ‘\
βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν
~ X 4 ἊΡ
5 δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα, βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι
Ν ca ς
ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία: ἔστι δὲ εὐστοχία τις ἡ
a > x, > N
ἀγχίνοια. οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ
a > > > “
ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἁμαρτάνει, ὁ δ᾽ εὖ ὀρθῶς
A , ΕΝ
βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι. ὀρθότης τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὔτε
3 ΄ ἧς » ὃ » > , ΝΥ % > “
10 ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης: ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν
, Ια) 3 ’ 3
ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία), δόξης δ᾽ ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια"
a 4 Ν
ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν
οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται: αὕτη
\
yap οὔπω φάσις" καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις
¥ € vy ΄ 5» 353 5»7 μ᾽ an
15 TUS ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, ἐάν τε εὖ ἐάν TE Kal κακῶς
βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλ᾽ ὀρθότης τίς
ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα πρῶτον
= Ν * , 3 Ν δ᾽ ε 3 θό a on 9
τί καὶ περὶ τί. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι
> a e \ 3 \ Noe ΩΝ a , IAA
ov πᾶσα: ὁ yap ἀκρατὴς καὶ 6 φαῦλος ὃ προτίθεται ἰδεῖν
20 ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται βεβουλευ-
μένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς: δοκεῖ δὲ ἀγαθόν τι τὸ εὖ
om Ν lal
βεβουλεῦσθαι. ἡ yap τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία,
ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλο-
a an % ἃ ἥς lal an a > a ἧς 3»
γισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι᾿ οὗ δὲ οὔ,
3 Ν lal x >
25 ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι: ὥστε OVS αὕτη πω
> ΄ a a a ae
εὐβουλία, καθ᾽ ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι’ οὗ
» » ¥ ‘\ ἡ sas
ἔδει. ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν, τὸν δὲ
1142 Ὁ 15 ἐάν τε καὶ K M Sus Byw: ἐάν τε L O Bek
18 6codd. edd: οὗ conj. Rassow
19 ἰδεῖν codd. (δεῖν Γ) : ἰδεῖν Bek Fritzsche Ramsauer : tidewt Grant
Byw Sus: δεῖν Madvig Jackson Grant Burnet: λαβεῖν conj.
Stewart: τυχεῖν conj. Rassow: τούτον conj. Byw: εἰ δεινός conj.
Apelt

21 τι Καὶ Μ Sus Byw: τι εἶναι LO Bek
γὰρ codd. edd: dpa conj. Spengel

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 111

in conjecturing : for success in conjecturing is attained without
reasoning, and is a rapid sort of thing, whereas a man de-
liberates for a long time, and people say that one should act
quickly when deliberation is over, but deliberate slowly.

Quickness of judgment also is different from deliberative
excellence: in fact quickness of judgment is a particular kind
of success in conjecture. Nor again is deliberative excellence
any kind of opinion.

But since the man who deliberates badly goes wrong, and
the man who deliberates well does it rightly, it is plain that
deliberative excellence is some kind of rightness: but a
rightness neither of knowledge nor of opinion: there cannot
be a rightness of knowledge, since there cannot be a wrongness
of knowledge: while rightness of opinion is truth}, and more-
over, everything about which we have an opinion is already
marked off from all other things. At the same time, de-
liberative excellence implies the power of reasoning. It must
therefore be rightness of the inquiring intellect: for the
intellect while inquiring has not yet arrived at assertion;
whereas opinion is not a search, but an assertion of something
already discovered ; but the man who deliberates, whether he
deliberates well or badly, makes some kind of search or
calculation.

But deliberative excellence is rightness in deliberation:
we must therefore firse know what deliberation is and what it
is about. And whereas the word ‘rightness’ can be used in
more senses than one, it is plain that not all the senses are
appropriate here. For the man without self-control, or the
wicked man, will reach through his calculation the conclusion
which it lies before him to discover, so that he will have
deliberated rightly’, but will have procured himself a great
evil: but to have deliberated well is evidently something
good, for deliberative excellence is that sort of rightness in
deliberating which leads to the gaining of some good.

But it is possible to gain even this by a false reasoning
process, and it is possible that the conclusion as to what
ought to be done may be right, but that the reason which led
to the conclusion may be wrong, and the middle term may be
the wrong one*, That quality then is still not deliberative
excellence which leads a man to arrive at the right conclusion,
but yet not by the right means. Moreover, it is possible to
arrive at a conclusion by means of long deliberation, while
another man may do it quickly. With the former, then, even

1 1,6. simply truth and nothing more. ;
2 i.e. in one sense of the word ‘rightly.’ 3 lit. false.

"-

fe)

15

112 ARISTOTLE

3 4 > 3 > 4 ε
ταχύ: οὐκοῦν οὐδ᾽ ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ᾽ ὀρθότης ἢ
4 ee \ a A ν. ἃ , 9 ¥ ¥

κατὰ TO ὠφέλιμον, Kal οὗ δεῖ Kal ὡς καὶ OTE. ἔτι ἔστι

n » a Ν ΄ , a ἮΝ x

jo καὶ ἁπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ πρός τι τέλος. ἢἣ μὲν δὴ

lal lal * Ἄ, %

ἁπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τὶς δὲ
Ἁ > 4

ἡ πρός τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι,

\

ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς
τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν.

> ,». > a
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ᾽ as λέ-
A Ψ ‘ > Ν
1143 a γομεν συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνέτους, οὔτε ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπι-
΄ ΕΣ ΄ὔ 4 \ λ > ΄ ΕΣ ,
στήμῃ ἢ δόξῃ (πάντες yap ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί) οὔτε τις pia
cal lan Εν > Ν, Ν a
TOV κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἢ ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν,
Ν Ν A ΓῚ μὰ
ἡ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθη" οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων
" \ an
5 καὶ ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσίς ἐστιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γινομένων
ε lal > \ \ ΟΝ > ΄ ” Ν ,
OTOVOUY, GANG περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν av τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο.
‘ N ‘ 2 JN. XN = , ΓᾺ a > » δὲ
διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν: οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
i + & Fd ᾿ ‘¢ ε 5 .᾿ ΄
τὸ αὐτὸ σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις: ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις
3 ᾿ 3 f Ν aN τε bal , x ΄
ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν: τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος
lal ᾿ς Ν
το αὐτῆς ἐστίν: ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον. ταὐτὸ γὰρ
΄ Ν > ΄ Ἅ XN ‘ > al » >
σύνεσις Kal εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ Kal εὐσύνετοι. ἔστι ὃ
» ee 2 \ s ¥ \ , ε ,΄
οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡ σύνεσις"
5 > 9 Ἂ, , / , ν ~
ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται
aA 3 a ν 5 “ lal 6 al δόξῃ | ει i
TH ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι TH δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν
᾿, 2 ἧς @ ε ΄ , 3 id ὡς
15 περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος,
ν ΄, a \ \ 5 aA ΝΥ \ > + N
Kal κρίνειν καλῶς: τὸ yap εὖ τῷ καλῶς TO αὐτό. καὶ

1142 Ὁ 31 τὶς δὲ Καὶ Μ Sus Byw: ἡ δέ τις L O Bek
33 πρὸς τὸ τέλος K Byw: πρός τι τέλος LM Bek Sus
35 εὐσυνεσία H. Stephanus Spengel Sus Byw: ἀσυνεσία codd. Bek
1143 8 1 εὐσυνέτους H. Stephanus Spengel Sus Byw: ἀσυνέτους codd. Bek
3 οἷον ἡ K M Sus Byw: οἷον L Bek Burnet
4 % γεωμετρία K Sus Byw: ἢ γεωμετρία 1, M Bek Burnet
μεγέθη K M Ramsauer Sus Byw: μεγέθους L Bek
14. ἐπὶ τὸ codd. Bek Sus Byw: ἐπὶ τῷ Coraes Fritzsche

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 113

now we have not deliberative excellence’, but only when we
have rightness of a beneficial kind, and have the right con-
clusion reached by the right means and at the right time.

Once more, it is possible to deliberate? well in general or 30
with a view to some particular end. Deliberative excellence
in general, therefore, is that which leads to success with
regard to the general end, while that deliberative excellence
which leads to success with regard to some special end is a
special kind of deliberative excellence.

If therefore to deliberate? well is characteristic of the
practically wise man, deliberative excellence must be that
rightness which declares what is profitable as a means to the
end, of which? practical wisdom is the true conception.

xX

Judgment, too, or sound judgment, the quality whose
possessor we call judicious or a sound judge, is not the same 1143 a
thing as scientific knowledge in general: nor as opinion, for
in that case everyone would be judicious: nor is it any one
special kind of knowledge, such as medicine the knowledge of
restoratives of health, or geometry the knowledge of magni-
tudes. For judgment is not concerned with the things that
exist eternally and cannot be affected, nor with all and any of 5
the things that come into existence, but only with the things
about which one may feel doubt and deliberate. Judgment
is therefore concerned with the same things as practical
wisdom, but yet judgment and practical wisdom are not
identical.

Practical wisdom gives commands; its conclusion is the
statement of what we ought or ought not to do: but judgment τὸ
is simply critical. 4(For judgment and sound judgment are
the same, the judicious person is the same as the sound
judge.)

Judgment is not the having of practical wisdom, nor yet
the acquiring of it: but just as learning is called judgment,
when a man uses his faculty of scientific knowledge, so too
when a man uses his faculty of opinion, to criticise what
another man says, about the matters with which practical 15
wisdom is concerned: that is to say, to criticise well—
‘soundly’ and ‘well’ meaning the same thing.

1 lit. so not even that is yet deliberative excellence.

2 lit. to have deliberated.

3 the reference of the relative pronoun is doubtful. i

4 sc. there is no need to go on repeating both the words ‘judgment’ and
‘sound judgment’....

G. δ

114 ARISTOTLE

A , > a > es
ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθεν τοὔνομα ἡ σύνεσις, καθ᾽ ἣν εὐσύνετοι,
ΕΣ fal 5 ἮΝ , , Ν Ν θ ,
ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν: λέγομεν yap τὸ μανθάνειν

συνιέναι πολλάκις.

ΧΙ

ε X ΄ , » ἃ , \ ¥
22 ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ᾽ ἣν συγγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν
lal “A τὰ , a
φαμὲν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστι κρίσις ὀρθή. σημεῖον
a 3 ΄
δέ: τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστά φαμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν,
\ 2 \ \ ἂν \ ¥ a ε δὲ
καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἔνια συγγνώμην. ἡ δὲ συγ-
᾽ὔ a: 3 x. ἐν A 3 lal > θ fe > Or, δ᾽ e€
γνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή: ὀρθὴ δ᾽ ἡ
τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.
3 XN Ν, “Ὁ ce ν > 4 3 > A κυ 5
2 εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι-
" ‘ ΄ \ , ν᾿ , \ A
λέγομεν yap γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν
2 ἃ * > Ν > ἡ μ rad » ᾿ “A no
ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη
΄ nw x ᾿ 2 :
καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς. πᾶσαι yap ai δυνάμεις
a na > , 2 ὁ \ A ψ \ 2
αὗται τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ Kal τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον' καὶ ἐν
a a Ξε ‘
30 μὲν τῷ κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετός, καὶ
a fal Ν lal
eLyVOpov ἢ συγγνώμων--τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν
3 a ε ὅ᾽ > er > a ‘ Ἂν » Ν “
ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν
> τ Ἂ, Lae: > , ν Ν , Ν
καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά: καὶ
¥ Ν 4 Lal , > Ἕ ἧς ε Ld ed
yap τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις Kal
Ν Ν, “ lal
ἃς ἢ γνώμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἔσχατα. καὶ 6 νοῦς
“ a a
τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα: καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων
‘\ lal > ¥* 1" "μὴ > Ἂς Ν 3 λ , ν ἢ Ν Ν
1143 Ὁ καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ
i > ὃ ἕω ων > 3 ν ᾿ δ 3 > >
Tas ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ᾽ ἐν
ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς
΄ > \ a -
ἑτέρας προτάσεως: ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται: ἐκ
1143 219 συγγνώμονας K Μ Byw: εὐγνώμονας L Bek Sus

30 εὐγνώμων ἢ seclusit Burnet
33 τὰ πρακτά seclusit Ramsauer

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 115

Indeed this name of judgment, the quality that makes
people sound judges, is used in a sense transferred from that
which is applied to learning: we often give learning the name
of judgment}.

XI

Consideration, as it is called, the quality whose possessors 20
we call considerate*, and say that they have consideration’, is
the correct critical judgment of what is fair. This is proved
by the fact that we describe the fair-minded man as par-
ticularly considerate’, and it is fair to take certain facts into
consideration‘. Sympathetic considerateness® is the correct
critical consideration of what is fair: and correct consideration
is that which reaches truth.

All the qualities mentioned® may fairly be said to have a 25
common tendency. We attribute consideration’, judgment,
practical wisdom, and intelligence to the same people, and
say that they ‘have consideration,’ ‘have intelligence by this
time,’ and are practically wise and judicious. For all these
faculties are concerned with ultimates, that is to say, par-
ticulars: and in judging of others’ opinions about matters
with which the practically wise man deals, a man may show
himself judicious, and also a good considerer or a considerate 30
man—for the quality of fairness belongs to all good behaviour
towards other persons.

All actions belong to the class of particulars or ultimates,
for the practically wise man must understand them®: and
judgment and consideration are concerned with actions, and
. these are ultimates®.

Νοῦς (Inductive reason or Intelligence) is also concerned 35
with ultimates, in both senses”: for it is this,and not deductive 1143 Ὁ
reason, which leads to knowledge of both the primary and the
ultimate propositions. This it is which leads to the unassailable
primary propositions that are the foundation of deductions”:
and this it is which in practical deductions” leads to the
particular, a not invariable fact, which forms the minor
premiss: these particular facts are the foundation of the end

1 the word σύνεσις translated ‘judgment,’ can also mean ‘intelligence,’ as here.

2 more properly ‘forgiving.’ 3 more properly ‘have good sense,’ ‘are right.’

4 properly ‘to make allowances for,’ ‘ to forgive.’

5 συγγνώμη is the ordinary word for ‘ forgiveness.’

6 sc. the four φρόνησις εὐβουλία σύνεσις γνώμη. .

7 the word here =‘ sense,’ ‘ understanding.’ 8 j.e. actions.

9 sc. hence practical wisdom, judgment, and consideration are all concerned
with ultimates.

10 sc, ‘both senses of the word ultimate’: (though two senses of νοῦς are also
implied). M sc. deductions properly so called. 12 only loosely so called.

8—2

116 ARISTOTLE

, a ȴ a
stav καθ᾽ ἕκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου" τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ
a ἧι \ \ n >
αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ νοῦς. διὸ καὶ φυσικα δοκεῖ εἶναι
ba % Ν 2 a ’ > (Ὁ ἂν
ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν οὐδείς, γνώμην δ᾽ ἔχειν καὶ
la Lisa > 4 Ν lal ε Ψ'.
σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις
fal ν [3 ε # lal » 7
οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, Kat ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν EXEL Kat
΄ Ξε lal , x αὶ » ὃ Ν Ἂν > x καὶ
το γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. O10 καὶ ἀρχὴ
Τὰς lal > ᾿ς x ε 3 ὃ he XN Ν ΄
τέλος vous: ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων.
lal a ΄ Ν la a
ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ
ΤΑ *. / >
φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ
Ξε a ‘ A \ » 2 A 2 ΄
ἧττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων: διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας
38: eon > Ἁ if BY 5 > Ν ε ΄ Ne
15 ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ
> Ψ "
σοφία, καὶ περὶ τί ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου

τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα, εἴρηται.

ΧΙ

διαπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοι εἰσίν.
ε \ Ν 2 ὑδὲ θ , > ἊΝ. » WT) 7
ἡ μὲν yap σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρήσει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων
»¥ 3 “ ΄, > ΄, ε Ν ,
20 ἄνθρωπος (οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως), ἡ δὲ φρόνησις
a \ ¥ > N ΄ “ n 2A ¥ ε Ν
τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς ; εἴπερ ἡ μὲν
I Ψ' 3 ε ‘XN Ν ᾽ ‘\ Ν + 3 Ἂς
φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἡἣ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ
* F “ 3 μὴ Ν a ba > ““ > i | = ας
ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς
, ὑδὲ δὲ # a ἰδ 2 3 Γ
πράττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν,
» ν͵ ἔς > - td 7 3 ἧς Ἂς € Ἂς, > Ν
25 εἴπερ ἕξεις αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ
x > , oy ἐν “ wn 3 Ν “ 3 Ν nw 2
τὰ εὐεκτικά--ςἅἡσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως
εἶναι λέγεται---οὐδὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴ
Ὕ γὰρ πρακτ ἐροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν
XN Ν
ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικήν ἐσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν
1143 Ὁ 5 τὰ καθόλου K Byw: τὸ καθόλου 1, M Bek Sus
15 περὶ τί K M Byw: περὶ τίνα L Bek Sus Burnet

19 θεωρήσει K M Byw: θεωρεῖ L Bek Sus Stewart Burnet
22 ἡ περὶ Καὶ M Bek Byw: περὶ L Rassow Sus Stewart

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 117

in view: for universals are constructed out of particulars : 5
therefore we must have perception of these particulars, and
this perception is vods (Inductive Reason or Intelligence).
That is why people look upon these qualities! as natural, and
hold that no one is by nature philosophically wise, but that
the possession of consideration and judgment and inductive
reason does come by nature.

A testimony to this view is the fact that we hold our
characters? to correspond to our periods of life: and those of
a particular age are said to possess intelligence and con-
sideration, nature being looked upon as the cause of this.

[Therefore Inductive reason is the beginning and the end: 10
for deductions start from these* and are concerned with these+.]

Hence it is necessary to give heed to the undemonstrable
statements and opinions of experienced and elderly or prac-
tically wise men no less than to their demonstrations: for
they see correctly, because they have acquired the power of
vision through experience.

We have, then, defined practical wisdom and philosophic 15
wisdom, and said what each of them is in fact concerned with,
and shown that they are the excellences of two separate parts
of the soul.

XII

But an objection may be raised by asking what the use of
them is. Philosophic wisdom, it will be said, will not attempt
to discover anything that will lead to a human being’s
happiness, since it is not concerned with the coming into 20
existence of anything. Practical wisdom on the other hand
has this advantage, it is true®; but for what is it necessary?
Practical wisdom is the quality concerned with what is just
and beautiful and good for man: and these are the things
which the good man naturally does: because we know about
them, we are not therefore in a better position to perform
them, for the virtues are permanent qualities: just as we 25
cannot perform healthy and vigorous acts any better for
knowing about them (using the words healthy and vigorous
in the sense not of producing, but of springing from, a state
of health and vigour): for we are not made more able to do
what is healthy and vigorous by understanding medicine and

physical culture.

1 1.6. practical wisdom, judgment, etc. 2 lit. ourselves.
3 sc. ultimates with which Inductive Reason deals.

4 1.6. practical ‘deductions’ lead finally to the statement of particular things

to be done. : ; .
5 i.e. the advantage of at least attempting to discover the means to happiness.

118 ARISTOTLE

a > ,
φρόνιμον ῥητέον ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις
» > > bs! “A Ἂν » »" 3 XN
30 οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος" ἔτι δ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν- οὐδὲν
ΕΣ ¥ ΄
γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι,
lal nw 4 Ἄν ἣΝ Ν ε Ld ὰ
ἱκανῶς τ᾽ ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν
ν - ἢ ΄, 3 cs
βουλόμενοι yap ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως ov μανθάνομεν ἰατρικήν.
> ΄ 3 , a
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς
> ᾿ lal »» ie ε Ν bia
35 σοφίας οὖσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται: ἡ yap ποιοῦσα
» v2 , vy \ 8) ΄ λ
ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὴ τούτων λεκ-
XN 7 A ᾿
τέον: νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον.
~ x > ψ > oN 3 a
11442 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ᾽ αὑτὰς ἀναγκαῖον
> > » ε ΄
αἱρετὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετάς γ᾽ οὖσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου
wn “ 39 lal
τοῦ μορίου, καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν.
ran N a ΄ > ε ε» N ee 2 3 >
ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ
ε ese ἃ Ψ ε ΄ aN ye , N >
5 ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίάν: μέρος yap οὖσα
ων Lal nw ~ ~ ~ >
τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ Kal τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαί-
μονα. ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ
Ἂ, 3 x 5 - ε Ἂ ᾿" > x Ν Ν᾿ ων
τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν" ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ
3 / ε δὲ / ‘ Ν a a δὲ ,
ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου
“ ~ ‘ cal lal
10 μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ"
> Ν Ἂν + 3: > “ re na x ΄ Ν ἧς
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν. περὶ δὲ
τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν
ca Ν ὃ ἃς μὰ > ¢ ὡς
καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας
φ ᾿ : ΄
ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράτ-
» > - a
IS TOVTAS τινας οὔπω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ TOV
νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι’ ἄγνοιαν ἢ
ὃ , ὧν / Ἂς Ν ὃ 3 Ὁ ὦ ΄ , ΄ a
u ἕτερόν τι Kal μὴ Ov αὐτά (καίτοι πράττουσί ye ἃ
Ἂν Ν ig \ “
δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστι
1143 Ὁ 28 ῥητέον K M Byw: θετέον LT Bek Sus Burnet
30 ἔχουσιν codd. Bek Sus Byw: οὖσιν Argyropylus Ramsauer
11444 1 λέγωμεν K Byw: λέγομεν L M Bek Sus
4 ἢ ἰατρικὴ K Byw: ἰατρικὴ 1, M Bek Sus
6 τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα edd. (sed cum obelis Byw): ἐνέργεια εὐδαιμονία

K, τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν L, τῷ ἐνεργεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα M I,
ἐνεργεῖ εὐδαιμονίαν O

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI [19

But if we are to say that a man should be practically wise,
not for the reason given’, but in order to decome able to do
good actions; then, it may be objected, practical wisdom can
be of no use to those who are already good persons ; nor can 30
it be of any use to those who have not got this goodness: for
it will make no difference whether they have it themselves or
are controlled by others who have it: it would be enough for
us to do as we do with regard to health: we want to be
healthy, but we do not therefore learn medicine.

A further possible objection is, that it is absurd for prac-
tical wisdom to be inferior to philosophic wisdom and at the
same time to be in a position of greater authority, ruling and
giving orders about every detail as it does, being the quality 35
that is connected with action. Β

So far we have been stating difficulties: now therefore we
must discuss them.

In the first place, then, let us reply that these qualities are 1144 ἃ
bound to be in themselves desirable, simply because they are
the respective good qualities of the two parts of the intellect,
whether either does or does not produce any positive restilt.

In the next place, they do produce results: philosophic 5
wisdom produces happiness, not indeed in the sense in which
medicine produces health, but in the sense in which health
produces happiness: it is a part of complete excellence, and
makes a man happy by being possessed and exercised.

Further, the proper function of a man is completely
performed by? the joint operation of practical wisdom and
moral excellence. Moral excellence makes the end in view
right, practical wisdom makes the means to it right. (The
fourth part of the mind, the nutritive, has no excellence of 10
this kind®: for there is nothing that it lies in its power to do
or not to do.)

But to deal with the objection that we are not because of
practical wisdom any the more in a position to perform
beautiful and just acts, we must go a little deeper into the
question. We ground our answer on the following con-
sideration. We say that some of those persons who do just
acts are still not just persons: for example those who do 15
what is commanded by law either unwillingly, or in ignorance,
or for some other reason than for the sake of the action itself:
and this in spite of the fact that they do the things which
they ought to do and which the good man is bound to do.
In the same way, it appears, it is possible for a man to be in

1 i.e. to de able to do good actions. 7 ie. only by...
3 j.e. no excellence relating to the pecudiar function of man.

120 ARISTOTLE

® * » 4 ν σ 3 cy 3 θό λέ
τὸ πὼς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ᾽ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω
a ~ va
20 δ᾽ οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τῶν πραττομένων.
> Ἂν am = > , ΄- > 9
τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ᾽ ὅσα
lal > lal
ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς
> , a
ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτέον δ᾽ ἐπιστήσασι σαφέ.
ν 9. Ὁ »” δὴ δύ a λ “ ὃ
στερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δει-
νότητα: αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑπο-
25 τεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν
καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτοῦ. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ἢ καλός,
3 4 5 ΕΝ X an ΄ x \ Ν
ἐπαινετή ἐστιν, ἂν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία: διὸ καὶ τοὺς
φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι. ἔστι δ᾽
τ᾿ δ' > ε δύ 32 3 > ” a ΄
ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύναμις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως
ϑοταύτης. ἡ δὲ ἔξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς
οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς εἴρηταί τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον: οἱ γὰρ
συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἶσιν, ἐπειδὴ
, ὃ Ν aN . Voy oY» e ὃ , » » N
τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν---ἔστω γὰρ
, , Ν fa Lied > > ὟΝ lal 3 A“ >
λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν. τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ
7 # Ἂς e la Ἄ,
35 φαίνεται: διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι
ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι
ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν.

XIII

ra ὃ Ἂ ’ὔὕ Ν ἃς > ~ Ν Ν ε
1144 Ὁ σ κΚεττεον ω) πάλιν και περι apeTys. και γαρ ἢ
3 Ν Ὧ A ε
ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει, ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν
, > & μὰ
δεινότητα---οὐ ταὐτὸ μέν, ὅμοιον δέ---οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ
3 τ Ν Ν ἂν ΄“ *, ἴω wn
ApeTy προς Τὴν κυριαν. πασι yap δοκεῖ ἕκαστα των
2 6 a“ ε la ¢ Ἂς » 7 Ἂς
5 ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει Tas: καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρο-
‘ & 5 ὃ a ‘\ > 4 > Ἂς > lal
VLKOL και αν. βέιοι και τάλλα EXOMEV εὐθὺς εκ γενετης"
11448.23 δύναμις K M Byw: τις δύναμις L Bek Sus
26 αὐτῶν codd. Bek Sus Stewart: αὐτοῦ Byw
28 καὶ mavotpyous codd. Bek Byw: καὶ τοὺς πανούργους Klein Ram-
sauer Sus

29 δύναμις K L Michelet Fritzsche Rassow Byw Burnet: δεινότης
M Bek Grant Ramsauer Stewart

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 121

such a condition when doing all his actions as to be a really
good man; I mean the condition in which he purposes those
actions and does them for their own sake. 20

Now moral goodness causes the purpose to be right: but
to understand what the nature of things requires should be
done in order to achieve that purpose is the work not of
moral goodness but of another faculty, which we must discuss
with careful attention.

There is a faculty which is called Ability, which is such
as to be able to put into practice the means to any pro-
posed end in view, and to discover what those means are. 25
Now if the end in view is a noble one, the ability is praise-
worthy ; but if the end in view is bad, the ability is villainy.
Hence we call able men practically wise or villainous?

Practical wisdom is not identical with this faculty, but it
cannot exist without it. The fixed quality* cannot come to
belong to this eye of the mind without moral virtue. This 30
has been said, and it is clearly true: for deductive arguments
about conduct always have as their premiss ‘Since so-and-so
is the end and the greatest good’—whatever so-and-so may
be, for we may take it as anything for the sake of argument:
and this cannot be seen correctly except by the good man:
for wickedness causes perversion and deception about the 35
premisses of arguments as to conduct. Plainly therefore it is
impossible that a man who is not good should be practically
wise.

XIII

Accordingly we must also further discuss moral excellence. 1144 b
The fact is that moral excellence shows very much the same
relation that practical wisdom bears to ability: these two are
not identical, but are similar: and it is in just this way that
natural moral excellence is related to true moral excellence.
All are agreed that in some sense or other the several moral
qualities are natural and inborn: from the very moment of 5
our birth we are just and self-controlled and brave, and
possess the other qualities.

1 reading αὐτῶν codd. not αὐτοῦ Bywater. 2 sc. as the case may be.
3 sc. the good quality of practical wisdom.

122 ARISTOTLE

lal > * x bs,

ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ

lal - Ἂς Ν Ν

τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶι

9 3,» ᾧαᾧ A

θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνευ νοῦ
5: n ν

το βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι. πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν

a na» "

ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ ὄψεως κινου-
a Ἄν ‘A * ¥

μένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν

ῳ ἴω a id #
ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα: ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράτ-
> ,

τειν διαφέρει: ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότ᾽ ἔσται κυρίως
3 7 Ψ , iN a n ὃ 4 4

ἀρετή. wore καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἔστιν

15 εἴδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ
+ » % Ν > AY Ν Ν > e ΄ ὴ ἊΣ ’

δύο ἔστιν, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ᾽ ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων

€ ¥ > a »” ¥ ἊΨ ,

ἡ κυρία ov γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. διόπερ τινές φασι
“ πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι. καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ
᾿ 3 “ > 7 died 3 ε΄ ua A % Ἂν ’
μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ᾽ ἡμάρτανεν: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις

5 ΟΥ̓
20 ᾧετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ
7 ἦδῳ »» " “ ref Ν Ν “
φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον dé καὶ γὰρ νῦν
΄ oy ε ἡ . 3 x ΄ a ᾿ λα
πάντες, ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι, τὴν ἕξιν
> - Ἄν Ὁ Ν ba 3 ‘\ Ν ἐν 3 * ie
εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς a ἐστιν, THY κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον"
2 ᾿ > ¢€ ‘\ Ν ,ὔ Ἂς. ὧν ΝΣ 7 ,
ὀρθὸς δ᾽ ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί
9 Ld ε ᾿ ν > ὅν. ἃ ε ἣν X
25 πως ἅπαντες OTL ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν
ν» ἴω ες Ν ~ yy Ν 3 Ψ.
φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι: ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον
ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου
Ψ 3 ’ 3 bs Ἂ, Ν ἊΨ ‘\ fal Fs ε
ἕξις ἀρετή [ἐστιν]. ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ
4 ΄ 2 , x > 4 \ > Ἂν
φρόνησίς ἐστιν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς
30 ῴετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ
λόγου. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε
> N > Ψ »” ΄, γῶν ΄ ¥
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ
εκ > rn > A > N ve , ΄ , > »¥ a
τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ Kal ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ᾽ ἄν, ᾧ
1144 Ὁ 6 ἕητοῦμεν codd. edd: ἡγούμεθ’ coni. Rassow

26 ἔστι γὰρ οὐ K M Byw: οὐ yap L Bek Sus
27 ἐστιν K L Bek Sus Byw: om. M O: seclusit Burnet

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 123

Nevertheless, we desire to find that true moral excellence
is something other than this, and that the moral qualities men-
tioned belong to us in some other way. The fact is that even
children and the lower animals possess these natural qualities,
which however are evidently harmful when separated from
intelligence. We may surely observe, at any rate, that just 10
as a body of great strength but without sight meets with
great falls, when put in motion, just because it is without
sight, so also it happens in this case. But if a man acquires
intelligence also, he acts particularly well: and his moral
character, though it will be much what it was before, will
then be moral excellence truly so called.

So that just as in the case of the intellectual part of the
soul that deals with the contingent there are two kinds of
quality, ability and practical wisdom, so also there are two 15
kinds in the case of the moral part, the one natural and the
other true excellence; and of these it is the true excellence
which cannot be produced without practical wisdom.

Hence it is that some say that all the moral excellences
are forms of practical wisdom: and Socrates was right to
some extent, but also to some extent wrong: he was wrong
in supposing all the moral excellences to de forms of practical
wisdom, but quite right in teaching that these excellences 20
cannot exist without practical wisdom.

A proof of this is that even now everyone in defining a
moral excellence, after stating the quality and the things
with which it is concerned, adds that it is the quality deter-
mined by right reason. And that reason is right which is the
result of practical wisdom. It appears then that all thinkers
have somehow or other hit upon the truth, that moral ex-
cellence is a quality which is in accordance with practical
wisdom. :

We must however, slightly change the wording of this
statement: for moral excellence is a quality that is not only
in accordance with, but in conjunction with, right reason.
And practical wisdom zs right reason about such matters.
Socrates, then, supposed the moral excellences to be kinds of
reason (for they were all, he said, forms of knowledge) but we 30
hold that they are conjoined with reason.

It is plain, then, after what has been said, that it is not
possible without practical wisdom to be really good morally,
nor without moral excellence to be practically wise.

Moreover, this result may provide an answer to the
argument by which a person might object that the moral

1 1,6. to the person with great moral qualities without intelligence.

iS}

5

124 ARISTOTLE

> ¢ ε 3 Fe 3
διαλεχθείη τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταῖ" οὐ
᾿ς ε Ta ν NX 3,
35 γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυέστατος πρὸς ἁπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν
¥ ἈΝ > \ » A = Ἂν Ἂ ‘
non THY δ᾽ οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται: τοῦτο yap κατὰ er Tas
a Ν ε “Ὁ
1145 ἃ φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ᾽ ἃς δὲ ἁπλῶς λέγεται
χγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέ - ἃ ip τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρ-
αγαῦος, OVK ἐνδέχεται" GUA yap TH φρονὴ peg P
an A las > N \
χούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον δέ, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ
“5 ῳ a a ΄ 3 \ > Ὗ
ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι: καὶ
ὃ IK ἔ ) ί ὀρθὴ ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ᾽
5 OTL οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ φρονή
L ἱρετῆς: ἣ μὲν γὰρ TO τέλος ἢ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος
ἄνευ ἀρετῆς: ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἣ δὲ τὰ πρὸς
3 ‘a 3 3 Ἂς ὑῶν τ
ποιεῖ πράττειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ᾽ ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας
lal ~ c ἂν ε
οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ
> # > s “ 3 Lal > > ε ΜᾺ, Ψ ie Ἔ
ἰατρική: οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾷ ὅπως γένηται
2 ΄ > 7 > ΄ 3 > 3 2 ΄ x an
10 ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκείνῃ. ETL ὅμοιον
zd ἊΡ Ν Ν ΄ »” lat 6 - ig
Kav εἰ Tis THY πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι
ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.
1145a 2 ὑπαρχούσῃ Κα Μ Byw: οὔσῃ L Bek Sus Burnet

3 τοῦ μορίου codd. Bek Byw: τοῦ * * μορίου Sus: τοῦ ἑτέρου μορίου
coni. Spengel

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VI 125

excellences are separable from each other: any one man, he

may say, is not equally disposed towards all of them, so that

he will have already achieved one of them when he has not 35
yet achieved another. This, it is true, is possible with regard

to the natural moral excellences, but with regard to those
excellences which entitle a man to be called morally good, 1145 a
without qualification, it is not possible: for as soon as a man

has the single excellence of practical wisdom he will have all

the moral excellences along with it.

And it is now plain that, even if practical wisdom had no
effect on action, it would nevertheless be desirable because it
is the excellence of that part of the mind to which it belongs:
and also that purpose will not be right without practical 5
wisdom or without moral excellence: for the one makes the
end right, and the other causes the doing of the means to the
end.

At the same time practical wisdom is not in a position of
authority over philosophic wisdom or over the nobler part
of the mind: just as medicine is not in a position of authority
over our health: for it does not make use of it, but takes
measures for its existence: it does not therefore command it, 10
but commands for it. It is, we may add, as if one were to
say that political science is in authority over the gods because
it orders everything that is done in the country.

1 i.e. without practical wisdom any more than without moral excellence.

DIALECTIC METHOD IN THE
SIXTH BOOK.

In his edition of the NE Professor Burnet says in some places,
and implies in many others, that many misunderstandings of the
Ethics have sprung from a failure to see how dialectic Aristotle’s
method is’. It will be well to see how far his contentions are justified
in so far as they apply to book v1: and generally to see what Aristotle
understands by the dialectical method, and what he takes to be its
place in ethical discussion.

The dialectic method is referred to by name in many different
passages of the Aristotelian writings’, and it has not been seen how
complex a notion the name conveys, and to what different conceptions
of it the various references must lead us. But it is possible to
distinguish at least three elements, which sometimes combine to give
διαλεκτική its complex meaning, whereas at other times one or other
of them is prominent to the partial or entire exclusion of the others.
1. The words διαλέγεσθαι, διαλεκτικός, as is well known, mean
‘conversation’ ‘conversational’ in the first place’. They became
restricted, during the century or so that followed Socrates, to con-
versation of a certain kind. A dialectic discussion was not desultory,
but concerned with one topic, in fact with the truth or falsity of a
given proposition. It took place not between a number of persons
speaking in any order, but between two persons only. These persons
either held actually, or for the purposes of the argument were
supposed to hold, opposite views about the question under discussion,
the one denying what the other affirmed to be true. The formal
object of the discussion was not to find out what the truth really was:
there was indeed-no common object, but each disputant attempted

1 See his edition of N.E. Introd. xxxix—xlvi and the Preface.

2 See Bonitz Index 5. v. διαλεκτικός.
3 I have not thought it necessary to give an accurate or full account of the

history of the word.

128 DIALECTIC METHOD

to prove the other wrong and himself right. The common ground of
argument was certain propositions, admitted by both disputants to be
true, whether as a matter of fact they were true or not. The
immediate result of such a discussion could never be an increased
knowledge of truth about the subject discussed, though indirectly it
might lead to such knowledge by giving a man keener insight into
the subject. The method was essentially oral. There was no
arbiter: neither party had won till he had forced the other to confess
himself in the wrong or at least defeated. Dialectic in this sense was
a kind of intellectual game, pleasant for the clever and active-minded,

and useful as a training in aad and readiness—it was in fact, as
Aristotle calls it, γυμναστική. ‘But the dialectic method is not
confined to debate between two persons. A single person may
employ it, and in his hands it becomes something very different, and
it is most important to observe what the differences are. Of course
it is quite possible to invent and to record in writing a debate
between two persons of the kind that has just been described. In
this case the author is simply a dramatist: he takes no side himself,
is not interested in the result, cares no more for the truth of the
matter (so far as anything he says in his own person goes) than
either of the disputants, and at the same time is not desirous, as the
disputants are, of winning a victory. The author of such a com-
position is not really himself discussing the subject dialectically—he
is merely recording a discussion on the part of others ; only those
others are not real people, but the creatures of the puter’: brain.
But putting aside such compositions as being merely a sort of literary
and artificial form of the first kind of dialectic, there is another kind
of dialectic argument employed by a single thinker. In any reason-
ing, whether inductive or deductive, the premisses may be true
statements known to be true, or they may be statements which many
people regard as certainly true but as to which the reasoner himself
is uncertain. There are certain subjects, about which it is evidently
possible to reason, and to learn better by doing so, concerning which
it is nevertheless impossible to discover any true statement known to
be true to start with. In the absence of certainly true premisses it is
necessary to take such premisses as seem most probably true. There
are two tests of the probability of any statement, the external test of

1 Topics 101 a 27. The usefulness of it πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις is different, but
similarly practical, and like it opposed to the third use of it, mentioned in the
same passage, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας.

IN THE SIXTH BOOK 129

its acceptance by other people, the internal test of its seeming to the
reasoner himself to correspond with facts. The statements about the
subject to be discussed that appear, after undergoing this double
test, to be most probably true, are the proper premisses for the
reasoning to follow. Now this reasoning is dialectic and not demon-
strative, for the uncertainty of the original premisses makes all the
conclusions founded on them uncertain. 3. The process of reason-
ing from probable premisses is quite different from the process of
obtaining those probable premisses: and the latter process is also
dialectical. If, whenever the truth about a thing cannot be ascer-
tained, everyone were agreed on the probable truth about it, this
latter process would not be needed. But when it is asked what the
probable truth is, it is commonly found that different people give
different answers. If in these various answers there were no common
element, no trace of agreement, it would be useless to investigate
them: the only thing to do would be to reject all authority what-
soever, and follow the view that seems best in itself, whether anyone
else holds it or not. But there is, Aristotle thinks, an a priori
likelihood of public opinion being not wholly wrong, and of the
cleverest thinkers being not wholly wrong either’: and in practice it
is commonly found that public opinion is at least partly right, and
that the cleverest thinkers are at least partly right ; and moreover, if
one takes the trouble to see exactly what they mean, that they do not
so entirely disagree with each other as appears at first sight. Various
ἔνδοξα or received views that seem incompatible to begin with may
be shown compatible by means of careful examination. If, for
instance, the cause of the existence of what error there is in any
given ἔνδοξον can be assigned, it is easier to feel certain how far that
ἔνδοξον is false and how far it is true: or again a formal restatement
of an ἔνδοξον, involving no change in its meaning, may remove an
inconsistency with another ἔνδοξον that was after all only a formal
inconsistency. In these and in various other ways ἔνδοξα may be
wholly or partly reconciled. All this will make it clearer what view
is most probable (ἐνδοξότατον) and ought to be started with: and the
process is called dialectic. It is plainly preparatory for the second
process, already described.

1 NE 1098 Ὁ 27—29 τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι
ἄνδρες. οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὔλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἕν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ
πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν. This is plainer than 1153 Ὁ 32 (quoted by Burnet) πάντα yap

φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον.

6. 9.

130 DIALECTIC METHOD

The last of these three processes is related in different ways to
each of the two former ones. It is like the first, especially like the
literary recorded form of the first, in that the author actually brings
the disputants, though he may not dramatically personify them, on to
the debating stage, and makes them speak their. parts and do the
best they can. The soundness of any ἔνδοξον can best be tested and
approved by the reader if he is allowed to see all the objections that
can fairly be urged against it, and the answers that can be made
against those objections in defence of it. But the author is no longer
merely passive, and cannot allow his reader to be passive either. He
is anxious to arbitrate between the rival views, to decide which of
them is the truest, and to take the truest for his own, modified it
may be by some element of truth that is contained in the others and
yet is rejected or neglected in that which is truest on the whole. It
is important for him to reach a view of his own on the questions at
issue, in order that he may have material for further reasoning, and
50. ultimately solve the problems that most press for solution and
acquire the knowledge that is most desirable. And it is important
that his view should be as near as possible to that truth which from
the nature of the subject he can never discover with exactness and
certainty: for his conclusions can.be no more true or convincing than
are the grounds on which they are based. He is thus in a position
quite different from that taken by either of the disputants whose
merits he has to judge: and he is a dialectician (διαλεκτικός) in quite
another sense. It does not follow that the man who is cleverest at
devising arguments to support his view and repel the opponent's.
attacks is the most acute or impartial judge of what the real merits of
the case are. To become the former may be more useful in practical
life: it may enable one to defend against skilful attacks some truth
that is not strong enough to defend itself: it certainly is one of the
best means to become the latter. But it is the latter who will be
capable of discovering truth for himself, and of distinguishing the
false from the true in the opinions of others.

The third process is different also from the second, though they
are alike in certain respects that distinguish them from the first.
They are processes carried on by a single thinker and not the
combination of the processes carried on by two thinkers. Their end
is not victory but truth, not mental training for future efforts but the
present attainment of valuable results. They. are in fact parts of a
single whole process, that by which the philosopher (to use the word

IN THE SIXTH BOOK 131

in its broadest sense) investigates those questions which are naturally
incapable of being answered with exact precision because they
concern variable and not invariable things. But the two parts are
different in themselves. The one consists in securing the right
materials to work with, and the other in making the right use of those
materials when secured. The one starts with a number of statements
that are not exactly-the same, that may be very different, that are
sometimes formally incompatible and sometimes inconsistent in sub-
stance: from which medley, by whatever means the dialectical ability
of the reasoner can devise, the truth must be sorted out, or at least
what is as near the truth as it seems possible to go. The other
follows out the method of exact science. The premisses are not
indeed scientifically certain, and the conclusions can be no more
certain than the premisses: but the procedure is exact and well-
defined. These two processes are plainly very different, and must
not be confused because they have the common name ‘dialectic,’ or
because Aristotle in no place formally states the distinction between
them. ‘They may be more mixed up with each other in the practical
setting out of an argument than the logical priority of the one to the
other makes strictly correct: thus an objection to the premisses may
be raised at any point where its force can best be felt or where it can
most conveniently be answered, and need not in practice necessarily
be forestalled before the constructive argument begins.

The common feature of these three forms of dialectic, in virtue of
which they deserve their common name, is that they are all forms of
reasoning about views that are not certainly true but are to some
extent probable. Dialectic is thus as a whole opposed to exact
scientific reasoning, to which it is in one sense inferior and in another
sense not so: for it is, or is capable of being, the best possible way
of reasoning about subjects that are in themselves variable and
inexact, and so is as good of its kind (i.e. in relation to its subject-
matter) as scientific reasoning can be: but as its subject-matter is in
itself inferior because of this variableness, and as the results produced
are at best less certainly true than those of science, it is as a whole-
definitely inferior to science as a whole. Dialectic is also opposed to
Sophistic and Eristic, for these latter are marked either by the
premisses not being probable as they are asserted to be or by the”
reasoning from the premisses not being well conducted as it pretends
to be: that is to say, either the third or the second of the three
dialectic processes distinguished above is not properly carried out,

9-

132 DIALECTIC METHOD

but an inferior imitation is substituted, containing statements that are
not only not certainly true—for that-can be said of the statements of
dialectic too—but are less true than other statements that might and
therefore ought to have been made in their place. Grote observes*
that this latter distinction is not so sound as that of dialectic from
scientific reasoning, seeing that it concerns not the arguments them-
selves but the minds of the persons who use them. But Aristotle
would no doubt reply to this, that there is an objective difference
between a sound and an unsound deduction from any given premisses,
and between premisses that are and premisses that are not accepted
by the majority of intelligent people ; that it is this difference rather
than the difference.in moral character of the reasoners that really
separates dialectic from sophistic and eristic, though in practice it is
found that the bad moral motives of greed or vanity or the like are
what induce men deliberately to pervert the truth as they do, the
sophist aiming at making a fortune by his profession, and the eristic,
who is not a sophist, desiring to win admiration by a display of his
talent. The distinction is therefore that of good from bad in the
same sphere, whereas the distinction of dialectic from exact scientific
reasoning is that of good from good in different spheres: both
distinctions are sound, but the latter is plainly the more radical®.
The way is now-open for considering the question of how far in
the Ethics generally, and in vi particularly, the method Aristotle
employs is, in any of the above senses, dialectical. It is not difficult
to return the general answer, that in the first sense the Ethics is
not dialectical, in the second sense it is, in the third sense it is to
some extent but by no means altogether. For the treatise is plainly
no mere piece of mental gymnastic like the Socratic dialogues of
Plato: it aims at positive results, and is to all appearance continually
reaching them, and is not forced by any later turn of the argument
to abandon what it has reached: it does not, like the first book of
the Republic, show two contending sides and one finally victorious,
but a single body of doctrine gradually shaping itself out of a chaos
of loose ill-defined opinions. But dialectical in the second sense it
is plain that on Aristotle’s principles this and any other ethical

1 “ Aristotle’ i 387.

2 Aristotle was no doubt aware of the Jatter’s being the more radical, as
indeed he indicates (if his editors have carried out his intentions) by separating
the Topics from the Analytics more completely than he separates the Sophistic
Fallacies from the other books of the Topics.

IN THE SIXTH BOOK 133

treatise is bound to be: for since it deals with that contingent
unknowable thing human conduct its general principles must be
rough and not truly universal (τύπῳ καὶ ws ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ), and its
particulars must always have a number of peculiarities that have to
be reckoned with in reasoning on the subject and yet are not to be
classified beforehand or brought under the general rule. The most
fundamental of all ethical general principles can only be the most
probable of ἔνδοξα on the subject; though that principle is not
necessarily an ἔνδοξον in the sense that it is actually accepted either
by people in general or by experts and wise men—it may be a new
opinion of the author’s own.

The question at issue is just this, How far is the Ethics dialectical
in the third sense above mentioned? This question may well be
stated in the words Professor Burnet employs in his preface. There
are some who have tried to find in the Ethics ‘the scientific and
metaphysical basis of Aristotle’s moral philosophy.’ Such a basis
Professor Burnet is quite unable to discover there. He regards the
treatise as ‘dialectical throughout,’ because ‘the foundations of the
doctrine here set forth’ are ‘of the most shifting character, taken as
they are at one time from the opinions of ordinary people, at another
from popular Platonism.’ Finding a large number of hitherto
unnoticed striking resemblances, if not direct references, to Isocrates
and Plato, he infers that Aristotle in the Ethics accepts, like a
practical dialectician (in the first of our three senses of the word),
views from his opponents that he does not hold himself and could
not square with many of his fundamental philosophic principles, and
deduces from them conclusions which his opponents are thus more
forced to accept than if the same conclusions had been deduced from
strict Aristotelian principles. Finding that the methods of argument,
of sustaining a θέσις or destroying an ἔνστασις or solving an ἀπορία,
are those prescribed in the Topics as rules for the game of dialectic,
he infers that the whole treatise is handled in the spirit of the
contemporary players of the game at Athens. Seeing however that
the external form of the work is not very different from that of other
works of Aristotle which cannot be regarded as anything but strictly
scientific in their methods and results, and that there is the appear-
ante at least of results obtained to which the author himself attaches
as much validity as the nature of the subject-matter allows of and
which form the basis of that comparatively scientific treatise the
Politics, it would appear that Professor Burnet, while rightly denying

134 DIALECTIC METHOD

what indeed Aristotle himself disclaims repeatedly—the exactness
and certainty of Aristotle’s conclusions on ethical subjects, has gone
too far in the opposite direction. The fact is that it is not impossible
that the foundations of the doctrine of the Ethics should be current
popular or philosophic opinions, and at the same time the Ethics
contain the scientific and metaphysical basis of Aristotle’s moral
philosophy in so far as moral philosophy admits of such a basis. It
is true that neither pure metaphysics nor pure psychology is allowed
to come into the treatise to any great extent. Professor Burnet
himself insists in Ἱ on a meaning of λόγος, familiar in Aristotle’s
metaphysical discussions but alien to common usage, which I cannot
see any reason to attribute to it there’. But the comparative neglect
of metaphysics and psychology does not imply Aristotle’s adoption of
views in any way inconsistent with his metaphysical and psychological
doctrines: such considerations are simply regarded as inappropriate
to the subject in hand, either because they do not throw light on the
questions to which an answer is sought, or because the subject is
essentially foreign to them and does not permit of any direct
application of them. Nowhere in the Ethics, I believe, does
Aristotle ever accept for the purposes of argument a view with which
he anywhere else expresses or implies his disagreement. That he
founds his own opinions about ethical subjects, and especially his
axioms and premisses, on the opinions of others, does not show that
the opinions he appears to accept, with or without investigation, are
not accepted in reality. Though he always considers the opinions of
particular thinkers and of men in general wherever they are to the
point, and though those opinions that he declares to be his own he
seems always to regard as placed on a firmer footing if shown to be
in harmony with or the same as the opinions of others: yet his
deference to others is neither invariable nor complete, especially not
in matters of substantial importance—in terminology he is more
ready to follow established usage—and he is not always content to
select and adopt the most plausible of current views, even in a
modified form; the preliminary examination of those views may
simply show how unsatisfactory they all are, and so justify the author
in striking out a line for himself. In the first book, for instance, the
preliminary definition of Happiness is reached directly, by an
argument to which the previous discussion of current views of
happiness does not, formally at least, contribute anything at all.

1 See the Miscellaneous Notes.

IN THE SIXTH BOOK 135

Professor Burnet admits indeed? that Aristotle’s ‘attitude toward
these beliefs’ of the many and the wise ‘is by no means uncritical’:
but he does not appear to regard the critical attitude as containing
the possibility of complete rejection of any of the beliefs of the many
or the wise, even in part. Anistotle does not, according to him, judge
for himself how far the wise and the many are right or wrong: he
only finds out how it is that the wise and the many, who are both
right, appear to contradict each other, though they do not do so in
reality. In spite of what he says about Aristotle’s being a convinced
intuitionalist in moral judgments’, this does amount to holding that
he would have us take our first principles on trust’. But it is clear
that if our premisses are taken on trust, our conclusions must be
taken on trust too, though less directly. Yet plainly the great result
of the Ethics, the view obtained of the greatest good for man, is not
taken on trust. The argument is not ‘If such-and-such people are
night in their views about human life, it must follow that happiness is
so-and-so: and since we cannot do better than suppose those people
to be right in their views, it follows that we cannot do better than
suppose happiness to be so-and-so.’ Nor, to put it rather differently
is it this—‘ You say this and that: well, if this and that are true,
happiness is so-and-so: you are therefore obliged to admit happiness
to be so-and-so: but whether it is so-and-so or not I have not shown
ner even stated what I believe about it.’ No: Aristotle’s line is
rather to consider first what current opinions are; to show by
comparison, or re-statement, or consideration of their history and
causes, how far they are true; to form, partly but not entirely by
their help, as correct opinions as possible on the points at issue; to
argue from these opinions thus formed, as from true premisses ; and
to test the conclusions produced by such argument by further appeals
to such current opinions as previous consideration has shown to be
at all plausible. So much for the dialectic question as: far as it
concerns the Ethics as a whole: I will now-try to determine the
extent and nature of the dialectic element in v1.

In the first place it will be allowed that vi is, like the other books
of the Ethics, dialectic in so far as its subject-matter is the variable
and contingent (τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν), since neither its con-
clusions nor its premisses can be statements of what is universally.
and always true. To reason about such a subject as the intellectual
goodness of man must be to reason ἐξ ἐνδόξων, for no certain and

1 Introd. xl. 2 xiii. 3 xli.

136 DIALECTIC METHOD

sure premisses can be got on such a subject, but only such as are
probably or generally true. Reasoning ἐξ ἐνδόξων is dialectic, as the
opening words of the Topics show. Hence the whole of v1, as well
as the rest of the treatise, must be dialectic in this sense. It should
be hardly necessary to point out that σοφία with its divisions ἐπιστήμη
and νοῦς, though they give rise to activities that are not dialectical
but scientific, since they have to do with the truly knowable and
exact, are yet considered in the Ethics from an outside point of view,
in their relation to the chief good for man, a question that is not
directly within their province, and concerning which no exact and
scientific statements can be made: these parts of the whole subject
form therefore no exception to the general rule, that the subject-
matter of the Ethics is not the eternal but the contingent.

Again, the form of the last two chapters, if not their spirit, is
obviously dialectical. The previous arguments had led to the belief
(1) that σοφία and φρόνησις are highly valuable and useful qualities,
(2) that σοφία is a better quality than φρόνησις is. ‘Two ἐνστάσεις or
objections are now raised in the regular disputants’ fashion, giving
reasons to support the view (1) that σοφία and φρόνησις are useless,
(2) that φρόνησις is better than copia. The result is the ἀπορία that
occurs when two disputants support opposite views with reasons, and
for a time neither can refute the other. The ἀπορία is removed by a
corresponding two-fold λύσις, which breaks down the objections and
sustains the original θέσεις. In what respect are these two chapters
less dialectical than any.other argument between the supporters of
two opposite views? In the first place it must be noted that the
same form of argument may and does occur in reasoning about
scientific subjects, and has no necessary connection with the un-
certainty of the premisses: an excellent instance is chapter ili of
Analytica Posteriora 1, which passage, and many others like it, is
distinguished from ordinary popular dialectical arguments by the fact
that truth and not victory is the end in view, and that the objections
are in consequence genuine and substantial, not captious and verbal,
the answers to the objections really satisfactory (at least in the
author’s view) and not merely good enough for the kind of objection
they meet or to convince the kind of person who would raise such an
objection. The two chapters in question have therefore the dialectic
form, but not the dialectic spirit, and their substance might have
been expressed without the use of the dialectic form, though that
happens to be a convenient form for the purpose.

IN THE SIXTH BOOK 137

Again, there is in this book much examination of popular and
philosophical (especially Platonic) doctrines and usages of words, and
much correction of both where the author considers them wrong.
As has been pointed out elsewhere, Aristotle is especially anxious to
introduce a correcter terminology, and many of his arguments chiefly
concern the proper use of words, showing that other people rather
use certain words wrongly than are wrong on points of fact. This
applies to the usage of every one of the eight names of intellectual
virtues (excluding the minor virtues εὐστοχία and ἀγχίνοια) with which
Aristotle deals: and he also introduces correcter usages of the words
λογιστικόν and πολιτική. Besides improving terminology he corrects
the substance of others’ views: thus he shows the error of ‘the
common suppositions, (1) that moral virtue is knowledge, (2) that
moral virtue is merely κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, (3) that politics are a
higher and better study than science, (4) that practical is superior to
theoretic statesmanship, (5) that selfish prudence is the highest kind
of φρόνησις, (6) that the intellectual excellences are of no use, (7) that
φρόνησις is superior to σοφία. Now all this correction of others’
mistakes is in a sense dialectical, for it is not direct reasoning from
premisses, as scientific reasoning (the opposite of dialectical reasoning)
usually is, but has to do with the opinions of opponents. But the
correction of others is done not to defeat or humble them but-to
produce truth and prevent the spread of falsehood: and moreover it
is made by means of contentions regarded not merely as what the
adversary will accept but as really probable in themselves. These
corrections are in fact not dialectical in just the. same respect as that
in which the last two chapters of vi are not dialectical—the higher
and more philosophical spirit in which they are made, and the
consequent greater soundness of the contentions that are supported.
It is of course in this consequent greater soundness that the
superiority of.those arguments that are not in this sense dialectical to
those that are consists. It is this fact that Grote overlooks in his
criticism of Aristotle’s distinction of dialectic from sophistic and
eristic as lying entirely in the motives of the disputants and not at all
in the objective character of their arguments. In practice it is found
that the motives of the disputants invariably affect the objective
character of the arguments.

So far it is probable that the account I have given of the extent
to which vi is dialectic would be more or less agreed to by everyone ;
but now comes the point on which I understand Professor Burnet to

138 DIALECTIC METHOD

disagree with previous commentators ; as I must think, mistakenly.
There are certain statements made, in vi as in other books of the
Ethics, which the author appears to accept as true and not to reject
or substantially modify afterwards, which Professor Burnet considers
are made dialectically. By this he seems to mean that Aristotle at
best only puts them forward tentatively and probably is conscious of
his disbelief in them: that in no case, at any rate, has he made up
his mind that they are probably true: that he afterwards tacitly or
openly rejects many of them, wholly or in part: and that he only
mentions them to show that the ethical views he supports, though
they could be made to rest on other grounds, on axioms with which
he would agree, can nevertheless rest securely enough on the axioms
that are accepted by his opponents though by him rejected or at least
considered inappropriate. There are moreover certain usages of
words which Professor Burnet considers to be not Aristotelian but
Platonic or popular, and which he therefore holds to be dialectically
used, accepted that is from the opponent, in order to have the
satisfaction of fighting him not only with his own arguments but with
his own words. I shall try to show that with one doubtful exception
none of the statements or usages referred to by Professor Burnet in
vi as in this sense dialectical really are so: that is to say, that they
do not imply that Aristotle has adopted, even temporarily, any view
that is not actually his own.

I. 1139 a 3—6 refers to the previous division of the soul into
two parts, and proposes to subdivide one of these parts into two
further parts. When the former division was made}, it was stated that
the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι made it rightly, and ought to be followed in this
matter. The ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, Professor Burnet says following Diels,
are discourses extraneous to the Aristotelian school: and he adds
that nearly always the expression means the writings of the Academic
school, and certainly has that meaning here (1102 a 26)*. The former
division would on this showing be a piece of current Academic
psychology. But (a) it is far from certain that ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι
means. ‘discourses extraneous to the Aristotelian school’; (6) τὸν
αὐτὸν τρόπον in 1139 a 5 need not mean that the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι
are being followed in the second division as they were in the first—
it would naturally mean only ‘into two parts’; (¢) if the ἐξωτερικοὶ
λόγοι represent the opinions of some other person or persons than

1 1102 a 26—28,
? See his note on this passage, page 58.

IN THE SIXTH BOOK 139

Aristotle, yet it does not follow that he disagrees at all with the
conclusions he proposes to adopt from them, even from the strictly
scientific point of view. Moreover, it is too much to say that ‘ Aris-
totle himself did not believe in parts of the soul at all’ (Burnet,
page 58 note). Such an expression as 1102 Ὁ 16 φαίνεται δ᾽ ἐν αὐτοῖς
(sc. ἐν τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι καὶ ἀκρατέσι) ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκὸς
ὃ μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ implies that in some real sense there
are parts of the soul. The point is not settled in the Psychology
one way or the other: it is only shown there that in whatever sense
the soul may be considered to have parts, these parts do not at any
rate correspond in space to parts of the body. So that this dividing
of the soul into parts is not a dialectical adoption of a piece of
Academic psychology in which Aristotle does not himself believe.

2. Professor Burnet holds that the argument that difference of
subject-matter implies a corresponding difference in the parts of the
soul (see his note on 1139 a 8—10) is un-Aristotelian and is dialecti-
cally adopted from Plato. It is one thing to admit that Plato held
this opinion when he wrote the Republic, and another thing to deny
that Aristotle held it when he wrote the Ethics. Even without con-
sidering the ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ theory of knowledge on which it is made
here to depend, the general principle that difference between two
things implies a corresponding difference between things similarly
related to them is upheld elsewhere in this same book of the Ethics.
Thus φρόνησις is said to be inferior to σοφία because its objects are
inferior to the objects of σοφία : 11414 20 ἄτοπον εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν
ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ
κόσμῳ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν : cf. also the rather different argument that
follows about ταὐτὸν and érepov. Also the ποιητικὴ ἕξις 15 said to be
different from the πρακτικὴ ἕξις as ποίησις is different from πρᾶξις :
1140 a 2—5. And in x there is the argument 1177a 12 εὔλογον
κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην (sc. ἀρετὴν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ἐνέργειαν) αὕτη
δ᾽ ἂν εἴη τοῦ dpéorov—which latter inference is not explicitly justified,
evidently because it is considered obviously true. There is therefore
no reason to suppose the view of this passage 1139 a 8—10—the
view that difference of subject-matter implies a corresponding dif-
ference in the parts of the soul—is a view that Aristotle does not
really take, even if no proof of that view were given at the same
time.

3. 11394 10 καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει.
‘Aristotle himself,’ says Professor Burnet, ‘did not hold the similia

140 DIALECTIC METHOD

similibus theory of knowledge in this naked form: the argument still
proceeds on Platonic lines.’ But the form is not particularly naked :
twa helps substantially to clothe it, implying dissent from such crude
forms of the theory as Empedocles held (γαίᾳ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν) and
making a reservation in favour of Aristotle’s own view. Moreover,
Aristotle’s own view is definitely a similia similibus one, as Professor
Stewart very plainly shows (Notes vol. ii p. 12—14) by a careful
examination of the teaching of the Psychology. ‘On Aristotelian
principles the faculties in exercise are not merely like but identical
with the objects as perceived’ (ii 14), and the objects as perceived
are the forms of things without their matter (εἴδη ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης). The
argument of 1139 a 10 thus proceeds along lines that may be and
indeed are Platonic, but are also Aristotelian enough.

4. The use of λογιστικόν (1139 a 12) to describe one part only
of what Plato called by this name can hardly be a dialectic use in
Professor Burnet’s sense: it is rather a usage to which the Academic
opponent would demur.

5. Professor Burnet maintains that the use of the imperative in
1139 a 6 ὑποκείσθω, 1139 a τι λεγέσθω, 1139 Ὁ 15 ἔστω is dialectical.
This can only be proved by showing that the positions taken up in
those passages are afterwards given up or considerably changed, or
that they are inconsistent with Aristotle’s doctrines clearly expressed
elsewhere. I have already defended the first two positions as really
Aristotelian: I will show below that the view of 1139 b 15 is also
maintained, so that ἔστω is really equivalent to ἔστι. For the usage
compare 1103 Ὁ 31 τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν Kal
ὑποκείσθω---8' position not afterwards abandoned. The imperative
appears to lay down, not a position which Aristotle really disagrees
with but accepts for the sake of argument, but one which it is not
considered necessary to prove because it either is obviously more or
less true, or has been proved elsewhere.

6. The list of five ἀρεταί in 1139 Ὁ τό, τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις
σοφία νοῦς, is said to be not Aristotle’s own list but ‘a mere pre-
liminary enumeration of states with a prima facie claim to be regarded
as διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί (Burnet 257 med.): we shall find that he reduces
them to two, φρόνησις and σοφία.᾽ It is said, moreover, that ὑπόληψις
and δόξα ‘are introduced as co-ordinate, quite in accordance with the
tentative character of the present discussion’ (Burnet 257). Now
there is no need to read into this passage the implication that the
five ἀρεταί on the one hand, or ὑπόληψις and δόξα on the other, are

IN THE SIXTH BOOK 141

regarded as co-ordinate: such a position is not here taken up, and
so has not to be surrendered afterwards. Again, there is nothing to
show that the prima facie claim of τέχνη νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη to be
intellectual ἀρεταί is not sustained afterwards: because the various
intellectual ἀρεταί can be classed in two groups each with a single
name, it does not follow they are not true and distinct intellectual
ἀρεταί in themselves. Φρόνησις is afterwards shown to include the
divisions εὐστοχία ἀγχίνοια εὐβουλία σύνεσις γνώμη νοῦς πρακτικός as
well as τέχνη here mentioned: but there is no reason to deny the
name of ἀρετή to the smallest of these subdivisions any more than
to the largest combination. Aristotle was above the pedantry (which
it is apparently desired to force on him) of supposing that everything
called an ἀρετή must be co-ordinate with everything else called an
ἀρετή. This important point, which I have referred to elsewhere,
is here mentioned simply with reference to the alleged dialectic
character of the present passage. As to ὑπόληψις and δόξα, there
is no difficulty in the fact that ὑπόληψις is the genus that includes
ἐπιστήμη : the statement that ὑπολήψει ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι is per-
fectly true, for it means not that azy ὑπόληψις may be false or wrong,
but that the name ὑπόληψις applies to what is wrong and what is
right alike. That ὑπόληψις and δόξα are here regarded as co-ordinate
is, as I have said, an unfounded assumption.

_7. Chapter iv (about τέχνη) Professor Burnet declares to be
highly dialectic in character. But again I maintain that it contains
no statement that is not entirely in accordance with Aristotle’s real
opinions. That ποίησις and πρᾶξις are different is a doctrine that
Aristotle does indeed say that he takes from the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, but
this does not imply that he has any fault to find, from the most strictly
scientific point of view, with the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι and their teaching
on this point. When he says πιστεύομεν he presumably means that
he thinks them to be correct in this matter and not that, whether
they are correct or mistaken, they may be followed in the present
discussion. The rest of the chapter is fair deduction on strict Aris-
totelian principles, from this initial fact, or (as regards the correct
usage of the word τέχνη) from the observed facts of ordinary
speech.

8. The definition of vots is said to be obtained dialectically
(Burnet, page 265, last note). If this means that it rests on premisses
that Aristotle does not agree to, the statement is incorrect, for there
is no reason to suppose that Aristotle does not consider the five aperat

142 DIALECTIC METHOD

of 1139 b 16 as a valid and exhaustive list. Nor is there anything
unscientific about the process of proof by exhaustion here employed.
It is true that the validity of the argument depends on the fact, yet
to be proved, that rod σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν ἐστιν : but that
statement Aristotle really holds to be true, and if the words ὡς δειχ-
θήσεται or the like were inserted after ἀπόδειξίν ἐστιν the argument
would be as valid formally as it is already valid in substance.

9. The argument about εὐβουλία is, it is said (Burnet, page 275,
rst note), on strictly Academic lines. This does not follow from the
doubtless true position, that Aristotle discusses εὐβουλία in its relation
to ἐπιστήμη because Plato (Republic 428 b) had said that εὐβουλία
was ‘clearly a kind of ἐπιστήμη. Aristotle is continually correcting
the errors of others as he does here, but he is not obliged to assume
even their phraseology to do so to advantage. Nor is there anything
obviously Academic about the phraseology here, with one possible
exception (διάνοια) to be noticed later.

το. Professor Burnet has a curious note on 1143 Ὁ 4 ἀρχαὶ γὰρ
τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται. ‘The universal rules of conduct and the definition
of εὐδαιμονία can only be found by a dialectical process which starts
from particular moral judgments.’ Now there is nothing obviously
dialectical about the moral induction by which particular moral judg-
ments are generalised into universal moral judgments, except in
the sense in which a moral induction and a moral deduction .are
both dialectical—namely, that they are processes concerned with
τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν and so must consist of reasoning ἐξ
ἐνδόξων. But Professor Burnet can hardly mean, by his use of the
word ‘dialectical,’ to point only to what is common to all moral
reasoning. He seems rather to suggest that there is an important
likeness between the system of investigation into ethical questions
here conducted in the Ethics and the investigations into ethical
questions that we each of us conduct in our practical life. But this
Aristotle never says; and it is hardly true.

The above are the principal passages in book vi that appear to
Professor Burnet to be of a dialectical nature. He believes indeed
that the entire tréatise is tentative, and that it contains a great
number of assumptions in the truth of which Aristotle does not
himself really believe, and which are the opinions either of the
contemporary Academy or of ordinary people. If he fails—as I
have tried to show that he does fail—to show that those particular
passages, which he thinks most strikingly support his view, really do

IN THE SIXTH BOOK 143

support it, a fortiori it may be argued that the rest of the reasoning,
which has on the face of it more of the scientific expository character
that marks all Aristotle’s other works, is not dialectic at all in the
sense of the word ‘dialectic’ in question. Professor Burnet further
makes a more definite though less important allegation, that Aristotle,
in the same dialectic spirit, uses words, not with the meanings he
would himself naturally attach to them, but with those attached to
them by the persons whose opinions he is supposed to be accepting.
Now it is undoubtedly true, as I have shown elsewhere, that Aristotle
sometimes accepts popular usages alongside of others which he re-
gards as more correct and which he wishes to introduce: thus he
is willing to use both πολιτική and φρόνησις, and certainly also νοῦς,
in the popular sense of those words, as well as with a wider and
more correct meaning peculiar to himself. But in nearly all cases
he distinguishes the sense that he holds strictly correct from that
which he holds merely allowable because .established. There are
one or two cases in which he is said to use words in the latter sense
without Saying anything to show he is not using them in the former,
and misunderstandings on the part of Aristotle’s readers are said to
have arisen in consequence.

1. About λογιστικόν and δοξαστικόν I have already said some-
thing. Professor Burnet supposes λογιστικόν to be used by Aristotle
because Plato used the word, though admittedly Plato used it in
quite a different sense: and he supposes δοξαστικόν to be used by
Aristotle because Plato opposes ἐπιστήμη to δόξα, and therefore
δοξαστικόν is the suitable antithesis to ἐπιστημονικόν. But the usage
of λογιστικόν constitutes not an acceptance but a rejection of the
Platonic usage: and since Aristotle’s classification of διάνοια into
θεωρητική and πρακτική is not the same as Plato’s distinction of
ἐπιστήμη and δόξα (a fact that Professor Burnet admits, but says
must be lightly passed over) it is hard to suppose that, whatever
reason Aristotle has for using the term δοξαστικόν, it is because he
is dialectically accepting the Platonic psychology and the Platomc
phraseology therewith. I have shown elsewhere the reasons I sup-
pose Aristotle to have had for using both λογιστικόν and δοξαστικόν
as he does.

2. In1143b 5 αἴσθησις is used in the general sense of ‘ per-
ception,’ and includes the activity of the intellect. This is said
to be a dialectical acceptance of vague everyday language. But
Aristotle often makes a vague and loose use of words even in his

144 DIALECTIC METHOD IN THE SIXTH BOOK

most scientific and expository treatises, simply because he is careless
of formal precision when he thinks his meaning is plain, and also in
some cases because he is without the word he wants and so has
to make another do. The latter as well as the former is the cause
of the use of αἴσθησις here: it is hard to see what other word could
‘have been used: and it is plain that αἴσθησις in the strict sense
cannot be meant, so that there is no danger of confusion of meaning,
or Aristotle thought there was none. There is then nothing dialectical
about the usage of αἴσθησις here.

3. In 1142 b 12 the use of διάνοια in διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται is
possibly the only instance in vi of a real acceptance of ἃ Platoni¢
usage with which Aristotle disagrees. Διάνοια here plainly means
the intellect considered as unsatisfied, searching, actively inquiring
but not contemplating the results of inquiry. That Plato uses διάνοια
in this sense is plain, though he certainly does not so use it always.
It is not so plain, however, that Aristotle never uses it in this sense.
Cf. for instance, Metaphysics 1074 Ὁ 36 dei ἄλλου 4 ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ
αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια (compare this list with that of this
chapter on εὐβουλία): Interpretation 16 Ὁ 20 ἵστησι γὰρ 6 λέγων
(sc. τὰ ὀνόματα) τὴν διάνοιαν ‘he stops his reasoning activity’: and
διάνοια is elsewhere used in a sense narrower than that in which
it is used in the early part of v1: thus in Metaphysics 1027 Ὁ 25 it
is definitely said to make propositions and not to apprehend simple
notions or ἀδιαίρετα : and it seems confined to the meaning διάνοια
πρακτική in Ethics 1148 a 9 παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν
ἀκράτης λέγεται, and Topics 1518 3 οἷον εἰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν ὡρίσατο τόλμαν
μετὰ διανοίας ὀρθῆς. So that all that can be fairly said is that διάνοια
is here used in a sense that is more regularly Platonic than it is
regularly Aristotelian, and not that Aristotle would not have admitted
the present sense as a possible and correct one. This single instance
of a dialectical attitude that Professor Burnet maintains pervades the
whole of vi cannot prove much, and could not even if it were more
unmistakeable than it is: μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ.

1 See Professor Burnet’s references, (page 276 of his edition).

ON FORMAL ACCURACY IN ARISTOTLE,
ILLUSTRATED BY THE SIXTH BOOK.

Aristotle’s originality is shown by this among other things, that
he first conceived how desirable it is for the philosopher to be
formally accurate in the use of his terms and in the arrangement of
his arguments. Like most original conceptions, whether Aristotle’s
or other people’s, this one was imperfectly formed, and much less
perfectly embodied in practice. To the modern reader the result
is a kind of perplexity comparatively absent from the writings alike
of those who have not formed the conception of accuracy at all, and
of those who have not only formed it but been able to work it out
properly. Such difficulties have usually been attacked without the
help of any general principles, and because singly, very often un-
successfully. Some consideration of this question of accuracy should
help towards the immediate object of understanding book vi, and
also serve as a basis for similar investigation of other works. The
principles it is here desired to establish are not shown to rest on
anything but this single book: but that they are in fact of very
general application it does not seem easy to deny, and this should
give them a. wider significance than will in this essay definitely be
claimed for them.

It must at once strike every student of to-day, it may also
have struck the students of those times, that Anstotle’s attempts at
carefulness and consistency are in some things greater than need be,
and in other things less. Pedantic precision seems to alternate with
unscientific slovenliness: and he is often, it appears, slovenly where
the subject is of great importance, and precise where it is trivial.
The view some scholars are ready to accept, that in the corpus of
Aristotelian writings we have to do.with mere lecture notes, and not
with such finished work as the Platonic dialogues, may be to some

G. 10

146 FORMAL ACCURACY IN ARISTOTLE,

extent true, though nothing can prove it; and if it is true it may
serve to account for much that is puzzling in the writings as they
have come down to us. But apart from the fact that even considered
as lecture notes they are inconsistent and irregular enough to demand
explanation, and sufficiently unlike what one would expect to find
the lecture notes of a modern philosopher, it is dangerous to make
such doubtful applications of a doubtful fact as many editors are
apt to make, explaining for instance the omission of what seems
to be urgently necessary by the hypothesis that the lecturer meant to
trust his memory to fill the gap when actually addressing his audience.
There is nothing for it but to take the text as it stands; to suppose
that the form in which we have it, however imperfect we may think
it, was considered by the Peripatetic school satisfactory enough to
remain as the permanent form and to be slavishly imitated even in
details; and to explain away as well as possible the difficulties to
which the peculiarities of this form give rise.

The question may be considered under two heads, not so dis-
tinct as not to shade into each other and present many. features
in common: (i) the undoubted variation, and the alleged incon-
sistency, in the use of particular words and phrases: (ii) the apparent
or real imperfections of argument. The latter shades off on the one
hand into the former, on the other into the larger questions of matter
and substance, as distinguished from pure form, a distinction which,
it may be remarked, it is often exceedingly hard to make, just as it
is hard, when the distinction between the two is easy to make
in itself, to know which of the two is really to the fore in any
given passage. It will be convenient to proceed from the more
to the less definite of the above two questions, and first to cofsider
the problems that arise from the usage of particular words and
phrases.

The claim already made for Aristotle, that he was the first to
aim consciously at formal accuracy of language, must be modified,
so far as the usage of particular words and phrases is concerned, by
a recognition of what he owes in this matter to certain of his
predecessors, who gave him some materials which he had only to
put into place in his system. Prodicus, according to a tradition pre-
served among other places in a well-known passage in the Protagoras
(337 A—C), attached the greatest importance to a correct use of
words (ὀρθοέπεια), drawing fine and not always justifiable distinctions
between what every-day people regarded as complete synonyms.

ILLUSTRATED BY THE SIXTH BOOK 147

Socrates, who was familiar with the teaching of Prodicus, was
anxious to fix the meanings of important or ambiguous words and
to establish a consistent usage of them accordingly: it is doubtful
whether he regarded words as having meanings attaching to them in
the unchangeable nature of things, so that each distinct word must
correspond to a real thing, and the only task is to discover what the
thing is; or whether he saw dimly, what Aristotle saw more clearly,
that words are a sort of spontaneous convention, rather instruments
of thought than guides to truth, and showing what people actually
think rather than whether in so thinking they are right or not.
Plato was curiously careless of form. He was a poet not only in
mind but in expression: and because he was a poet, and not a man
of science like Aristotle, he could feel no reluctance to sacrifice
formal exactness to beauty. It is this far more than his dialectic
method that makes him inexact. It is not the experience of the
modern dialectician that a vague use of terms is unobjectionable,
and it must be held a weakness on the part of Plato, though scarcely
one to be regretted, that he did not see how far consistency of
language may be of service in the search for material truth. Not
that he is indifferent to terminology: he is always glad to fix a
conception with a name, and if the name is not ready to his hand he
does not hesitate to coin a new word or give an old one a technical
meaning. The form his inquiries take is nearly always the search
for the definition of some word. But his theory of ideas taught him
to distinguish words from things, it is not words but things that
really interest him, and so long as he can make it clear that he is
talking about a certain thing he does not trouble himself to describe
it always in the same words.
Aristotle as well as Plato could see the difference between
things and the words describing them. It is lardly more than an
accident that some of his most important works take the Socratic
shape of search for the meaning of words—that the object of the
Ethics, for instance, seems to be a definition of the word εὐδαιμονία,
and the object of the 6th book the definition of a number of words
likely to be confused with each other—for precision and consistency
in language is never his end in view, never anything more than the
most subordinate of means to reaching the truth about real things.
But he saw how important it is as such a means, and not only in the
search for truth but in its exposition to others when found. The
result is that his works are crowded with technical terms, and with

1“.

148 FORMAL ACCURACY IN ARISTOTLE, -

discussions as to the meaning and right ‘use of particular words.
Like Plato he now and then regrets the fact that there is no name to
describe some class of things determined by some induction or
analysis, and is at pains to account for the fact. He far exceeds
Plato in the boldness with which he invents new words and phrases,
or uses old words and phrases with new meanings. The former
process was hard for the Greeks. The flexibility of their language
was a small compensation for their lack of the advantage that
modern thinkers possess in two dead languages with a large and
varied vocabulary which may be drawn upon to any extent without
fear of confusion with common speech. New coinages were accord-
ingly rare, though the need for them was never greater, even in our
own day. Consequently the other process, adaptation of terms
already existing, was common with all thinkers, and for the greatest
thinkers inevitable: Aristotle found himself driven to it at every
turn. But whereas the more recondite sciences demanded new
terms to express ideas that were at once novel and abstruse: in the
Ethics the subject dealt with is too closely connected with the
common experience of men to demand them to the same extent, for
the main ideas are not wholly novel. What new terms there are
nearly all belong to such other sciences as logic, metaphysics or
psychology, and occur when these sciences are touched upon in
some ethical connection. Here and there an unfamiliar vice or
virtue, to which people are not in practice addicted, is held worthy
of a new name: but sometimes its namelessness is merely remarked
and not remedied. To the special use of terms already in use
Aristotle was led by inclination almost as much as by necessity. It
was one of his cardinal principles that the mass of mankind is not
likely to be wholly wrong on any subject, and that, as they are on
the whole capable of expressing their opinions correctly in speech,
the ordinary usage of words is apt to be more or less the right one.
He paid a similar respect, genuine though discriminating, to the
language as well as to the opinions of earlier philosophers. He was
therefore glad to adopt an old term whenever he could, feeling it a
testimonial to the soundness of his own conclusions. He kept as
nearly as he could to the old meaning, and if he was obliged to
enlarge, to restrict, or altogether to change the meaning, he tried his
best to exhibit some justifying analogy of the new meaning with the
old, beyond what would at first sight appear.

The sixth book contains instances of (a) popular and (8) philo-

ILLUSTRATED BY THE SIXTH BOOK 149

sophic terms, which Aristotle has adopted, fixing upon them a special
meaning of his own. A third important but complicated class is (y)
those terms that have been previously adopted by philosophers from
common speech and by them modified in meaning, now taken over
by Aristotle, who modifies their meaning still further.

(a) Popular Terms.

(1) Téxvy. This term is modified from popular usage in two
ways: (1) its application is restricted to the actual making of things,
(2) it is regarded as a necessarily good state of mind and not as one
that may be either good or bad and yet deserve the name. As to
the first point, it is carefully distinguished from the intellectual
excellence that applies to πρᾶξις or the doing of things. Ποίησις and
πρᾶξις, it is affirmed, are entirely different things, and it is with
ποίησις only that τέχνη can be concerned. The sphere of ποίησις is
certainly not well-defined—it does not seem clear under which head
divination and rhetoric, for instance, would come ; but restriction in
the meaning of τέχνη there is, and in spite of the fact that the
᾿ definition of τέχνη is obtained (1140 a 6—10) by induction from
popular usage, it seems clear that popular usage is to some extent
being set aside. The other modification, whereby τέχνη is made to
connote what is necessarily excellent, scarcely needs proof: it will
be shown later that, Aristotle himself takes account of it.

(2) Πολιτική. Aristotle broadens the meaning of this word.
It means, he says, the architectonic practical science, under which
all the others come, and by which all the others must be determined.
People in general regard it as something that chiefly concerns the
magistrate or the demagogue: but it has to do with everything
from. the most trivial details of civic administration to the widest
generalities concerning the end of human life or the nature of law.

(3) Τνώμη. Whereas people use γνώμη to mean merely ‘ opinion,’
or at best ‘common sense’ about anything, Aristotle infers from its
derivation that it has a restricted and good meaning. It is ὀρθὴ
κρίσις, not any sort of κρίσις, and κρίσις τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, not κρίσις of
anything and everything.

(B) LPhilosophic Terms.

(1) Ὀρθὸς λόγος. This means various things in the mouths of
various philosophers: all are agreed that it is ὀρθὸς λόγος that fixes

130 FORMAL ACCURACY IN ARISTOTLE,

what is good, but they are vague or wrong about what it is. Socrates
identifies it with virtue, Protagoras judges it fluctuating with the
utility of the moment, Plato makes it the transcendental knowledge
of the ideas. It is really, Aristotle says, the excellence of the lower
reasoning part of the soul, that concerned with such ἐνδεχόμενα
ἄλλως ἔχειν as affect the actions of men: or rather it is that part of
the soul when possessed of that excellence. The formula that states
its connection with moral virtue is to be adopted but modified—
moral virtue must be said to be neither ὀρθὸς λόγος itself nor merely
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον but μετὰ Tod ὀρθοῦ λόγου.

(2) Δογιστικόν. Plato used this word to denote the reasoning
part of the soul as a whole (e.g. in Republic 439 Ὁ), but Aristotle
restricts it to mean the lower of the two parts of the reasoning part
of the soul (1139 a 12 τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν" τὸ γὰρ
βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν).

(3) Εὐβουλία. Plato identified this with σοφία and ἐπιστήμη
(Republic 428 8B), but Aristotle restricts it greatly: with him it is only
one aspect or division of the practical excellence φρόνησις.

(y) Terms both popular and philosophic.

Under this head come four out of the five of the most important
terms of this 6th Ὀοοϊκ---ἐπιστήμη νοῦς σοφία and φρόνησις.

(1) The popular use of ἐπιστήμη distinguished it little from
τέχνη. The skill of a statesman or doctor or general could be called
either. It was only philosophers who took a stricter view of it.
They narrowed its meaning too much, Aristotle thinks: it is absurd
to think with Parmenides that nothing but pure being, or with Plato
that nothing but the ideas, can be known. But it is true that only
those things can be known, in the strict sense, which μὴ ἐνδέχεται
ἄλλως ἔχειν : this view is insisted on constantly in NE vi, cutting
out the popular ἐπιστῆμαι from their right to the name, but including,
in opposition to Parmenides, Plato, and most other philosophers,
physics as well as metaphysics and mathematics, and more of mathé-
matics than the barren methods of many earlier thinkers would
allow. :

(2) Νοῦς in the popular usage was usually equivalent to common
sense or intelligence. Philosophers on the other hand exalted it as
they exalted ἐπιστήμη. Aristotle, who admires Anaxagoras and his
elevated conception of νοῦς, joins with him and Plato in giving the
word great dignity. In vi ii he uses it for a-moment in the broad

ILLUSTRATED BY THE SIXTH BOOK 151

sense of ‘the intellect.’ But in vi vi he quite definitely applies it, in
a restricted sense, to the intellectual excellence that leads the mind
by induction to the grasp of necessary axiomatic truth: a use on the
whole quite consistent with the last section of the Posterior Analytics.

(3) Σοφία in the popular usage meant either the practical
wisdom of a legislator or moralist? or the skill of an artist of high
merit. The philosophers used it variously to mean the highest kind
of intellectual excellence of which they held a man capable. Their
ideas not squaring with those of Aristotle, their application of the
word was different also, to anything from practical wisdom in the
popular sense to the lofty knowledge of reality conceived by Plato.
Aristotle carries on the philosophic tradition, adapting the meaning
of σοφία to his own views in making it composite of νοῦς and
ἐπιστήμη, and by an ingenious analogy connecting his definition with
the popular meaning as well (1141 a 16).

(4) Φρόνησις. The philosophers never distinguished between
φρόνησις and σοφία. People in general, says Aristotle, do not always
distinguish them, but tend to call the man who knows his interests
φρόνιμος, and the clever artist σοφός. Aristotle adopts this distinc-
tion, but with important modifications. His idea of the σοφός is
more the philosophers’, his idea of the φρόνιμος more the ordinary
person’s. Φρόνησις is to be concerned with practical matters only:
the popular view is only wrong in narrowing the notion down to that
of a selfish unsocial consideration of one’s own individual interests,
whereas the φρόνιμος must act as what Nature intends him to be, the
member of a community.

It should now be clear that Aristotle finds no difficulty in
supplying his terminology with the forms of common speech or of
other philosophers, or in modifying their meanings to suit the
peculiarities of his own doctrines, while adhering as far as may be
to the common meanings, and justifying his departures therefrom by
tracing analogies between old meanings and new.

This would not in itself be a source of serious confusion to
anyone. But unfortunately, though quite naturally, Aristotle is often
not content to use words only in the new senses he has imposed
upon them, but at other times reverts to the senses more familiar to
people in general or to other schools of philosophers. It will be

1 e.g. the seven sages were σοφοί.
2 141 2.9 THY σοφίαν ἐν ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδί-

δομεν.

1522 FORMAL ACCURACY IN ARISTOTLE,

best to give such examples of this as occur in NE v1 before trying to
explain why it happens.

(r) Τέχνη is used in two places not in the new sense of an
ἀρετή but in the old sense of a field of intellectual activity in which
goodness or badness can be shown. These are 1140 Ὁ 22 τέχνης μὲν
ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, 1141 a τι οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες
τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν. Compare this with the contrast
of τέχνη with ἀτεχνία ττ40 8. 20 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη... ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου
ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστιν, ἡ δ᾽ ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς
ποιητικὴ ἕξις : the difference of meaning is plain’. It may also be.
noted that in other works Aristotle uses τέχνη in a very loose sense,
e.g, Analytics 71a 4 αἷ re μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν....καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἑκάστη τεχνῶν, Metaphysics 981 Ὁ 23 αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τέχναι, Topics
170 ἃ 31 καθ᾽ ἑκάστην τέχνην....οἷον κατὰ γεωμετρίαν.

(2) Πολιτική is applied to a section of what in Aristotle’s special
usage? is meant by πολιτική. This use is quite definitely distin-
guished from the special one as being the popular one: 1141 b 28
διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνους λέγουσιν. It is accepted in the
popular sense as adequately patching the gap caused by the want of
a special name for this division of πολιτική in the broad sense: only
it is intimated that the popular judgment, that practical are better
than theoretical politics, to which the popular usage of the word
πολιτική is due, is mistaken, for νομοθετική is ἀρχιτεκτονική and so
better than πολιτική in the narrow sense. With this caution the
narrow sense is allowed to pass’.

(3) Ἐπιστήμη. This word is used in NE vi, as elsewhere,
in the loose sense of ‘art,’ ‘practical science,’ sometimes almost
‘profession’: which is the popular usage. Thus 1138b 26 ἐν ταῖς
ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, where the examples
following of such ἐπιμέλειαι are γυμναστική and ἰατρική, with which
of course ἐπιστήμη in the strict sense has nothing to do. Also
1141 a 16 ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία, where the strict
use follows, εἴη ἂν τὖ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη. Also τ143 ἃ 2 (ἡ
σύνεσις οὔκ ἐστι) τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ
ὑγιεινῶν ἡ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθη, where one of the examples, ἰατρική,
15 περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν.

1 This point is discussed more fully in the Notes.

2 Illustrated by 1141 Ὁ 24 τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις
νομοθετική, ἡ δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική.

3 Classical Review Feb. 1905 page 17 (note 8).

ILLUSTRATED BY THE SIXTH BOOK 1353

(4) Νοῦς is used in four senses in NE vi. Besides the strict
meaning determined in the chapter devoted to it, vi vi, it may
mean :—(a) the intellect as a whole: 1139 a 17 τρία δή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις, where
νοῦς = διάνοια, cf. ἃ 33 ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας, ἃ 21 ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ
κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις τοῦτ᾽ ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή, b 4 ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς
νοῦς ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική. (6) that particular sort οἵ φρόνησις which
apprehends particular facts either as minor premisses for practical
syllogisms or as materials for inductively-reached major premisses of
the same sort of syllogisms; see the whole passage 1143 a 25—b 5,
particularly a 35—b 5. (ὦ) φρόνησις in general, 1144 Ὁ 12 ἐὰν δὲ
λάβῃ νοῦν ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει. Of these three usages the first is
that of previous philosophers, especially Anaxagoras, the other two
popular, as in the common phrase νοῦν ἔχειν ‘to have good sense.’

(5) Φρόνησις. The usage of Socrates, Plato and other philo-
sophers, whereby φρόνησις is a synonym of σοφία and means the
highest wisdom, is not adopted by Aristotle (though it is, in several
places, by Eudemus in the undisputedly Eudemian books). But its
use in a less elevated sense than the strict one, that is to say in the
ordinary sense of common speech, is accepted with a reserve, just as
πολιτική is accepted, 1141 Ὁ 29 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι ἡ
περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα, καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις : the reserve
being, as with πολιτική, that the popular ethical judgment on which
the usage is founded is a wrong one: for φρόνησις περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα
is the lowest, and not the highest, of the three divisions of φρόνησις
in the strict sense, πολιτική οἰκονομική and φρόνησις περὶ ἕνα.

Besides the variations in usage where there is a strict usage and
also one or more loose ones, there are certain terms used in several
senses none of which can be said to be more the strict one or more
accurate than the others: such as διάνοια, βουλευτική, λόγος.

(1) διάνοια in the 2nd chapter is a synonym of νοῦς, and means
the intellect as a whole, but in 1142 b 12, διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται (sc.
ὀρθότητα εἶναι τὴν εὐβουλίαν): αὕτη yap οὔπω φάσις, it is plain διάνοια
is the intellect considered as searching for and not as possessing
truth, or as the activity itself that consists in such searching.

(2) Povdevruy in its broadest sense is the distinguishing epithet
of φρόνησις as a whole, as distinguished from σοφία", or of the
λογιστικὸν μέρος as distinguished from the ἐπιστημονικὸν μέρος

1 3143 27, Ὁ 7.
2 1140 a 30 ὅλος ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός.

134 FORMAL ACCURACY IN ARISTOTLE,

(1139 a 12)!: more narrowly it is applied (1141 b 27) to πολιτική"
(in the narrower sense of that word as distinguished from νομοθετική):
most narrowly of all to parliamentary as distinguished from judicial
πολιτική (1141 b 33 ἡ μὲν βουλευτικὴ ἡ δὲ δικαστικη).

(3) λόγος means (a) the reasoning part of the soul, τὸ διανοητικὸν
μέρος, not clearly distinguished from the ἐνέργεια of that part. In
this sense it is used in the often-repeated phrase ὀρθὸς λόγος, which
means ‘the reason in its excellent condition.’ (Professor Burnet
indeed maintains that the metaphysical meaning of εἶδος, as opposed
to ὕλη, belongs properly to ὀρθὸς λόγος, and speaks of the φρόνιμος
as having the form of goodness in his soul; but such metaphysical
subtilty is foreign to the methods of the Ethics, except for such
definite metaphysical digressions as that in Book 1 on the Platonic
idea of the good.) So too λόγος is a synonym of νοῦς and διάνοια,
1139 a 24 δεῖ τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι Kai τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, a 32
προαιρέσεως δὲ (SC. ἀρχαί εἰσιν) ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος, 1140 Ὁ 28
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον: σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι κτλ. and in all the
definitions of intellectual virtues ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς κτλ. Aédyos
also means (4) ‘the argument’ 1144 a 33 ἔστω yap λόγου χάριν τὸ
τυχόν, 1144 Ὁ 32 ἀλλὰ καὶ 6 λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ᾽ ἂν ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις
ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί: also in the phrase ἐξωτερικοὶ
λόγοι, which occurs in this book at 1140 ἃ 2: (c) ‘syllogism’ as
distinguished from induction (ἐπαγωγή). So 1140 b 33 μετὰ λόγου
γὰρ ἡἣ ἐπιστήμη, 1142 a 25 ὃ μὲν yap νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος,
1142 Ὁ 12 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία (where it suggests the
first meaning also), 1143 a 36 καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων
νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος.

The above are I think all the important variations in the meaning
of terms to be found in NE γι. The list is a considerable one, and
though there are probably more in NE vi than in any other part of
Anistotle’s writings, to a greater or less extent they occur everywhere.
The fact is the more remarkable because Aristotle does nevertheless
at times attach great importance to the use of names, as may be
shown from this very book. He is most careful, for instance, to lay
down the principle that πρᾶξις and ποίησις are different (1140 2,
again a 5—6, again a 16—r17, again Ὁ 3—4). He carefully states
that σύνεσις and εὐσυνεσία are different names for the same thing,
and also συνετός and εὐσύνετος 1143 10. And there is the

1 1139 a 12 τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν.
2 r141 Ὁ 26 αὕτη γὰρ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική.

ILLUSTRATED BY THE SIXTH BOOK 155

remarkable variation of epithets given to the part of the διανοητικόν
concerned with ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. At 1139 a 12 the apparently
natural epithet βουλευτικόν is rejected in favour of λογιστικόν, in
order, as I have elsewhere tried to show, tacitly to allow for non-
practical θεωρία τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν, and in two other passages,
1140 Ὁ 26 and 1144 Ὁ 14, the word δοξαστικόν is substituted for
λογιστικόν, in the first passage if not in both apparently to insist on
the same point, that θεωρία of ἐνδεχόμενα is not necessarily practical.
Even if this were not the true explanation of the variation in terms,
it would still be plain that Aristotle for some reason or other
does attach much importance to the use of the right term in this
connection.

The variations in the meaning of terms have not all the same
explanation. There can be little doubt that one or two of them are
due to sheer confusion of thought on the author’s part. Just as
Aristotle was capable of producing confused arguments, so he was
capable of confusing various meanings of single words. The extra-
ordinary change in the sense of τέχνη, quite unmarked as it is by
any observation or explanation, can hardly be explained otherwise.
But of no other change in this book can it be definitely asserted with
any confidence, only in a few other cases can it even plausibly be
conjectured, that the author did not clearly separate his meanings
and successfully avoid real-confusion of thought. As a general rule
it is easy to suppose that he was not only clear in his own mind that
he meant different things by the same word at different times, but
certain that his hearers or readers also would quite understand what
his meaning was. It has to be remembered how unlikely it is that
the formal difficulties that give most trouble to-day are just the same
as those which gave most trouble then. Even people speaking the
same language and of the same age and training and general ability
-will be variously disconcerted by various ellipses or obscure transi-
tions in argument, or by. various instances of this particular practice
of changing the meanings of words. The view that these variations
were clear to Aristotle and his hearers is not the less but the more
plausible that in other passages in this work there may be observed
what seems exaggerated carefulness to define a not always very
important point, already it would seem defined clearly enough: e.g.
1140a 16—17 in spite of the previous a 1—10, 1142a 23—25 in
spite of the previous 1140 Ὁ 1—3, and such repeated definitions as
1140 Ὁ 20—21 (of φρόνησις) after the previous 1140 Ὁ 4—6, I140.a

136 FORMAL ACCURACY IN ARISTOTLE,

20---21 (of τέχνη) after the previous 1140 ἃ 9-ἴο, 1141 Ὁ 2—3
(of σοφία) after the previous 1141 a 19—20. It is, then, confidence
that the variations in usage are clear and will not lead to confusion
that has probably caused Aristotle to admit them, without as a rule
commenting on them at all; though he sometimes does comment on
them, eg. 1139 Ὁ 18 εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς
ὁμοιότησιν, which plainly marks a departure from his use of the word
ἐπιστήμη elsewhere. It is perhaps more literary purism than anything
else that makes modern philosophical writers avoid similar variations
where the sense is not endangered ; an avoidance that is in any case
easier for them than for Aristotle because of the larger vocabulary
on which they can draw for synonyms. They are not always more
successful than Aristotle in avoiding that material confusion of
thought which comes from confusing the meaning of words. One
explanation of Aristotle’s variations, the simple fact of his limited
vocabulary, will not serve to explain his varying without comment
in places where comment seems needed: for it was his practice to
comment where he felt the danger of confusion; of this there is a
good instance (besides 1139 b 18 already quoted) in 1143 Ὁ 25
ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Ta ὑγίεινα οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ
τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται. We are thus obliged to suppose that he only
withholds explanatory comment because it seems to him superfluous,
and so that all the difficult variations are more difficult now than
they seemed at the time, except in one or two cases where real
confusion of thought may be causing the trouble. There is seldom
any good reason either for straining the meaning of a word into
consistency with its meaning in other places, or for regarding it as a
meaning dialectically accepted for the purposes of argument but in
no way stamped with permanent approval.

Before turning to the kindred question of how far NE v1 is
logically accurate and well-arranged in its arguments, it will be worth
while to notice certain points that turn, altogether or very largely, on
questions that are purely terminological. (i) Much difficulty has
been needlessly made about the opening of the 3rd chapter in
respect of the remark ὑπολήψει yap καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται ψεύδεσθαι.
This has been held to imply that the five virtues mentioned just
before, τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς, are infallible; that is to
say, that they are states of soul that prevent their possessors from
ever making any false judgments about the matters with which they
are severally concerned. In a sense this is true, but the infallibility

ILLUSTRATED BY THE SIXTH BOOK 157

of these virtues is quite a different thing from the infallibility of
that νοῦς which is concerned with simple concepts as distinguished
from propositions. In this latter there is indeed no possibility of
error, but neither is there in the strict sense any possibility of truth:
however, since there is no possibility of error in that kind of νόησις,
the statement of the ‘Psychology’ that this kind of νοῦς is infallible
may be regarded as a significant and correct one; and. it is correct
in this sense, that everyone who exercises this kind of νόησις at all is
as right as anyone else at all can be. But it is not true that everyone
* who exercises his mind in various ways in such.a manner that the
virtues τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς would belong to him if he
exercised it rightly ipso facto does exercise it rightly and so has
those virtues belonging to him. For example, a man may attempt
to be φρόνιμος, but may fail, either partly or altogether. In so far
as he fails he does not deserve the name of φρόνιμος, but on the
other hand in so far as he succeeds he does deserve that name; and
the case is the same with the other virtues. The name φρόνιμος
really belongs without qualification only to the perfect man, who is
of course infallible in the strict sense of that word. But a man can
be more or less φρόνιμος ; it is absurd to deny the name to anyone
who is very wise in practical matters simply because he is not
perfectly or invariably wise. Yet such a person is not infallible: it
may be said of his φρόνησις (or more accurately perhaps of his mind)
ἐνδέχεται ψεύδεσθαι. Plainly then this is a question of terminology :
τέχνη and the other four are virtues, good states, states that lead the
mind to truth: ὑπόληψις and δόξα are states that may be good or
may be bad, the names indicating neither quality. (ii) A smaller
point is raised by rr4o Ὁ 28 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον-
σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν.
This does not mean that φρόνησις is indestructible, as some have
explained, but that its destruction is not of the kind called λήθη or
forgetfulness, and that since only that can be forgotten which is
purely intellectual, φρόνησις which cannot be forgotten is not purely
intellectual—with which conclusion, incomplete as it is, the subject
breaks off for the time: the argument is completed in the last
chapter of the book by showing the connection between φρόνησις
and ἠθικὴ ἀρετή. (ἰὴ When it is said τ144 Ὁ 31 οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν
εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ᾽ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς,
this statement is pronounced a circular argument, and therefore a
difficulty to those who find it hard to credit Aristotle with such an

158 FORMAL ACCURACY IN ARISTOTLE,

argument. Yet there is no sign that Aristotle feels any difficulty
himself. The fact is that the circle is only apparent, being a merely
terminological one. A parallel statement would be ‘A man cannot
be a husband without a wife, nor a woman a wife without a husband.’
For just as the man by marrying becomes a man of a special kind, a
husband, and a woman by marrying becomes a woman of a special
kind, a wife, so δεινότης by its association with φυσικὴ ἀρετή becomes
δεινότης of a special kind, φρόνησις, and φυσικὴ ἀρετή by association
with δεινότης becomes ἀρετή of a special kind, κυρία ἀρετή. Δεινότης
and φυκικὴ ἀρετῇ may either of them exist without the other, but -
when this is the case δεινότης does not deserve the zame φρόνησις
nor ἀρετή the ame κυρία ἀρετή. Questions such as the above,
turning partly or altogether on the meaning and proper usage of
particular words, are so common in Aristotle that great care should
always be taken to see how far an argument really concerns the
matter of the subject under discussion and how far merely the form
in which the matter is expressed: commentators as a rule seem too
ready to assume the former alone to be in question. But it is often
the latter. This fact is not only of importance in itself, but helps to
show the importance Aristotle attaches to the right use of words and
so to justify the attempt to find method and purpose in his variations
of terminology that seem on the surface slipshod and unmethodical.
There is one more question yet of interest and importance that
has to do with accuracy in the use of words as distinguished from
arguments. It was the inevitable consequence of the fact that the
Hellenes had no language but their own, none at least in which any
but the most ordinary thoughts could be expressed by them, that
the forms of the Greek tongue very often led them astray on points
of material fact; and one of the common stumbling-blocks was
etymology. The meaning of a compound word was held to be
made up of the separate meanings of the elements of the compound ;
or the meaning of one word was held to fix that of another derived
from it. The result was that the things themselves which these
words were most commonly taken to represent were forced into an
unnatural connection with each other. In the Cratylus dialogue,
and in isolated passages elsewhere, Plato illustrates this tendency, to
which it is a matter of some doubt how far he was subject himself.
In NE vi the force of etymology is evident in two cases, an exami-
nation of which, desirable in itself as an attempt to explain two
difficult passages, will serve to typify Aristotle’s attitude towards

ILLUSTRATED BY THE SIXTH BOOK τιο

etymology as a guide to fact, and to show further the amount of
importance he attaches to names and their correct use. (i) In the
chapter on εὐβουλία it is decided that εὐβουλία must be an ὀρθότης
τῆς διανοίας (1142 Ὁ 12). Then the statement is suddenly made
(Ὁ 16) ἀλλ᾽ ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς, which nothing further
is said to justify. Evidently the argument is that the εὐ- in εὐβουλία
implies ὀρθότης, and the - βουλία implies βουλή. Derivation is allowed
to have as much weight as this, that the name εὐβουλία cannot
properly be used of anything that is not ὀρθότης βουλῆς. The con-
sistency of this formula with the previous formula ὀρθότης διανοίας is
assumed. The one was reached by etymology, the other by con-
sidering what εὐβουλία is in practice used to mean. ‘Common usage
is thus maintained to pay due respect to the derivation of a word, and
not to attach to a word any meaning inconsistent with its derivation.

(ii) The section on γνώμη seems to contain a real confusion
of thought that is due to an improper use of etymology. Γνώμη
(as in the phrase γνώμην ἔχειν) may mean either ‘opinion’ or ‘right
opinion’ about anything, occasionally even ‘ good sense.’ Συγγνώμη,
though derived from γνώμη, means ‘consideration,’ ‘ fair-mindedness,’
‘readiness to make allowances and to forgive’: more a moral than
an intellectual quality (or rather activity) and more a consequent
than an antecedent of the moral virtue ἐπιείκεια. These two very
distinct notions are fused into one, or rather a sort of mean between
them is taken, and the name γνώμη is given to the condition the
definition of which is reached by this compromise. This meaning
of γνώμη is wholly artificial, though it may attach mghtly to the
name of a class or kind of intellectual excellence really important
and otherwise nameless. There is room to doubt whether Aristotle
did not see quite well what he was doing, aware of the real distinct-
ness of γνώμη and συγγνώμη, and using etymology more as a pretext
for his artificial meaning for γνώμη than as a real argument to show
what γνώμη is actually used to mean. But it is more consistent with
his respect for common usage and for the public opinion on which
that usage is based to suppose there is real confusion here and that
he does suppose γνώμη and συγγνώμη to be as closely connected in
meaning as they are closely connected in name.

To turn now to the other branch of the subject, in the matter of
arrangement of the argument the sixth book has been charged with
as much looseness and inaccuracy as in its use of particular words.
The want of formal symmetry, even the want of formal correctness,

160 FORMAL ACCURACY IN ARISTOTLE,

must be admitted: but it is quite another thing to admit that this
want is due to confusion of thought and veils material inaccuracy.
Occasionally the latter is true, but hardly oftener, in my opinion,
than I have allowed it true as regards particular words.

The first question is that of Order: both the order of words in
lists, and of subjects in the whole discussion. As to the first, if
significance is to be attributed to the order of words in lists, Aristotle
can only be called slipshod for his carelessness about this in the
sixth book: but if, as appears really to be the case, in spite of argu-
ments which editors have brought forward to support the contrary
view, such order is practically never significant either in this book or
elsewhere, the undoubted fact that such order often varies greatly is
a fact of no importance, and proves no real carelessness on the
author’s part even as regards the form in which he expresses himself.
Consider the examples that occur in vi—

(2) 1139 a 18 αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξι. Here Professor Burnet
suggests that the position of νοῦς between αἴσθησις and ὄρεξις in-
dicates that it is to be taken with both: to which there are doctrinal
objections as well as the want of any parallel to this particular kind
of significance of order, a significance which here at least is not
obvious at first sight.

(6) 1139 Ὁ τό τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς. This is not
the order in which these five virtues are discussed in detail, and so
can hardly be significant. There is a parallel passage Analytics
89 Ὁ 7 Ta δὲ λοιπὰ πῶς δεῖ διανεῖμαι ἐπί τε διανοίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ
ἐπιστήμης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας κτλ, where the order
can hardly (pace Stewart) be more significant than here. The order
in 1141 a 5 ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς is just that of the previous
discussion, and since τέχνη is left out altogether can hardly be
supposed significant.

(6) 1143.4 26 γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν. The
order is not suggestive, and is not the same as what follows, a 27
γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς, nor as that of b 7
γνώμην δ᾽ ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν : there is thus no significance of
order in any of these cases.

None of the above instances of haphazard order spring from
confusion in the author’s mind, or can naturally lead to confusion in
the student’s mind, provided no attempt is made to find a significance
in the order which the author never attempted to put into it.

The order in which the subjects of the sixth book are discussed

ILLUSTRATED BY THE SIXTH BOOK 161

is hardly of greater importance than the order in which words in
lists are arranged. A. certain rough practical convenience deter-
mines it, rather than the obviousness or importance of the subjects
themselves. This refers especially to the accounts of the various
-intellectual virtues, both the five main ones and the three or four
subordinate ones. Ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς must plainly be defined
before σοφία can be defined, since the latter is composite of the two
former. Τέχνη is more intelligible in itself than is φρόνησις, which
is more easily explained by contrast with τέχνη than τέχνη by contrast
with it: therefore τέχνῃ is discussed before φρόνησις. The full dis-
cussion of φρόνησις is deferred till some view of all the five main
virtues is got, in order that the general outline of the argument of
the book may be indicated as soon as possible. The three or four
subordinate virtues (εὐβουλία σύνεσις γνώμη, also νοῦς in one sense,
besides the barely-mentioned sub-species εὐστοχία and ἀγχίνοια) are
clearly best explained when the main virtue φρόνησις, to which they
are subordinate, has itself been explained for the most part. It
thus appears that the order of the discussion is rather practically
convenient than theoretically significant. Even where practical
convenience cannot be traced, there is no reason to suppose the
order of subjects, as of words, is not purely haphazard. This
principle may be applied, though it does not always hold good, to
Aristotle’s writings in general, even to the more severely didactic.

The sixth book further contains many instances of formal in-
accuracy of expression in small points, such as are not very easy to
distinguish from the variation from strict meaning in particular words
that has already been discussed, but may be said to consist less in
the meaning of a word or phrase itself than in its relations with the
context. They may be roughly classified into instances of vagueness,
looseness, and incompleteness.

1. Vagueness.

(a) 1139 a 2 περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπόντες. In discussing the
virtues of the ψυχή of course one περὶ ψυχῆς λέγει : see the preceding
sentence, τὰς THs ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι. But the vague phrase περὶ
ψυχῆς is evidently intended to bear a strictly psychological meaning,
as in the title of the ‘ Psychology ’—lepi Ψυχῆς.

(6) 1139 a 8—x0 describes the difference between the two main
divisions of the intellect as generic (γένει). 1140 Ὁ 3 describes the

G. II

162 FORMAL ACCURACY IN ARISTOTLE,

difference between the two main divisions of one of the previous
divisions as also generic.
διανοητικόν

eS
ἐπιστημονικόν.......... λογιστικόν (γένει ἕτερα)
1

ποιητικόν πρβιρρφυονς sau senee πρακτικόν (also γένει ἕτερα)

Generic difference is regarded as something quite vague, and the
meaning would hardly have been changed if εἴδει (‘specific’) had
been written for γένει.

li. Looseness.

(@) 1142 a 12 γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται.
This seems to imply that the γεωμετρικός is, whereas in fact he is not,
wholly different from the μαθηματικός. Geometry is of course one
branch of mathematics, as it is elsewhere said to be. Correct writing
would place ἄλλως or ὅλως before μαθηματικοί. But the sense is
clear.

(6) 11420 17 διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ᾽ ἄν, σοφὸς δ᾽
ἢ φυσικὸς ot. ΒΥ σοφός is plainly meant φιλόσοφος or θεολογικός :
but there is formal inconsistency with the previous inclusion of
μαθηματική and φυσική under σοφία.

(ce) No less than four formulae describing εὐβουλία are given
successively in chapter ix: 1142 Ὁ 1 βουλή τις, Ὁ 8 ὀρθότης τις, Ὁ 12
διανοίας ὀρθότης, Ὁ τό βουλῆς ὀρθότης. Formally, βουλή τις is in-
consistent with ὀρθότης τις and the other two, and the last two with
each other.

(2) ’Apery is used without qualification to mean ἠθικὴ ἀρετή,
though the intellectual ἕξεις that are the subject of the book are just
as much ἀρεταί as are the ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί. For this see chapter xiii
passim.

(6) Φρόνησις and its subordinates (σύνεσις γνώμη etc.) are called
ἕξεις In 1143 a 25, δυνάμεις immediately afterwards a 28.

(7) 1144 a 24 δεινότης defined as τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν
ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν Kal τυγχάνειν
αὐτοῦ. Here the word πράττειν is used with remarkable looseness of
a purely intellectual act. :

(g) In dealing with the ὀρθὸς λόγος in chapter xiii these two
formally inconsistent statements occur: 1144 Ὁ 23 ὀρθὸς δὲ (sc. λόγος)
ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν, 1144 Ὁ 27 ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ
φρόνησίς ἐστιν.

ILLUSTRATED BY THE SIXTH BOOK 163

il. Lncompleteness.

(a) τιφ4τᾶ 3 εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα..
ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ κτλ. Why is
τέχνη left out of the list? Many reasons have. been given: (a) we
may have the list of another editor here (Stewart): (4) the omission
may be a pure accident (Burnet): (c) τέχνη was shown in chapter v
to be a ἕξις ἧς ἔστι λήθη (Stewart): (4) τέχνη is included in φρόνησις,
both being περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν (Eustratius) : (6) τέχνη may
be included in ἐπιστήμη (Stewart): (2) τέχνη may be included in
σοφία, which is the ἀρετὴ τέχνης (Burnet). Now Ramsauer well says
that Aristotle does not mind going without formal symmetry and
precision so long as his meaning is plain. But the meaning is quite
plain. τέχνη had its proper place in the argument at 1140 Ὁ 34 τῆς
ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις κτλ.
It is therefore probably left out of the formal list because there is no
possibility of confusing the use of τέχνη with the use of νοῦς, whereas
it is easy to see that νοῦς might, in certain connections, be used as a
synonym of-either émeotnun φρόνησις or σοφία.

(4) 11434 25 Εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι...συνετούς. The list of virtues εἰς
ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι is incomplete to. begin with, for εὐβουλία is left out.
Lower down at 1143 b 7 the list is reduced to three by leaving out
φρόνησις, and at Ὁ 9 to two by leaving out σύνεσις. There being no
assignable reason why any of these three should be purposely
omitted, it must be supposed due to the author’s being careless of
formal accuracy and intending the full list of five to be understood
in each place. The original omission of εὐβουλία is the most
remarkable, for πᾶσαι ai éfe.s—whether αὗται is read or not—agrees
ill with its intentional omission in a list that includes φρόνησις, and
at the same time εὐβουλία was discussed at such length that it cannot
be considered of minor importance. Burnet’s explanation, that the
ἕξεις here mentioned all apprehend their object immediately, that in
this way they are εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι, and that therefore εὐβουλία is
purposely excluded as being μετὰ λόγου, could not hold. For this
would make it necessary to exclude φρόνησις also, since φρόνησις is
ἕξις ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου πρακτική (1140b 5). As a matter of fact
the meaning of εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι is given quite clearly in line 28,
πᾶσαι yap ai δυνάμεις αὗται τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ Kai τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον :
and of course εὐβουλία is also τῶν ἐσχάτων καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον. It
seems possible that the reason of the omission of εὐβουλία is that it

1I—2

164. FORMAL ACCURACY IN ARISTOTLE,

is so closely connected with φρόνησις that whatever is said here of
φρόνησις applies to it also. But it is surely more likely that εὐβουλία
is not omitted of any set purpose at all, but simply through careless-
ness of formal completeness. The other omissions are to be explained
in the same way. They are less remarkable, for it is easy to see that
the omitted terms, since they have been definitely mentioned once,
are to be understood again.

The sixth book contains at least one remarkable instance of the
‘assumption of a statement as proved when the proof has not been
explicitly set forth. This is the sentence 1143 Ὁ 14——17 τί μὲν οὖν
ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τί ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ὅτι
ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα, εἴρηται. All the premisses
necessary for these conclusions have been collected in the previous
discussion, but the conclusions themselves have not been explicitly
drawn, and yet here they are referred to in a recapitulatory fashion
that seems to advance no new proposition at all. This fact, it may
be pointed out, is of considerable importance in relation to the
question whether the reference in Χ, 1177 a 18 ὅτι δ᾽ ἐστὶ θεωρητική
(sc. 7 ἐνέργεια ἡ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν ἡμῖν), εἴρηται, implies that the author
had something else than NE vi in his mind. It is undeniable that
the statement is not explicitly made anywhere in vi. But ( 1) the
distinction of σοφία from φρόνησις as μὴ πρακτική from πρακτική is
substantially the same as that of θεωρητική from πρακτική, (2) σοφία
has distinctly been declared in vi to be better than φρόνησις and so
to be the best of ἀρεταί. Here again, therefore, we find a conclusion
referred to as drawn when it has not been drawn explicitly, though
all the necessary premisses for it have beeh collected—a mere
terminological note, to point out that θεωρητική is a fit adjective to
apply to σοφία in consideration of its character as already set forth,
is all that would have been needed: less indeed than is needed to
formally justify the statement of 1143 Ὁ 14—17 about φρόνησις and
σοφία, as to the connection of which with the rest of vi there can be
no reasonable doubt.

NE v1 contains some instances of very badly stated arguments.
(4) That by which in 1140 a 31 seq. φρόνησις is distinguished from
ἐπιστήμη, though stated very fully, is very far from clear. It has
several steps:

(1) φρόνησις is a ἕξις βουλευτική.

But βούλευσις is not περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων (this is twice
said, a 31—33 and a 35—36).

ILLUSTRATED BY THE SIXTH BOOK 165

εἰς βούλευσις ἔς περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων.
εἰς, φρόνησις is περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων.
(2) There is no ἀπόδειξις of ἐνδεχόμενα.
But φρόνησις is περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων.
ες φρόνησις is not μετ᾽ ἀποδείξεως:
(3) ἐπιστήμη ἐξ per’ ἀποδείξεως.
But φρόνησις is not μετ᾽ ἀποδείξεως.
εἰς. φρόνησις is distinct from ἐπιστήμη.

The course of the argument is confused by:

(4) the use of three nearly synonymous phrases, τῶν ἀδυνάτων
᾿ἄλλως ἔχειν, τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι, τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης
οντων.

(4) the wrapping up of syllogism within syllogism,

(¢) the introduction of the proof (πάντα yap ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως
ἔχειν) of what is already known (οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις τῶν
ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν).

(4) the mention of τέχνη before ἐπιστήμη is done with.

(e) the substitution of πρακτόν in 1140 b 3 for Bovdevtor.

(B) The argument by which εὐβουλία is distinguished from ἐπιστήμη
and δόξα (1142 ἃ 34—b 12) is also very badly stated: it begins
by alleging one reason why εὐβουλία is not ἐπιστήμη : then follows
an awkwardly-placed ‘distinction of εὐβουλία from εὐστοχία and
ἀγχίνοια: then the bare statement that εὐβουλία is distinct from
δόξα is made and not supported: then with a slight but confusing
change of formula the argument returns to ἐπιστήμη, showing that
εὐβαυλία is not ὀρθότης ἐπιστήμης (a wholly needless step considering
the material grounds on which εὐβουλία has already been shown not
to be ἐπιστήμη itself): then εὐβουλία is shown to be distinct from δόξα
—for to show that it is not ὀρθότης δόξης is to show that it is not ὀρθὴ
δόξα and a fortiori not δόξα of any other sort, though this inference is
not expressed as it should have been:—could anything be much
worse than all this from the point of view of arrangement? (C) It
is possible that the text of certain passages ought to be re-arranged,
and that the author is not to be blamed for what is really the result
of subsequent dislocation. The most striking passage of this kind is
1139 a 21—b το, a re-arrangement of which I have suggested in
another place. Unless re-arrangement is allowed Aristotle cannot
be acquitted of great carelessness in the writing of this passage.
Another passage is 1141 a 20—-b 2, where the argument that φρόνησις
or πολιτική cannot be the best intellectual excellence is badly broken

166 FORMAL ACCURACY IN ARISTOTLE

by the proof that φρόνησις and σοφία are not the same, which is an
awkward interruption even if considered as in parenthesis.

If it is asked how Aristotle can be justified in his disregard of
logical precision and clear systematic arrangement, the answer is in
part that it is impossible to justify him for it altogether. It is easy
to excuse him for it, and to point out that in an age which had not
conceived the ideal of formal precision as the fit vehicle for precise
thought it is too much to expect that the first exponent of that ideal?
should be able to go as far towards its attainment as he has since
taught others to go. But to excuse a fault is not to deny its
existence, and some of the apparent faults that have been mentioned
cannot be disregarded on the ground that they are not real. Others,
however, are probably more apparent than real. Just as many
variations in the use of words that are a puzzle to us to-day were
most likely matters of course to Aristotle’s immediate followers, so
the formal inconsistencies and incompletenesses and haphazard
arrangements of argument were in many cases far less troublesome
at the time than they have since come to be, and conversely certain
points needed elaboration at the time which would now be passed
over lightly enough. Aristotle’s contemporaries had the advantage
of thoroughly understanding their own language as a living and
spoken one, and also of being fully conversant with the phraseology
of both the Academic and the Peripatetic schools and aware of the
relation between the two: so that suggestion could often take the
place of formal exposition, and gaps in argument be readily, almost
instinctively, filled up by the hearers or readers. Helped by that
comparison of languages which enables us to see in detail the difference
between facts and the words that describe them, and enlightened by
the progress philosophy has made since the age that gave it birth, we
are better able now than any previous generation has been to discern
certain real mistakes of expression and argument that Aristotle has
made: but we are more likely than those of his own time to con-
demn other expressions and arguments as faulty which the general
intelligence of the time must rightly have regarded as adequate and
satisfactory. Whatever the formal difficulties of such a book as
NE vi may be, whether due to the author’s fault or our own
ignorance, the material doctrine, in its main features and in nearly
all its details, will be found to stand out with as much clearness and
consistency as can reasonably be desired.

' The last part of the Parmenides shows indeed that Plato had conceived the
ideal, but is hardly enough to constitute him its first exponent.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

1138 Ὁ 18—34.

What is the meaning of the word λόγος in chapter i of
book v1, as it occurs in the phrases ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, κατὰ τὸν
ὀρθὸν λόγον, 6 τὸν λόγον ἔχων ?

Professor Burnet holds that λόγος means ‘form,’ in the strict
metaphysical sense, in which it is equivalent to εἶδος : and that the
ὀρθὸς λόγος is ‘the form of goodness in the soul.’ The objections to
this are: (1) 1103 Ὁ 31 τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω,
and 1144 Ὁ 21 πάντες ὅταν δρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετὴν προστιθέασι... .τὴν κατὰ
τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, imply a meaning of the word λόγος that is not
confined to the. Aristotelian school but common to all schools of
philosophy: but the metaphysical meaning ‘form’ is purely Aris-
totelian. (2) Pure metaphysical questions are avoided in the Ethics
as much as possible, and words are not likely to be used there in
purely metaphysical senses. Otherwise it would not be very im-
probable that Aristotle should use the common formula ὀρθὸς λόγος
in a special sense of his own. But as it is, the special sense is not -
appropriate to the method of the Ethics. In any case, the change to
the special sense would be so violent that it could hardly have been
made without some explanation. (3) In the context, the ‘form of
goodness in the soul’ could only mean the form of moral goodness.
‘The subject of book vi is certainly not moral but intellectual good-
ness. But book vr no less certainly answers the question at the end
of chapter i τίς ἐστιν ὃ ὀρθὸς λόγος; Therefore 6 ὀρθὸς λόγος must be
intellectual goodness rather than moral: and this is in fact stated in
1144 Ὁ 27 ὀρθὸς λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φρόνησίς ἐστιν.

These difficulties are avoided by taking λόγος in its ordinary
though vaguer sense of ‘reason.’ There is no need to press the

1 Ramsauer appears to do so, Peters and Welldon translate rightly, and
Eustratius is on the right track.

168 MISCELLANEOUS. NOTES:

question whether by ‘reason’ is meant a part of the soul, or a
‘faculty, or a process, or a quality. The distinction between these
four things is often neglected, in book vr and elsewhere: :thus in
chapter xiii the ὀρθὸς λόγος is said to de φρόνησις and also to be κατὰ
φρόνησιν. ‘O ὀρθὸς λόγος means therefore ‘the reasoning part of the
soul in its good condition,’ or ‘the good quality of the reasoning part
of the soul,’ or ‘the faculty of good reasoning,’ or ‘the process of
‘good reasoning.’ This view is supported by the following considera-
tions: (2) No change of meaning is thus required: for all schools of
philosophy would understand something of the kind by ὀρθὸς λόγος :
the same meaning therefore fits the passages in vi where the phrase
occurs and the two passages already quoted 1103 Ὁ 31 and 1144 Ὁ 21.
(ὁ) νι is in this view what the wording of chapter i requires that it
should be, a fulfilment of the resolution 1138 Ὁ 20 τοῦτο (sc. τὸν
ὀρθὸν λόγον) διελῶμεν, and an answer to the question 1138 Ὁ 34 τίς
ἐστιν ὃ ὀρθὸς λόγος; (Ὁ This meaning best suits the phrases ws ὃ
λόγος or ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λύγος κελεύει, which occur repeatedly in the
discussion of the moral virtues (see 1114 Ὁ 29, 1115 Ὁ 12 and 19,
1117 ἃ 8, 1119 a 20, 1125 Ὁ 35). The personification involved in
the use of the word κελεύει is far moré natural than if the λόγος
were a pure abstraction. (4) The identification of the ὀρθὸς λόγος
with φρόνησις in 1144 Ὁ 27 becomes easier in this view. The
passage 1103 Ὁ 31—34, where it is implied that the ὀρθὸς λόγος is an
᾿ ἀρετή (τί ἐστιν ὃ ὀρθὸς λόγος Kal πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς), agrees
with this view, and need not be rejected, as most editors wish to do,
on the ground of inconsistency of doctrine with v1.

Two views of other editors may be noticed briefly. Grant
supposes the ὀρθὸς λόγος to be identical with the σκοπός and the ὅρος
of 1138 b 22 and 23, and naturally complains that this chapter
merely confuses the question with a cloud of formulae. But he is
wrong, for it would be absurd, if the ὅρος and the Adyos were identical,
to ask the question at the end of the chapter in the form there given,
τούτου (1.6. τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου) τίς épos.—Professor Stewart says that the
λόγος is at once the subjective faculty and the objective order. This
is no doubt true, for the thinking mind and its thought are
(according to Aristotle’s metaphysics) the same. But if, as I have
maintained, metaphysics are not in place in the Ethics, there is no
reason to suppose that this identity of mind and thought, true as it
is, is at all referred to in this book: the subjective faculty alone is
meant,

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 169

1138 Ὁ 18.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν ete.

The argument of this opening paragraph of v1 may be stated
more or less as follows :—Moral virtue was defined as a mean
between too much and too little. Since the mean is*relative to the
various characters and circumstances of different people, it fluctuates,
and must be fixed by each man for himself, whether on the advice of
another or not. All are agreed that it is the reason which must do
this fixing of the mean, and that it is the reason in its good state
(ὀρθὸς λόγος) that will do it rightly, z.e. that will declare for a given
person in given circumstances that to be the mean which really is so
for that person in those circumstances. It is plain that of this ὀρθὸς
λόγος, an important subject, as much should be known as possible :
for though to know about it is not to have it, yet to know about it is
a necessary first step to having it: just as, though to know what
medical skill is does not amount to being a successful or skilful
doctor, to know what medical skill is must be a necessary first step
towards becoming a skilful doctor. ‘You should do the right thing’
is a maxim very generally true of any line of activity: if it be asked
‘What is the right thing?’ it is a correct answer to say ‘That which
the expert in that line holds to be right’: but this answer is not
explicit enough to be useful: it must further be asked ‘Who is the
expert, and what is the nature of his knowledge?’ It is the full
answer to this question that will both decide whose advice is to be
taken about the right thing to do, and serve as the first step towards
becoming one’s self an expert and adviser. Moreover, it is by
referring to the grand final end of all action that the expert fixes the
nature of any particular mean ; for any given state is truly a mean,
and not an excess or a defect, simply because it contributes better
than any excess over it or defect from it would contribute to the
grand final end. This end is of course happiness: to ask what
happiness is is to ask the main question of the Ethics, which is thus
for a moment brought forward to show the connection of this part of
the treatise with the treatise as a whole. At the end of the paragraph
the two questions are summed up and put side by side: (1) the
more immediate problem, What is the ὀρθὸς Adyos? (2) the final
and supremely important problem, What is the grand final end, which
is the standard to which the ὀρθὸς λόγος refers? The former
question is answered in book v1, the latter in book x.

170 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

Professor Burnet rightly says’ ‘There is nothing in Rassow’s view
that an independent introduction to book vi begins’ at 1138 Ὁ 35
Tas δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς dperds....But the connection of thought that he
discovers between the first and the second paragraph is not obvious and
not necessary. As.he admits himself’, Aristotle has two reasons for
the discussion of Goodness of Intellect. (1) It is necessary in order
to understand Moral Goodness: (2) it is necessary in order to
discover what the best and completest goodness is, for that best and
completest goodness may be not moral but intellectual, as indeed the
sequel shows. The first paragraph sets forth the first reason, and
the second paragraph the second reason, The transition is certainly
not more abrupt than that to the discussion of moral virtue at
1103 a18. But neither is there any specific connection of thought.

Is however the general substance of the first paragraph of
VI inconsistent either with the second paragraph or with any
preceding part of the Ethics? Both questions have been
wrongly answered in the affirmative.

(A) That the first paragraph gives a different reason from that
given by the second paragraph for discussing intellectual goodness is
no sign that the two paragraphs are inconsistent. Both reasons are, as
has been said, valid—intellectual virtue ought to be understood both
for its own sake and also in order that we may understand moral
virtue. All the fault that can fairly be found with the two paragraphs
is that their wording does not clearly bring out the connection of
these two reasons with each other, but presents each reason in turn
as if it were the only one. But the last two chapters of the book
unmistakably bring up the question of the first paragraph again when
they discuss the relation of ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ (the moral μεσότης) to
φρόνησις (the ὀρθὸς λόγος concerned with the moral’ μεσότης) : and the
seeming inconsistency of the first two paragraphs then disappears.

(2) Ramsauer holds that the first paragraph only sets out to do
what has been done already. In 11 ix, he says, directions have
already been given for finding the mean in moral action, such as to
avoid the extreme that is more contrary to the mean, the extreme to
which we are more prone, the extreme that is pleasanter, and so on:
and the process of ἐπιτείνειν καὶ ἀνιέναι (1138 Ὁ 23) recommended in
the first paragraph of vr is the same as the process of inclining now
towards the excess and now towards the defect recommended in

1 Note on 1138 b 35. ? Introduction to Book v1, § 1.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 171

11 ix. This is true: but-all those suggestions of 11 ix are practical,
and take for granted knowledge of the nature of the mean. They
are meant as helps towards making use of that knowledge and
applying it to conduct rather than towards acquiring it in the first
instance. The way is therefore still open for a discussion of the
means of knowing what the moral mean is. The suggestions of 11 ix
answered not the question ‘How am I to find out the best thing to
do?’ but the question ‘How am I to get myself into the way of
doing it?’ The first paragraph of vi is therefore not inconsistent
with 11 ix.
1139 a 12—15.

Why is the word λογιστικόν, rather than βουλευτικόν or
δοξαστικόν, chosen as the name of the part of the intellect
concemed with variables? And why is δοξαστικόν nevertheless
used twice in vi instead of λογιστικόν ἢ

The objections to the use of λογιστικόν are as follows :—

(2) the word is generally used by Aristotle and also by Plato in the
general sense of ‘reasoning,’ as a synonym for διανοητικόν as Aristotle
uses that word. See Republic 439 D τὸ μὲν ᾧ λογίζεται λογιστικὸν
προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ᾧ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ...ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ
ἐπιθυμητικόν : and Psychology 432 a 24 (referring to Plato’s doctrine)
λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν. For Aristotle’s own use of
λογιστικὸν in this general sense see Psychology 433 Ὁ 29 φαντασία
πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική, 434 a7 ἡ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς
ζῴοις, Rhetoric 1369 ἃ 1 τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ BV
ἀλόγιστον, Topics 128 Ὁ 39 (sc. ἡ ἀρετή) ἐν πλείοσιν, ἐπιστήμη δ᾽
ἐν λογιστικῷ μόνον καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι λογιστικὸν πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, and see
also Topics 134 a 34, 136 Ὁ 11, 138 b 13, 145 a 29, 147 Ὁ 32.

(ὁ) Βουλευτικός is a word commonly used, apparently in just the
sense wanted here, both in the Ethics and elsewhere ‘in Aristotle, and
also by Plato. See Ethics 1113 a 10 ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ
ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, 1152 ἃ 19 ὃ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὅλως, and
three other passages of VI, 1139 ἃ 23, 1140 ἃ 30, 1141 Ὁ 27: also
Rhetoric 1383 a 7 ὁ φόβος βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ: καίτοι οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται
περὶ τῶν ἀνελπίστων, Psychology 434 ἃ 7 ἡ βουλευτικὴ φαντασία ἐν τοῖς
λογιστικοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχει" πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε λογισμοῦ ἤδη
ἐστὶν ἔργον, Politics 1260 ἃ τοῦ. Plato uses the word, as in Republic
434 Band 441 a. So that βουλευτικόν on its own merits would seem

a better word to have used here.

172 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

(c) But further than this, the passage 1139 a 12 τὸ yap βουλεύεσθαι
καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων
ἄλλως ἔχειν: ὦστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν ἕν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος
appears to make the correctness of the use of λογιστικόν here
entirely dependent on its meaning the same thing as βουλευτικόν.
Why therefore is βουλευτικόν not simply used at oncer

(4) In spite of what is said in 1139 a12, τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ
λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, it does not appear that in common speech (which
is obviously referred to here) the terms βουλεύεσθαι and λογίζεσθαι
have in fact the same meaning. The meanings of λογίζεσθαι that
come nearest to those of βουλεύεσθαι, such as ‘reckon, calculate, take
into account, infer from calculation,’ are quite distinct from ‘take
counsel, deliberate, seek to find what the right course of action is.’

To these objections it may be replied :—

(a) It is quite in accordance with Aristotle’s custom to use the
same word in a generic and also in a specific sense: and he would
not be likely to object to the specific use here simply because
elsewhere he had used or meant to use the word in the wider sense,
especially as he is not here obliged to use it in the generic as well as
the specific sense, but has the term διανοητικόν to fall back upon.

(2) βουλευτικός is indeed a more suitable word to describe that
part of the soul which is concerned with practical conduct. But it
appears to me that the non-practical contemplation of variables is not
altogether lost sight of by Aristotle, although he does not discuss it.
Now λογιστικόν is a word suited to the lower part of the intellect
considered as purely theoretic, while BovAeutixov is not. Δογιστικόν
is therefore employed here as being the more inclusive term.

(c) The argument τὸ yap βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν need
only be supposed to justify the use of the word λογιστικόν as applied
to the inferior part of the intellect considered as practical. As
applied to that part of the intellect considered as non-practical, the
use of λογιστικόν is accepted without justification, just as the use of
ἐπιστημονικόν applied to the higher part of the intellect is accepted
without justification. The very fact that βουλευτικόν is more appro-
priate than λογιστικόν as the name of the practical intellect is what
makes the justification desirable.

(4) It must be admitted that in common speéch βουλευτικόν and
λογιστικόν do not mean the same thing. But they are not so far
apart that the gap cannot be bridged well enough for the purpose in
hand. And it must be noticed that all that is required is that it

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 173

should be possible, in ordinary speech, to use λογιστικόν in the sense
of βουλευτικόν, even if it can be used in other senses too: it is not
required (as the sense of the passage shows) that the words should
be exact synonyms or co-extensive in their meaning.

Why then is the word δοξαστικόν twice used (1140 Ὁ 26 and
1144 Ὁ 14) instead of λογιστικόν In the former case, I believe, to
call attention to the two-fold nature of the lower part of the intellect,
which can be purely theoretic as well as practical. Just as βουλευτικόν
was the right name for it considered as practical, so δοξαστικόν is the
right name for it considered as theoretic, and λογιστικόν is the right
name for it considered as both. In the latter case (1144 b 14) the
object seems to be to emphasize the purely intellectual nature of
δεινότης as Opposed to ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ. This emphasis really is conveyed
by the use of δοξαστικόν, for in so far as the λογιστικὸν μέρος is
βουλευτικόν it is associated with, and dependent upon, moral ἀρετή
to some extent.

1139 a 15.
ληπτέον ἄρ᾽ ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις- αὕτη γὰρ
ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου.

No such peculiar and detailed definition of intellectual goodness
is here given as was given of moral goodness. The virtues of the
parts of the soul are, it is said, their best conditions: this statement
needs no proof, for it would readily be agreed that by the ἀρετή of
anything at all is-meant its best condition: this is as true of ἠθικὴ
ἀρετή as of anything else, though of this particular kind of ἀρετή a
special definition was obtained. ἶ

The usual ραποίυδίοη---αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἡ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ
ἔργον τὸ oixetov—hides the sense. I have placed a full stop after
ἑκατέρου. The words ἡ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον have nothing
to do with what precedes, and a great deal to do with the whole of
the following chapter, which is devoted to discovering the ἔργον of
each of the two intellectual faculties with a view to discovering the
ἀρετή of each thereby. This is quite clearly brought out by the
conclusion 1139 Ὁ 12 ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ

ὃ > ᾽ - ΤΕΣ τὰ
ἔργον. καθ᾽ ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον, αὗται ἀρεταὶ
ἀμφοῖν.

1139 a 17.

Τρία δή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ etc.
The opening lines of this chapter are rather obscure from

174 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

compression. The argument may be fully stated as follows :—There
are two main objects of specifically human activity, doing what is
good (in the broadest sense of ‘good’) and knowing what is true.
In the attainment of these objects three parts of the soul are directly
concerned as efficient causes, sensation (αἴσθησις) desire (ὄρεξις)
reason (νοῦς). It will be allowed that ὄρεξις is not an efficient cause
in knowing what is true, while αἴσθησις (either immediate or remaining
in the form of φαντασία) and νοῦς are concerned therein, either
separately or together. It is less clear, and so deserves to be proved,
that αἴσθησις, together of course with ὄρεξις, does not cause the doing
of what is good or bad. But the lower animals, which have both
αἴσθησις and ὄρεξις, nevertheless have no πρᾶξις ; they cannot be
said to do what is good or bad. The fact is that it is λογιστικὴ
φαντασία, and not αἰσθητικὴ favracia—the distinction is made in
the ‘Psychology ’—that combines with ὄρεξις to cause human πράξις,
and λογιστικὴ φαντασία-- 85 the ‘Psychology’ has pointed out—is
really a kind of νόησις or operation of νοῦς.

1139 a 21—b 5.

The following re-arrangement of the text of 1139 a 21---Ὁ 5 (the
only important passage in the 6th book which at all seems to require
re-arrangement) is I think new and has some advantages over others
—(i.) (as at present) a 17 Τρία δή ἐστιν... ἃ 20 πράξεως δὲ μὴ
κοινωνεῖν : (11.) a 31 πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις... ἃ 35 ἄνευ
διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὐκ ἔστιν : (111.) Ὁ 4 διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς... Ὁ 5 καὶ
ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος : here would appropriately follow the foot-
note Ὁ 6 οὔκ ἐστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός... Ὁ 11 ἀγένητα ποιεῖν
doo’ ἂν ἢ πεπραγμένα: (iv.) ἃ 21 ἔστι δ᾽ ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ
ἀπόφασις... ἃ 31 τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ: (ν.) a 35 διάνοια δ᾽ αὐτὴ οὐθὲν
κινεῖ... Ὁ 4 ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις τούτου : (vi.) the last two lines, Ὁ 12---13, of
course keep their place. The advantages of this arrangement are as
follows: 1. All the passages dealing with προαίρεσις are brought
together and arranged in their natural order. 2. The discussion of
θεωρητικὴ διάνοια is properly separated from that of πρακτική, which
is only mentioned again to make the nature of θεωρητική plainer by
contrast, no new fact about πρακτική being mentioned. 3. a 35 seg.
carries on the contrast smoothly from the end of the sentence a 30
τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ: and then, in the light of the now sufficient
discussion of both πρακτική and θεωρητική, ποιητική is properly
discussed and put in its place. 4. The transition from a 20 πράξεως

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 175

δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν to a 31 πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις is clear and
natural, while the present continuation at a 21 is highly obscure.
5. The meaning of ἀρχή, ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, is given earlier, and so close
to a 18—20 that it serves to explain the use of ἀρχή there too. 6. It
would be absurd, after the assumption of the truth ἡ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις
βουλευτική in ἃ 23, to write later on Ὁ 4 διὸ ἢ ὁρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ
προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, the statement being the grand con-
clusion of the whole argument: but on the other hand Jrom the
conclusion Ὁ 4 διὸ ἢ épexrixds νοῦς κτλ. (a conclusion that follows
naturally enough from a 31—35) the remark a 23 ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις
βουλευτική follows quite well as a recapitulation of an already proved
statement. With regard to such a re-arrangement as the above I
would say what Professor Stewart says of his own re-arrangement of
another passage in this book, 1140 ὃ 3—30: it ‘is offered, not as a
reconstruction of the text as it may have originally stood, but as an
attempt to make the meaning of the passage, as we now have it,
clearer.’

1139 a 23.

δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν

ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι
τὴν δὲ διώκειν.

No editor has pointed out, I think, that the above sentence
expresses two different requirements, and not the same requirement
in two different forms. Professor Stewart (see his note on 1139 a 24)
says “ὄρεξις is ὀρθή when it seeks (δίωξις) what λόγος or διάνοια affirms
(κατάφασις) to be good, and shuns (φυγή) what it denies (ἀπόφασις)
to be good.’ But the harmony of reason with appetite is not the
same thing as the goodness of either. It is true of vicious προαίρεσις,
where the λόγος is false and the ὄρεξις morally bad, that ὄρεξις seeks
and shuns respectively what λόγος affirms and denies. What is
wanted is not merely the harmony of reason and appetite—not
merely that both should have the same object—but the harmony of
right reason with good. appetite, so that both are rightly active with
regard to the same object. Now the rightness of reason depends on
the truth of its affirmations and negations, and not at all on the
character of the appetite, and the goodness of appetite depends on
the goodness of its pursuits and avoidances, and not at all on the
character of the reason. For every προαίρεσις, good or bad, it is
necessary that the reason and the appetite should be concerned with

176 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

the same object: otherwise there is merely an opinion, right or
wrong, about one thing, and a desire, right or wrong, about another,
and no προαίρεσις can occur. For good προαίρεσις it is necessary
that both reason and desire should be good in themselves, and if
they are good, and refer to the same object, it must follow in the
nature of things that both feel attraction (κατάφασις and ὄρεξις) or
both repulsion (ἀπόφασις and φυγή). It has been shown that this
harmony of attraction with attraction and repulsion with repulsion
also exists in vicious προαίρεσις, where both reason and appetite are
bad in themselves. Two other kinds of bad προαίρεσις, are possible,
where this harmony does not exist: when the reason is bad and the
appetite good, and when the reason is good and the appetite bad:
then there exist the two states considered in the last two chapters of
this book, the baneful development of natural moral virtue, which is
nameless, and the baneful development of natural intellectual virtue,
which is πανουργίβ. The two requirements stated in this passage
are, then, (1) that reason and appetite should combine to form
purpose by being directed to the same object, (2) that their relation
to the object should be good in each case: and my point is that
these two things required are causally independent of each other.

1130 a 34—35.

If obvious and complete inappropriateness and logical unsound-
ness is warrant enough for bracketing a passage’, the words εὐπραξία.
γὰρ Kai τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὔκ ἐστιν ought to:
be bracketed. For these words add nothing to the argument of the
previous sentence. Moreover they appear to try to prove one state-
ment by another that is logically posterior to it. For the meaning of
πρᾶξις depends on that of προαίρεσις, and not vice versa: 1139 ἃ 31
πράξεως ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις : πρᾶξις is action done as the result of mpoat-
peows, or by a being capable of προαίρεσις. Also the meaning of
εὐπραξία obviously depends on that of πρᾶξις :" for εὐπραξία is πρᾶξις
of a certain kind. Hence the meaning of εὐπραξία depends ultimately
on that of προαίρεσις. Further, the statement 1139 ἃ 33 διὸ οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ
νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστιν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις, which εὐπραξία.
γὰρ κτλ. is supposed to prove, follows directly from the previous words
ἃ 32 προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις (sc. ἀρχή ἐστιν) καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. 80.

1 And by common consent this has been held to be the case with the awkward

words 1143 Ὁ g—r1 διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς: ἐκ τούτων γὰρ al ἀποδείξεις καὶ.
περὶ τούτων.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 177

if the words εὐπραξία γὰρ κτλ. are to be kept, they must present the
absurdity of a statement, hitherto unproved, about a derived notion,
brought forward to support a statement, already proved, about the
notion from which the former is derived. Neither can this ob-
jectionable passage be better placed elsewhere.

1139 Ὁ 2.
ov τέλος ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ πρός TL καὶ τινός, τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
πρακτόν. This passage contains several difficulties. (4) Does
τὸ ποιητόν mean ‘the thing produced’ or ‘the process of
production’? (ὁ) What does τινός mean? (c) Is τέλος to
be understood with πρός τι and τινός, or not? (4) Should
᾿ πρός be understood again with τινός ἢ

The two latter difficulties are of course purely grammatical, but
they make the interpretation of the passage more difficult. Probably
the answer in each case is in the negative: with regard to the last it
must be noticed that πρός with the genitive is a rare construction in
Anistotle.

The answer to (4) depends on the answer to (a). “Professor
Burnet’s answer to (a) is ‘the process of production,’ disagreeing
therein with everyone else’s view, it seems. My reasons for thinking
Professor Burnet wrong are as follows—

1. In ordinary language ποιητός would naturally be an epithet
of the thing made and not of the action of making it. The word
does not occur elsewhere in Aristotelian writings, except at 1140 a 1
which throws no light on the question, and at Politics 1275 a 6 (in
quite a different sense) where ποιητοὶ πολῖται means ‘factitious’ or
‘adopted citizens.’ There is therefore no Aristotelian authority for
the special meaning Professor Burnet would give to τὸ ποιητόν, and so
far no inducement to depart from the ordinary meaning. Professor
Burnet’s remark that ‘we may say either ποιεῖν ποίησιν or ποιεῖν
ποίημα’ does not show that τὸ ποιητόν can ‘correspond to the
internal accusative.’

2. Since the process of production is not an end in any sense at
all, it would be absurd to say that it was not an absolute end (οὐ
τέλος ἁπλῶς). Only that can be said to be οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς which is
an end but is also a means to the absolute end. The thing produced
by ποίησις is such; for it is not 276 end but is a means to εὐπραξία
(1139 Ὁ 3); and at the same time it is ax end, for the ἔργον is related
to the ποίησις as end to means—see Περὶ Οὐρανοῦ 306 a 16 τέλος δὲ

G. 12

178 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

τῆς μὲν ποιητικῆς ἐπιστήμης τὸ ἔργον, Ethics 1094 a 4 τῶν τελῶν τὰ
μέν εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά.

3. Grammatically, Professor Burnet’s rendering of τὸ ποιητὸν
τινός (ἐστι) is easy, ‘the process of production is the production of
something’: easy, that is, granted that τὸ ποιητόν can be equivalent
to ἡ ποίησις. But the sense is not forcible. It is equally possible
to say of πρᾶξις that ‘the process of doing is the doing of something.’

The meaning of ‘the thing produced’ being given to τὸ ποιητόν,
τινός is best taken as neuter, and as meaning ‘belonging to’ or
‘connected with something else,’ and thus as almost a synonym of
πρός τι Both τινός and τι must in this case refer to the absolute

end εὐπραξία.

1139 Ὁ 5—11.

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός κτλ.

No editor appears to find any real explanation of the occurrence
of this passage at the end of chapter ii. Ramsauer thinks it is out of
place, and wishes to read it in book 111 along with the rest of the
description of προαίρεσις. Grant takes it to be an addition made
with pride by Eudemus to the statement of Aristotle on the subject.
Professor Stewart admits that the statement might have been dis-
pensed with, but sees no reason to bracket it. Professor Burnet
calls it ‘a detached fragment, loosely appended as usual to the end
of a section. It appears to be part of a proof that Practical Thought
deals with τὸ ἐσόμενον."

The passage really is appropriate enough to the reconsideration
of προαίρεσις in the light of the new distinction between ἐνδεχόμενα
and μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. For it might be objected, and prima
facie quite plausibly objected, that events which have in the past
been brought about by the human will belong to the class of ἐνδεχόμενα
and not to the class of μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα : and since ἐνδεχόμενα are the
subjects of προαίρεσις, it would follow that events in the past brought
about by the human will, such as the capture of Troy, are the subjects of
προαίρεσις. The difficulty is of course a purely formal one ; but formal
difficulties had great terrors for the Greek mind, which could not
ride rough-shod over them by the help of common sense, but insisted
on due formal explanation. It was therefore necessary to explain
that past events are not contingent now, though they may have been
contingent once. The historical imagination, projecting itself into
the past and imagining the time before Troy fell, rightly thinks of

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 179

the fall as an ἐνδεχόμενον. But the historical imagination is not the
ordinary channel for the contemplation of the contingent, and from
the practical point of view, that of the mind gua deliberative, the fall
of Troy is not ἐνδεχόμενον but μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον.

1130 Ὁ 15.
ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἢ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι...
τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς" ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ
ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι.

Professor Stewart says "Νοῦς is infallible as the immediate per-
ception of ἀδιαίρετα or ἁπλᾶ," implying that the perception of ἀδιαίρετα
or ἁπλᾶ, ze. of simple concepts as distinguished from propositions, is
the whole function of vots. He is obliged to suppose therefore that
the words τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι are only loosely applied to νοῦς,
since they imply the making of propositions, which νοῦς does not make.
I can find no evidence that other editors disagree with this view.

Now Professor Stewart admits that νοῦς here means what it
means in chapter vi, where it is said εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν τῆς ἐπιστήμης.
But deductive science cannot start from simple concepts: it must
start from propositions. Chapter vi therefore shows that vods makes
propositions. This does not prevent its also perceiving simple.
concepts, according to the doctrine of Metaphysics 1051 b 24: though
it is probable that the author is not thinking of vots in that sense
anywhere in this book—which need cause no surprise, since, as it is,
he uses the word in at least four different senses in this book.
Professor Stewart himself admits that the doctrine thatthe principles
of knowledge are reached by νοῦς is not inconsistent, in the author’s
view or in the view of the writer of Posterior Analytics too Ὁ 3 seg.,
with the doctrine that the same principles are reached by induction
(ἐπαγωγή). Clearly induction cannot be concerned entirely with
ἀδιαίρετα.

But in what sense then is νοῦς infallible? In just the sense in
which the other four virtues are infallible and ὑπόληψις and δόξα
fallible. It is a matter of names. In so far as a man is deceived,
his ἕξις διανοητική is not truly any of the five virtues mentioned, but
only in so far as he is right. ὑπόληψις and δόξα are fallible in the
sense that they are either good or bad states—the ames are not
confined to virtues but may be applied to vices. They are not
distinct from the five virtues as things mutually exclusive are distinct ;
for all five virtues are ὑπολήψεις of a certain kind, see 1140 Ὁ 13

12—2

180 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

where φρόνησις is, it is implied, a ὑπόληψις, b 31 where ἐπιστήμη is
called a ὑπόληψις, 1142 Ὁ 33 where φρόνησις is called a ὑπόληψις 5
and δόξα is at least a part of φρόνησις, which is twice called the
virtue τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ μέρους. This infallibility then, which has caused
the editors so much trouble, is a notion brought in, rather clumsily
perhaps, to distinguish between the names of virtues and the names
of states that may be good or bad.

1139 Ὁ 23 diSiov ἄρα: τὰ yap ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀΐδια,
τὰ δ᾽ ἀΐδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα. There ought to be a period, and
not a comma, after πάντα ἀΐδια. For τὰ δ᾽ ἀΐδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα
is a new fact, and not part of the argument whose conclusion is
ἀΐδιον dpa, Fully stated the passage would consist of two distinct
syllogisms, thus—

(a) τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἁπλῶς πάντα aidid ἐστιν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἁπλῶς ἐστιν,
᾿ς τὸ ἐπιστητὸν αἰἴδιόν ἐστιν.
(6) τὰ ἀΐδια ᾿ ἀγένητα καὶ ἀφθαρτά ἐστιν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἀἰδιόν ἐστιν,
᾿ς τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἀγένητον καὶ ἀφθαρτόν ἐστιν.
The comma would be the right stop if instead of ἀΐδιον dpa had been
written ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ἄρα.

1130 Ὁ 28.
ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου.

Professor Burnet translates ἀρχή by ‘starting-point,’ and says it
is identical with the προυπάρχουσα γνῶσις of Posterior Analytics 71 a 2
(see his note). He says truly ‘it is just as proper to call τὰ καθ᾽
ἕκαστα the ‘startirig-point’ of our knowledge of τὰ καθόλου as to call
τὰ καθόλου the ‘starting-point’ of demonstration.’ But just as τὰ
καθόλου are distinct from the process συλλογισμός, 50 τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα
are distinct from the process ἐπαγωγή. While therefore it would be
correct to say that τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα are the starting-point of ἐπαγωγή,
or even of the knowledge of τὰ καθόλου to which ἐπαγωγή leads, it
seems impossible to speak of ἐπαγωγή itself as ἀρχὴ τοῦ καθόλου,
except in whatever sense συλλογισμός may be called ἀρχὴ τοῦ συμ-
περάσματος, and this sense cannot be that of ‘starting-point ’—the
syllogism cannot be called the starting-point of the conclusion,
ἐπαγωγή is not, any more than συλλογισμός, προυπάρχουσα γνῶσις.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 181

And there seems to be no satisfactory sense of ἀρχή in which
ἐπαγωγή can be said to be ἀρχὴ τοῦ καθόλου.

To read ἀρχῆς with L> removes the difficulty. Professor Burnet’s
objection to this reading, that it brings in an irrelevant truth instead
of the required proof of the statement ἐκ προγινωσκομένων πᾶσα
διδασκαλία (1139 b 26), does not hold: for no such proof is required.
The point is the difference between συλλογισμός and ἐπαγωγή, and
the consequent difference between ἐπιστήμη and the intellectual
ἀρετή that is afterwards called νοῦς. Now the difference between
συλλογισμός and ἐπαγωγή lies in their relations to τὰ καθόλου, those
universals which are the τέλος of ἐπαγωγή but the ἀρχή (in the sense
of starting-point) of συλλογισμός. The words 7 ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχῆς ἐστιν
καὶ τοῦ καθόλου naturally mean τέλος τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς ἐστιν ἡ ἀρχὴ (sc. τῆς
ἀποδείξεως), τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ καθόλου.

11408 3.
ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου
ποιητικῆς ἕξεως, διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ
πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πράξίς ἐστιν.

It has not been noticed how obscure the sequence of the
argument is here. If the first sentence stood alone, érepov might be
taken to mean either (1) ‘not exactly the same’ in the sense in which
a European is ἕτερος from an Englishman—+.e. as genus from species,
or (2) ‘not at all the same’ in the sense in which a Frenchman is
ἕτερος from an Englishman—ze. as species from species. The
second sentence is added to show that it is the latter meaning of
ἕτερον that is intended: ποίησις and πρᾶξις are mutually exclusive
terms. But the fact οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων does not follow
from the first sentence. The proof of it is given in what follows,
οὔτε yap ἡ πράξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, which clearly
shows the trend of the argument and the sense in which ἕτερον was
used. It is therefore hard to explain διό. Professor Burnet neglects
οὐδέ in his translation ‘therefore neither is contained in the other’:
but it is οὐδέ that makes διό difficult, ‘they are not even included
either of them by the other’: not only are they not identical, but
they are not even related as whole and part. Probably διό may be
translated ‘so different, indeed, that...’ But it is rather that the
context forces this meaning out of the word than that it could
naturally mean this: however, it is just possible to take it to mean
“on account. of the great difference that there actually is between

182 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

ποίησις and πρᾶξις rather than ‘on account of the fact just stated,
that the ποιητικὴ ἕξις is different from the πρακτικὴ ets.’

Is the doctrine of 1140 a 5 οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων
inconsistent with the doctrine of 1139 Ὁ 1 αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς

a 4
ποιητικῆς ἄρχειν

Ramsauer and Stewart say Yes: Grant and Burnet neglect the
point. If 1140 a 5 is inconsistent with 1139 b 1, it must also be
inconsistent with the whole of the latter part of this book, in which
σοφία and the πρακτικὴ ἀρετὴ φρόνησις are in some sense or other
admittedly asserted to cover the whole field of intellectual goodness,
leaving no room for a ποιητικὴ ἀρετή distinct from either. But there
is no inconsistency. ποίησις can quite well be simply a means to
πρᾶξις, aS 1139 Ὁ 1 asserts, and at the same time be a completely
distinct thing from πρᾶξις, as 1140 a 5 asserts. No more subtle
distinction is intended in 1140 a 5 than lies in the fact that in
ποίησις an external object is produced while in πρᾶξις it is not.
Ramsauer has no reason to say that περιέχειν in 1140 a 5 means the
same thing as ἄρχειν in 1139 Ὁ 1. Περιέχειν in 1140 a 5 has a
logical meaning, ‘include,’ as the genus includes the species: ἄρχειν
in 1139 Ὁ 1 means ‘is superior to’ as the end is superior to the
means.

1140 a 6. -

2 ‘\ 3. ε + ἣν id
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ oixodopixy...... IO ποιητική.

The argument of this sentence is hardly more than a categorical
statement, the statement that the word τέχνη is in fact always used to
mean ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική. Take any sample, Aristotle
says in effect, of a réxvy, say building. Building, or the builder’s
art, is admittedly a τέχνη. It must also be admitted to correspond
exactly to the description ἕξις pera λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική. But it
does not follow from these two facts that the word τέχνη and the
phrase ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική are even in any way connected
in meaning. So Aristotle appeals to his hearers or readers to take
any instance they like of a τέχνη, and say whether that thing’is not
also a ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ; and conversely to take any
instance they like of a ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική, and say
whether that thing is not also called τέχνη. He does not make the
induction for them, beyond suggesting a single instance to begin

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 183

with. He assumes that anyone who chooses can make the induction,
and that it will yield the required result. The only further step is
from the statement that the word τέχνη and the description ἕξις μετὰ
λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική can always both be applied to anything to
which either can be applied, to the statement that the two are
identical, 2.4. that ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική is the definition of
τέχνη. The inference is of course not unavoidable, but Aristotle

.regards it as at least sufficiently probable and plausible not to need
further discussion.

1140 a τό.

ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πράξεως εἶναι.

At first sight this sentence seems a pure repetition of what has
been said. But the point has not been definitely made before. It
has been shown that ποίησις and πρᾶξις are different, and that τέχνη
is concerned with ποίησις: but the conclusion, that τέχνη is not
concerned with πρᾶξις, has not been stated. But it is worth stating:
for the language of lines 10 to 16 does not clearly distinguish τέχνη
from the virtue concerned with πρᾶξις, but only from ἐπιστήμη and
from unpractical θεωρία τῶν ἐνδεχομένων : moreover, the loose uses. of
the word τέχνη include its application to rhetoric and other practical
systems. The sentence would indeed read better after the end of
line ro: but it is quite intelligible where it is.

1140 a 20.
ἡὶ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς
ποιητική ἐστιν, ἡ δ᾽ ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ
¢
ἕξις.

In this book τέχνη is used in two senses, one good, the other in
itself neither good nor bad. These two senses are conveyed by the
phrases (a) ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική (6) ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς
ποιητική. The former sense occurs in two other places in this book,
where the above definition has been forgotten: 1140 Ὁ 22 τέχνης μὲν
ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, and 1141 a 12 σημαίνοντες τὴν
σοφίαν ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν. In these two places τέχνη is perhaps
not really thought of as a és at all, but as an activity or process or
body of rules or something that is not a quality or fixed condition of
the mind of the τεχνίτης. If it is thought of as a ἕξις, the words

184 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

τέχνης ἔστιν ἀρετή cannot mean that τέχνη can ave an ἀρετή so
much as that τέχνη can de an ἀρετή. In any case these two passages
are inconsistent with the above definition of 1140 a 20, where τέχνη
is clearly said to be a virtue, and has its vice ἀτεχνία opposed to it.
Τέχνη in this sense can no more have an ἀρετή than φρόνησις can.
It would have been an excellent thing if the word evreyvia—which
occurs in Hippocrates and Lucian but not in Aristotle—had been in
common use enough to have displaced τέχνη here. How far the
author clearly distinguished in his own mind his double use of τέχνῃ
is doubtful; but as he does not generally mention intellectual vices,
probably he had the neutral sense of τέχνη in his mind at 1140 a 20,
and mentioned ἀτεχνία on purpose to show that it is not the neutral
but the good sense that is there intended.

1140 Ὁ 3.
(οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις) τέχνη...ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως

,
καὶ ποιήσεως.

This argument is so badly expressed that what is to be proved
appears as the reason for what is to prove it. The point is not that
φρόνησις is different from τέχνη because it is concerned with πρᾶξις
and not with ποίησις, but that it is concerned with πρᾶξις and not
with ποίησις because it is different from τέχνη. That φρόνησις is
different from τέχνη according to the belief that underlies popular
usage has been said already: 1140 a 29 τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους λέγομεν,
ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, dv μή ἐστι τέχνη. Since
it is simply the usage of the word φρόνησις that Aristotle is here
trying to fix, he accepts the popular usage with the belief that
underlies it. So it is known already that φρόνησις is different from
τέχνη. On the other hand, nothing has so far been said to show
that πρᾶξις (as opposed to ποίησις) is the peculiar sphere of φρόνησις.
That the φρόνιμος is the βουλευτικός certainly does not show this;
for βούλευσις is said to be concerned with the arts in particular, see
1112 Ὁ 3—7 βουλευόμεθα... μᾶλλον...περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας"
μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ ταύτας διστάζομεν. It is true that the immediately
preceding distinction of φρόνησις from ἐπιστήμη, made on the ground
that ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, implies that πρᾶξις is the sphere
of φρόνησις, but the assumption is there made for the first time, and
without any warrant from the previous argument,

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 185

1140 Ὁ 4.

λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν
περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον
τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη- ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία
τέλος.

The transposition of these two sentences proposed by Rassow
(Forschungen, page 30) seems to me so certain that I have introduced
it into the text. For (a) τῆς μὲν yap κτλ, is a simple recapitulation
of a well-known distinction, and is introduced here to explain the
statement ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως : it does not, as the
received order makes it appear to do, in any way justify the conclusion
λείπεται ἄρα κτλ. (6) The words of the definition περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ
ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά lead immediately up to 1140 Ὁ 7 διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα
καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν. This connection of thought is most
awkwardly broken by the intervening sentence.

1140 Ὁ το.

» Ν £ ε ΄΄ A ? Ν ‘ ‘
εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ Tous

πολιτικούς.

Professor Burnet strangely holds that the οἰκονομικοὶ and πολιτικοὶ
are instances of the φρόνιμοι κατὰ μέρος. Surely not. Τὸ εὖ ζῆν
ὅλως, the great final τέλος, is the end that the οἰκονομικοί and
πολιτικοί, as such, have in view—their end is not any particular τέλος
such as health and victory. The φρόνησις of the politician, or rather
statesman, is ‘architectonic’ above all other forms of φρόνησις, and
the φρόνησις of the householder is more architectonic than that of
the individualist (ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα) : and yet none of these three
forms of φρόνησις are κατὰ μέρος, for they all have as their end τὸ εὖ
ζῆν ὅλως, whether for a country or a family or an individual. It is
in no κατὰ μέρος sense that in the Politics φρόνησις is called the
peculiar virtue of the ruler: 1277 b 25 ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος

ἀρετή.

1140 Ὁ τι.

For the relation of σωφροσύνη to φρόνησις, as set forth in vi ν,
compared with the relation of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή to φρόνησις, as set forth in
νι xii—xiii, see Introduction, pages 51-53.

186 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

1140 Ὁ 24.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή τις ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη.

As Ramsauer says, the conclusion here stated is at first sight
very unsatisfactory. For φρόνησις is not a moral dpery, and the
preceding words ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς appear to make the words
ἀρετή τις ἐστὶν (sc. ἡ φρόνησις) mean that it ἐς a moral ἀρετή. Also
τέχνη ἔς an ἀρετή, and the sentence seems to imply that it is not.

' I think it is possible to translate ‘It is plain then that φρόνησις is
an ἀρετή which is not τέχνη᾽ : no τις being understood with τέχνη.
This allows ἀρετή ris to be taken as referring to διανοητικὴ ἀρετή,
which is certainly rather abrupt after the use of ras dperds just before
in the sense of ras ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς, but is evidently the sense required.
ἀρετή τις ἐστί will then be quite unemphatic, and οὐ τέχνη will be the
point of the sentence.

A meaning can be given to 1140 Ὁ 22 τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετὴ
φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν that is in accordance with this view. Τέχνη is
used, not in the necessarily good sense of 1140 a 20, but in the
neutral sense of 1141 ἃ 12, in which it includes the ποιητικὴ ἀρετή
called τέχνη in 1140 a 20 and the ποιητικὴ κακία called arexvia-in the
same passage. Τέχνης ἔστιν ἀρετή means that τέχνη may be an ἀρετή
or may not, φρονήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετή means that φρόνησις must
always ὅδ an ἀρετή. This is, so far as it goes, a quite definite ground
of distinction between τέχνη and φρόνησις, though it only shows that
the two terms are not co-extensive in meaning, and does not even
show that φρόνησις is not the same as the ἀρετὴ τέχνης, ze. not the
same as τέχνη in the sense given to the word in 1140 a 20. The
latter truth is shown in the following sentence 1140 Ὁ 22 καὶ ἐν μὲν
τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων aiperwrepos, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὦσπερ
καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς : this shows that τέχνη and φρόνησις are totally
distinct, and not only as genus is distinct from species.

The whole argument seems-to aim at establishing the distinctness
of τέχνη from φρόνησις independently of the view that τέχνη is only
ποιητική. The reason for so doing is no doubt that τέχνη has for
some people a wider meaning than that of ποιητικὴ ἕξις. Aristotle
himself commonly calls rhetoric a τέχνη: and the sophists who
taught the ἀρετῆς τέχνη would certainly have denied that τέχνη was
concerned with ποίησις only.

1140 Ὁ 29.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον" σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι λήθη μὲν
τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστιν, φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 187

Professor Burnet holds that ‘the point is that the ἐνέργεια of
φρόνησις is more continuous than that of other ἕξεις μετὰ λόγου
(ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη) just because it is πρακτική He quotes the
passage 1100 Ὁ 17 that describes the highest activities κατ᾽ ἀρετήν as
not subject. to λήθη because (for the μακάριοι) they are the most
continuous. But these highest activities are not πρακτικαί but
θεωρητικαί, as book x shows: and it is the θεωρητικαὶ ἐνέργειαι that
are the most continuous, θεωρεῖν yap δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ
πράττειν ὁτιοῦν (1177 a 21). Though complete continuity of any
high activity is impossible for man, yet θεωρία, which is μετὰ λόγου
only, is more continuous than πρᾶξις, which is of μετὰ λόγου only.
The difficulty is then that whereas from 1177 a 21 and r100 Ὁ 17 it
appears that the theoretic activities are less subject to λήθη than any
others, from this passage 1140 Ὁ 29 it appears that the practical
excellence φρόνησις is not subject to λήθη, whereas the theoretic
excellences. are.

The solution I offer is that λήθη means two different things in
the first two’ contexts and in the third. What 1177 a 21 and
1100 Ὁ 17 mean is that the theoretic activities are less destructible
than any others, no matter what their destruction may be called:
a fact that follows well enough from the statement that the theoretic
activities are the most continuous. But what 1140 Ὁ 28 means
is that, whether φρόνησις is or is not more destructible than those
excellences which are purely intellectual (μετὰ λόγου μόνον), the
destruction of it is not λήθη or forgetfulness: a fact that is perfectly
plain, as may be learnt by simple observation of the usage of the
word λήθη in ordinary speech. There is no reason to suppose
that Aristotle would not allow the purely intellectual element of
φρόνησις (what he afterwards calls δεινότης) to be subject to λήθη.

1140 Ὁ 31.
ἡὶ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις.

Professor Stewart says ‘It is awkward to begin a chapter,
intended to present the distinction between ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς, with
words ascribing to the former a characteristic (τὸ περὶ τῶν καθόλου
ὑπόληψιν εἶναι) which it shares with the latter.’ The question turns
on the meaning of περὶ τῶν καθόλου, This cannot mean ‘having
universals as its ἀρχή or starting-point,’ which would be ἐκ τῶν
καθόλου. Stewart therefore supposes it must mean ‘having universals

as its réAos.’ If this were so, the awkwardness that Stewart com-

188 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

plains of would really exist: for νοῦς like ἐπιστήμη has universals as
its τέλος. But the word can mean ‘concerned with universals’ in a
general sense, including the two notions of ‘having universals as
its ἀρχή᾽ and ‘having universals as its τέλος. Now ἐπιστήμη has
universals as its ἀρχή, but νοῦς has particulars as its ἀρχή. Therefore
ἐπιστήμη is, while νοῦς is not, ‘concerned with universals’ in the
above general inclusive sense. On this showing the awkwardness
that Stewart complains of does not exist: for the characteristic τὸ
περὶ τῶν καθόλου ὑπόληψιν εἶναι is not shared by ἐπιστήμη with νοῦς.
Instead of awkwardness the phrase περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις
shows great pertinence: for it does not (pace Professor Burnet)
distinguish φρόνησις from ἐπιστήμη, but begins the distinction of
ἐπιστήμη from νοῦς that is the subject of this vith chapter.

Ι141 a 20.
” N »” ΝΥ ἧς AY s ,
ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις THY πολιτικὴν ἢ THY φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην

οἴεται εἶναι.

Why does the author mention πολιτική here before explaining its
relation to φρόνησις, when the mention of φρόνησις alone would have
answered the purpose of the argument equally well? Because at the
beginning of book. 1 πολιτική has been described as the master’
science : 1094 a 26 τῆς κυριωτάτης Kal μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς- τοιαύτη
δ᾽ ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται... ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων
ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας .. τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. All of
this has raised a presumption that πολιτική is σπουδαιοτάτη, and this
idea it is important to remove. The argument is indeed less clear
and cogent than if the relation of φρόνησις to πολιτική had been
settled already, but the nature of each and their general similarity
are already understood well enough for the purpose in hand.

1141 a 20.

ἄτοπον yap... Ὁ 2 ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν.

In this passage a 22 εἰ 8. .. 33 πάντων τῶν ὄντων is so markedly
parenthetical that parenthesis brackets ought to be printed in the
text : otherwise the argument is confusing. The parenthetical passage
merely aims at proving φρόνησις or πολιτική to be different from
σοφία, and makes no mention of their comparative excellence. But
the main argument, begun in a 2zo—22 and resumed abruptly in
a 33—b 2, assumes that φρόνησις or πολιτική is different from σοφία,
and aims at proving σοφία the better.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 189

II4I a 33.

εἰ δ᾽ ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει

κτλ.

The statement made by way of objection to the theory that
φρόνησις Or πολιτική is not σπουδαιοτάτη is, Aristotle says, not
relevant. He implies that it-is true; and he thinks so. But it does
not follow that man is, because βέλτιστον τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, therefore
τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, and in point of fact he is not this latter.

The view here taken, that the knowledge of the nobler of two
things is always ipso facto itself nobler than the knowledge of the
less noble, is plainly at the bottom of Aristotle’s final conclusion
about the summum bonum. It was an axiom of his thought that
the excellence of a state of mind varies directly, other things re-
maining constant, as the excellence of its object. This is a conclusion
that it was natural for him to draw from his metaphysical doctrine of
the formal identity of the knowing mind and the thing known. But
the view, or something like it, pervaded all Greek thought. In art
the most beautiful handling of base material was not held to produce
a perfectly beautiful whole. It was on this ground among others
that the tragedies of Euripides were condemned.

Ι141 Ὁ 2—3.

Ἂς “ Ψ' “ Ψ =
ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη Kal
νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει.

Stewart, Ramsauer and Susemihl are surely not ght in wishing
to bracket these words. For (@) repeated definitions are common:
see those of τέχνη, 1140 a 10 and 20, and those of φρόνησις,
1140 b 5 and 20: also the repetition of 1144 a 7—9 at 1145 a 5—6.
(6) There is a special reason for the repetition here, for τῶν τιμιω-
τάτων has now been justified, which had not been done when the
former statement of the definition was made at 1141 a 18. (ὦ The
words διὸ ᾿Αναξαγόραν κτλ. do not (though Stewart seems to think
they do) depend immediately on the passage ending Ὁ 2 συνέστηκεν.
The fact that σοφία is superior to φρόνησις because the stars are
nobler beings than men hardly leads up to the statement that we call
Anaxagoras and Thales σοφοί because they know fine things that are
of no use to them personally and practically. The latter statement
follows much better from the definition of σοφία, which must therefore
stand.

190 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

1141 Ὁ 20 κοῦφα καὶ must ‘surely be bracketed in spite of
Professor Burnet’s defence of the words. It is hard to take the
words ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά to mean ‘that light meat
is digestible, and since digestible meat is wholesome therefore light
meat is wholesome.’ It is much more natural to take εὔπεπτα and
ὑγιεινά as synonyms, so that εὔπεπτα καὶ might even be omitted
without destroying the reasoning. So also if κοῦφα καὶ is read in
line 20 it is hard to take ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινά to mean
‘that poultry is light meat, and since light meat is wholesome
therefore poultry is wholesome.’ Leaving out κοῦφα καὶ we obtain a
quite simple and clear argument: otherwise it is needlessly and
confusingly complicated. Rassow’s emendation for κοῦφα καὶ---κρέα
καὶ (Forschungen page 96)—is unlikely, if for no other reason,
because of the καί, which would spoil the sense by throwing emphasis
on ὑγιεινά instead of on ὀρνίθεια. Kpéa without καί would be free

from objection, and may have been the original reading.

II4I Ὁ 22.

εἴη δ᾽ ay τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική. καὶ ἐνταῦθα clearly means
‘in the sphere of φρόνησις too.’ But there is some doubt as to the
reference of «ai. Burnet interprets ‘in this case as well as in that of
diet.’ Stewart seemis to take ἐνταῦθα to mean ‘as regards the καθ᾽
ἕκαστα of φρόνησις. Ramsauer says of this sentence that the words
in their present place ‘ita sunt obscura ut inania videantur.’ It is
simpler to take καί to refer to σοφία, which is architectonic in the
theoretic sphere, κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα. The sentence is not a mere saving
clause, added as a tail-piece to § 7, but definitely introduces the
discussion of πολιτική and its sub-divisions that follows. The archi-
tectonic form of φρόνησις is, as Burnet says, πολιτική : particularly
that division of πολιτική called νομοθετική, but also, as compared with
other forms of φρόνησις, πολιτική as a whole.

1141 Ὁ 26.
αὕτη δὲ (sc. 4 ὡς τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα φρόνησις περὶ πόλιν, OF
πολιτική in the narrow sense) πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική.

All φρόνησις is to some extent πρακτική and βουλευτική, as was
laid down at the beginning of the discussion of φρόνησις, 1140a 30
and Ὁ 5. But it is nevertheless true that πολιτική (in the narrowést
sense) is both πρακτική and βουλευτική in a sense in which νομοθεσία
is neither. For πολιτική has to do with particulars, but νομοθεσία

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES ΙΟΙ

only with universals, and since πρᾶξις is always particular (one cannot
have action that is not particular action) πολιτική is πρακτική in a
sense in which νομοθεσία is not. Again, βούλευσις may occur about
general principles, but it is strictly speaking about particular actions
only, and not about what the general nature of actions should be;
therefore πολιτική is also βουλευτική in a sense in which νομοθεσία is
not. Νομοθεσία is nevertheless both πρακτική and βουλευτική as
compared with the purely theoretic σοφία.

1141 Ὁ 27.
> x ᾿ᾷ Ν ε Ἂς ΟΝ;
τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἐσχατον.

There is disagreement among commentators as to what ἔσχατον
means. Grant thinks it means the minor term in the syllogism:
Professor Stewart, the last step in deliberation: Professor Burnet
agrees with Stewart, but says that the ψήφισμα is the minor premiss
of the political syllogism and the νόμος the major. Now it is not the
minor term or minor premiss but the conclusion of the practical
syllogism that is the statement of the πρακτόν or thing to be done,
the last step in deliberation and the first in action. The νόμος is the
major premiss: the statement of the particular circumstances is the
minor premiss: the ψήφισμα is the conclusion. Professor Stewart
therefore is right, Grant wrong, and Burnet inconsistent. But I can
see no reason for thinking that τὸ ἔσχατον here means anything more
than ‘the particular’ (τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον) : particulars are so-called (as
Stewart points out) because they are the ultimate units in which the
process of analysis ends, but the process of analysis is not always
thought of whenever the word ἔσχατον is used in the meaning of
‘ particular.’

Ι141 Ὁ 34.
ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν. What does διαφορά mean here ?

Two meanings are excluded. (a) ‘Superiority’ is not an
Aristotelian meaning of διαφορά : so that we cannot translate ‘it has
great advantages over the other species of φρόνησις or yrdors.’
(ὁ) The use of the singular prevents our translating with Welldon
‘it has many varieties,’ which moreover gives no satisfactory sense.
There remain two other possible meanings: (c) ‘controversy ’—‘ the
subject admits of considerable controversy’: (41) " difference ’—‘ this
kind of φρόνησις or γνῶσις is very different from the other kinds.’

192 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

Aristotelian usage supports both (c) and (4), But except in two
or three instances διαφορά in the sense of ‘ controversy’ is used of
persons, and of quarrels as distinguished from simple differences of
opinion: thus it is coupled with στάσις in the Politics. The
exceptions are

Ethics 1094 Ὁ 15 τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ

σκοπεῖται, πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὦστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ

> a Ν ΄
μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή.

Politics 1299 a 4 ἔχει. γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας πολλὰς

διαφοράς, πόσαι τε ἀρχαὶ καὶ κύριαι τίνων, κτλ.
Politics 1303 b 14 ἔοικε πᾶσα διαφορὰ ποιεῖν διάστασιν

—though in the last instance διαφορά may mean ‘quarrel.’ On the
other hand there are countless instances of Siahopa=‘ difference,’
whether in the technical logical sense or more generally. Combined
as here with ἔχειν it occurs as follows
Analytics 32 a 15 περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀναγκαίου, πῶς γίνεται καὶ τίνα
διαφορὰν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὑπάρχον, εἴρηται.
Topics 103 ἃ 14 δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς κρήνης ὕδωρ ταὐτὸν
λεγόμενον ἔχειν τινὰ διαφορὰν παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους.
Meteorology 360 b 14 ἐὰν μή τι διαφορὰν ἔχωσιν ἴδιον.
Hist. Anim. 524 a 20 ἔχουσι δὲ διαφορὰν of τε πολύποδες καὶ τὰ
εἰρημένα τῶν μαλακίων.
Politics 1269 a 24 εἰ κινητέοι οἱ νόμοι... ; ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχει μεγάλην
διαφοράν (possibly an instance of the meaning ‘ controversy’).

Of these two meanings the former is supported by the absence of
the article and the use of πολλήν instead of μεγάλην: the latter by
the occurrence of εἶδος in the preceding sentence (which Professor
Stewart points out)—this suggests that εἶδος and διαφορά are used in
the technical sense of ‘species’ and ‘differentia.’ I think the latter
view is right, but yet that neither εἶδος nor διαφορά is used with strict
logical exactness: thus εἶδος is not distinguished from γένος, and
διαφορὰν ἔχει means not so much ‘its differentia is considerable’ as
‘it is a very different sort of thing’: a looseness that explains the
absence of the article and the use of πολλήν instead of μεγάλην. The
argument that follows is that people in general have refused com-
munity of name to the various forms of φρόνησις simply because these
forms are so very different.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 193

11428 9.
, » ” N
καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι TO αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ

πολιτείας.

It might appear that this is a statement of altruistic doctrine; but
it is not. It is not a denial of the view that enlightened self-seeking
is the best spirit in which a man can go about seeking good. What
it does say is that the self-seeking which takes the form of isolation
of interests and life is not enlightened self-seeking. This is quite an
adequate argument in this place. The popular view stated a few
lines before is not attacking altruism, which it certainly could not
even conceive as a rule of life: it is attacking the view that the
individual gains most good for himself by devoting himself to the
public service and to family life: a view that Aristotle, on the other
hand, maintains, not perhaps without some confused perception of
the higher altruism, but certainly without any clear statement of it
here.

1142 a Io.

” ἂν τῳ Ἐς ὧς a a a” \ L
ετι δὲ TA αὐτου TWS δεῖ διοικεῖν ἄδηλον και σκεπτεον.

There are two main views to be taken of the meaning of σκεπτέον.
It may refer to the investigation
(a) of the author and his readers (so Stewart, Burnet, and
perhaps Ramsauer) :
(ὁ) of the would-be φρόνιμος (so Heliodorus, Eustratius, Grant,
Welldon, Peters).

Of (a) Stewart remarks that ‘it would be more in accordance with
Aristotelian usage than (4),’ but he can give no reference to any
subsequent discussion of the question τὰ αὐτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, and
Burnet’s reference to the end of Book x does not convince even
himself. The question is certainly not discussed any further in this
book, and Aristotelian usage would demand some word like ὕστερον
if the discussion referred to were to be delayed for some time. Also
the introductory words ἔτι δέ do not suit this meaning well.

There remains (4). This admits again of two lines of argument.
(A) Heliodorus and Eustratius agree that the argument is that the
σκέψις of the would-be φρόνιμος implies ἐμπειρία, and ἐμπειρία implies
κοινωνία ἢ οἰκονομικὴ ἢ πολιτική, 50 that the knowledge of τὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ
ἑνὸς ἀγαθόν is in practice unattainable unless a man takes part in
social life and activities. (B) Grant’s argument is: If φρόνησις were

G. 13

194 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

pure selfishness, it would be such a simple matter that boys would
grasp it at once. But boys do not grasp it at once (11424 13):
plainly therefore other than selfish considerations enter into it.

Both of these views make ἔτι δὲ... σκεπτέον a second proof of the
position ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν 7 φρόνησις μάλιστα ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα. Both
connect ἔτι 8%...cxerréov with what follows by taking τοῦ εἰρημένου to
refer to ἔτι δὲ... σκεπτέον and not to 1141 Ὁ 14 οὐδ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις
τῶν καθόλου μόνον ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν. Both are
open to material objections. (A) ἐμπειρία is in the following passage
said to be due not to any sort of κοινωνία but to πλῆθος χρόνου : and
at the beginning of the Metaphysics it is said to be gradually pro-
duced from the accumulations of memory. (B) The view that
φρόνησις is pure selfishness does not imply that the knowledge of
how to attain purely selfish ends is easy to acquire.

I think that ἔτι δὲ... σκεπτέον is not a second reason, parallel with
καίτοι ἴσως... «πολιτείας, for considering pure selfishness an unintelligent
state of mind: but that it simply introduces some further facts about
φρόνησις, in order to make the survey of the subject as complete as
possible—this general rather than particular relevancy marks all the
rest of chapter viii. In this view σημεῖον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου, xrd., 15
closely connected with ἔτι δὲ... σκεπτέον, to which τοῦ εἰρημένου refers.
But ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον does not in this view imply that social life is
therefore necessary, but only that time is necessary for experience to
grow. Also τὰ αὐτοῦ is not. contrasted with ra τῶν ἄλλων, but τὰ
αὑτοῦ mas δεῖ διοικεῖν is simply the general expression for the know-
ledge given by ad/ φρόνησις. It may be thought an objection to this
view that it makes Aristotle use τὰ αὐτοῦ in the general sense of ‘the
good for man’ immediately after using it in the special sense of
‘one’s own individual good.’ But it must be remembered that the
function of φρόνησις was originally defined as τὸ καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι
περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα : so that the general sense is at
least quite natural in itself.

If there has been any mis-arranging of the text of this chapter by
ancient editors, which many modern commentators suppose -has
happened, the occurrence of the two phrases τὸ αὐτοῦ and τὰ αὐτοῦ
has probably caused the two sentences containing them to be
wrongly placed next each other.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 195

Ι142 8 20.
ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ
τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον: ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα
ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον.

What is the connection of this passage with the,rest ?

I cannot think (with Eustratius Heliodorus and Stewart) that ‘it is
meant as a further proof of the statement 1142 ἃ 9 οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτοῦ
εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ πολιτείας. Stewart says ‘The universal,
πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, is parallel to the knowledge of the
social good: the particular, rodi βαρύσταθμον, to the knowledge of
one’s own good.’ But to be really parallel the propositions ought to
be πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα (or τοδὶ τὸ βαρύσταθμον) πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις
φαῦλα, and πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα (or τοδὶ τὸ βαρύσταθμον) ἐμοὶ φαῦλα.
In the form in which they occur here the universal and the particular
offer only the most shadowy resemblance to the knowledge of the
general good and one’s own good respectively.

It is much more likely that this section is meant as a proof of
I142a 10 τὰ αὐτοῦ was δεῖ διοικεῖν ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον. In that case
the emphasis will be on περὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον rather than on περὶ TO
καθόλου. Translate: ‘Error in deliberation may occur not only
about general principles but also about particular facts.’ The medical
illustration fits this meaning well enough. It is important to notice
that the illustration is not an example of the working of φρόνησις in
the strict sense, any more than was the example about poultry as
digestible food in 1141 b 18—21: they are both examples of φρόνησις
κατὰ μέρος. .

It is quite possible that this section is not directly connected with
the preceding argument at all, but is only meant to make still clearer
the nature of φρόνησις. There is some emphasis on ἁμαρτία. Neither
the general nor the particular judgments involved in an act of
φρόνησις are in any way infallible, and the possibility of two distinct
kinds of error in ethical judgments is a clear sign of the complex
nature of φρόνησις.

11428 24.

τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

τοῦ ἐσχάτου is here equivalent to τοῦ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, as Ramsauer
and Stewart agree. Burnet, however, is wrong in supposing, as he
plainly does, that ἔσχατον here means ‘last in order of analysis.’ For
it must have the same meaning here as in line 26, and in line 26 it

13—2

196 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

must mean the particular judgment that forms the minor premiss of
the practical syllogism. Therefore in this line 24 also τοῦ ἐσχάτου
refers to the minor premiss and not to the conclusion. But it is the
conclusion and not the minor premiss that comes last in the order of
deliberative analysis. Therefore ἔσχατον does not here mean ‘last in
order of analysis, but simply ‘particular’: though it is no doubt true
that ἔσχατον gets the meaning of ‘particular,’ which it has here, from
its other meaning of ‘last in order of analysis,’ which it actually has
for instance in 1141 Ὁ 28.

τὸ yap πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον is to be explained as follows. It means
‘an action is always particular.’ It is the conclusion, and not the
minor premiss, that states the πρακτόν. The conclusion is therefore
a particular proposition. Now the major premiss is of course a
universal proposition: and a particular conclusion cannot be drawn
from two universal premisses: therefore the minor premiss is a par-
ticular proposition. This shows that the statement τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου
ἐστίν, explained as I explain it above, is not only consistent with the
statement τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον, but is explained by it, as the γάρ
shows it should be. It is true the explanation is less direct than if
τοῦ ἐσχάτου could refer to the conclusion instead of to the minor
premiss: but it is not less sound and plain: and I have already
shown why τοῦ ἐσχάτου must refer to the minor premiss and not’ to
the conclusion. ;

ὥσπερ εἴρηται refers to 1141 15 δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν,
where φρόνησις is spoken of, and not to 1141 b 27 τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα
πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον, where it is not φρόνησις that is spoken of, but
the particular form of φρόνησις that is called πολιτική in the narrow
sense. I note this fact because I have already argued that at
1141 Ὁ 27 ἔσχατον means ‘last in order of analysis,’ and the ψήφισμα
refers to the conclusion and not to the minor premiss: and it is well
to observe that, since that passage is not referred to by the words
ὥσπερ εἴρηται, it cannot support Professor Burnet’s view of the mean-
ing of 11424 24.

11428 25.
ἀντικεῖται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ... 30 ἐκείνης δ᾽ ἄλλο εἶδος.
These lines are probably the hardest to explain in the whole book.
They are quite full of equivocal terms, and the reading is uncertain -

in one important point at least. I have followed Bywater in reading
ἢ in line 30, but not in bracketing ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 197

dvrixeirax is a word of vague meaning. It is best translated by
‘corresponds’: not by ‘is opposed,’ for the relation said to exist
between φρόνησις and νοῦς is a likeness and not a difference. The
likeness consists in the apprehending by each of its proper facts
directly, without syllogistic reasoning (λόγος) of any kind.

νοῦς has, undoubtedly, exactly the same meaning as in chapters
vi and vii.

ὅρων may not itself mean ‘propositions.’ But if this passage—
6 νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι Aéyos—is compared with chapter vi, and
especially with 1141a 7 λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, it is evident
that νοῦς is said to be concerned with the ὅροι (even if they are
‘terms’ and not ‘ propositions’) as combining them into propositions,
such namely as become the ἀρχαί or premisses of scientific syllogisms.
Aristotle is not here thinking simply of isolated concepts of which
there is no λόγος because they involve no proposition of any kind.
He is thinking of the ‘axioms,’ undemonstrable propositions made
by induction from particular facts that are apprehended by sense-
perception.

The minor premiss in the practical syllogism is apprehended by
some kind of αἴσθησις : whereas no kind of αἴσθησις apprehends the
conclusion. Therefore rod ἐσχάτου must refer to the minor premiss
and not to the conclusion. It may seem an objection to this view
that the ὅροι ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, as has been admitted, compose the
conclusions or final results at which νοῦς aims and arrives. Ought
not therefore τὸ ἔσχατον, in the antithesis, to mean the conclusions or
final results at which φρόνησις aims and arrives? Not necessarily:
the antithesis need not be carried out in this detail. In any case
the inductive work of νοῦς is quite different from the syllogistic work
of φρόνησις. There is no reason why part of the work of φρόνησις

should not be said to correspond to the whole of the work of νοῦς in
virtue of the common characteristic, direct apprehension as opposed
to syllogistic reasoning: and this is in fact all that constitutes the
antithesis.

στήσεται yap κἀκεῖ. Mathematics are one branch of σοφία, and
νοῦς therefore is concerned with them. It thus makes no practical
difference whether κἀκεῖ refers to (2) φρόνησις as distinguished from
mathematics—or vice versa, or to (4) νοῦς generally as distinguished
from pévyows—or vice versa.

Two lines of explanation of ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον
τρίγωνον have been suggested. (a) In analysing a geometrical figure

198 MISCELLANEOUS ‘NOTES

such as a polygon, by joining its angular points we can divide it into
various figures which have a smaller number of sides than it has itself.
But no rectilinear figure can have less than three sides, and therefore
the analysis of the figure can be carried no further than its division into
triangles. It cannot be proved, but must be directly perceived, that
the triangle zs the simplest possible rectilinear figure, and so the last
in order (ἔσχατον) that analysis into simpler figures can produce. So
in a problem of conduct we eventually reach simple facts that contain
no general principle to be analysed into simpler facts, but can only
be apprehended as true in themselves. In both the geometrical and the
ethical processes, analysis stops at a certain point. (6) In working
out a geometrical problem with a diagram it is necessary that the
senses should perceive the nature of the figures that are drawn, for
example, on the blackboard before them. If for instance a triangle
is the subject of the problem, it must be seen that the figure in the
diagram 7s a triangle before anything can be shown about it; and if
sense-perception does not convince the observer that the figure in
the diagram zs a triangle, no proof of the fact can be given. The
same is true, of course, of a diagram mentally conceived. So too
in a problem of conduct, no deliberation can help the apprehension
of the particular concrete facts that go to make up the circumstances
under which conduct is to take place. These concrete facts must be
apprehended by sense-perception.

Of these two explanations the latter seems to me the better, for
the following reason. The predicate in ὅτι τὸ ἔσχατον τρίγωνον is not
ἔσχατον but τρίγωνον : the thing perceived by the αἴσθησις in question
is not ultimateness but triangularity. According to the former
explanation, however, it is ultimateness that is perceived. -It is far
more natural to suppose (as Professor Stewart does) that ἔσχατον
simply means ‘the particular figure in the diagram,’ so that any other
word such as κύκλος might be substituted for τρίγωνον without chang-
ing the essence of the argument. This result Professor Stewart
unfortunately goes on to spoil in his note: for he confuses the minor
premiss of the practical syllogism with the conclusion. He says that
the φρόνιμος (meaning the φρόνιμος as such) directly perceives things
as good or bad in the same way as the geometer perceives things to
be triangular or circular. He thereby adds goodness and badness to
the qualities, such as size, number, motion, shape, that can be
perceived by the κοινὴ αἴσθησις. He thus does away at once with
the whole principle of the practical syllogism, for he ascribes to direct

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 199

perception what is as a matter of fact the conclusion of reasoning.
This is the result of taking τοῦ ἐσχάτου in line 26 to refer to the
conclusion of the practical syllogism and not to the minor premiss.
He is led in his next paragraph to entertain the notion that τοῦ
ἐσχάτου may have some reference to ‘the last step in ζήτησις, since
that is the conclusion of the practical syllogism and not the minor
premiss. But this is to lose the whole point of the analogy of φρόνησις
with νοῦς, which is that certain facts are reached by both directly,
without any kind of reasoning : whereas ‘the last step in ζήτησις, the
conclusion of the practical syllogism, is the result of reasoning.

I hold then that ὅτι τὸ ἔσχατον τρίγωνον means ‘that the particular
figure in the diagram is a triangle,’ and that statements of this sort
are regarded as forming minor premisses of practical syllogisms.
But why, it may be asked, if this be the case, should not 7 τῶν ἰδίων
αἴσθησις apprehend τὸ ἔσχατον ᾽ῥΡ΄ Consider for instance such a prac-
tical syllogism as

It is wrong to give people nasty food:
But this food is nasty :
Therefore I ought not to give you this food.

Here the minor premiss ‘This food is nasty’ is a proposition that
may, it would seem, depend directly upon the sense of smell and
that only, or upon the sense of taste and that only: so that 9 τῶν
ἰδίων αἴσθησις does here, it seems, apprehend the minor premiss.
The best way out of the difficulty is this. All that the ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις
entitle a man to do is to say ‘I have a sensation of nastiness’ or the
like: they do not entitle him to go on to make a judgment about the
cause of the sensation. But the minor premiss of the practical
syllogism must be a judgment about the cause of the sensation, as in
the example above, ‘This food is nasty.’ Such a judgment involves
κοινὴ αἴσθησις. This view is justified by the mathematical parallel
οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα κτλ. For, as Professor Stewart points out, σχῆμα 15
a ‘common sensible’; and it is the perception of σχῆμα that leads to
the judgment ὅτι τὸ ἔσχατον τρίγωνον.

Finally there is the sentence ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις,
ἐκείνης δ᾽ ἄλλο εἶδος. αὕτη I take to refer to the common sensation
faculty that apprehends particulars and supplies minor premisses, not
only in mathematics but also in the sphere of φρόνησις. ἐκείνης,
I agree with Professor Stewart, means τῆς τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθήσεως : the δέ
is concessive. ἐκείνης ἄλλο εἶδος means not ‘another species belong-
ing to that genus’ (26. to αἴσθησις), but ‘a species different from that

200 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

species’ (16. from αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων) : the γένος is αἴσθησις, the two
εἴδη here distinguished are αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων and κοινὴ αἴσθησις.
Professor Stewart is surely wrong in saying that the distinction
in αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις is between the sense operative
in mathematical ζήτησις and the sense operative in ethical ζήτησις.
The distinction is between φρόνησις itself, which states the whole
syllogism and draws the conclusion, and the αἴσθησις that enables
φρόνησις to state the minor premiss: an αἴσθησις precisely the
same in kind as that operative in mathematics, but different (as
that operative in mathematics is different) from 7 τῶν ἰδίων αἴσθησις,
and also different from φρόνησις itself. It would be absurd to say of
the αἴσθησις operative in mathematics that it was μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ
φρόνησις, for it is clearly in no possible way φρόνησις at all. But the -
αἴσθησις operative in ethical ζήτησις has a prima facie claim (gua so
operative) to be called φρόνησις : and Aristotle thinks that there is
a danger of this claim’s being wrongly regarded as valid owing to his
having said 7 φρόνησις τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν. It is therefore worth his
while to point out that the αἴσθησις in φρόνησις is not the φρόνησις
itself, though perhaps in practice it cannot be completely distinguished
from φρόνησις except as part from whole. ΤῈ is in fact this αἴσθησις
that is called νοῦς in 1143 Ὁ 5, νοῦς πρακτικός as distinguished from
νοῦς ὃ κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις or θεωρητικός (1143 Ὁ 1): though νοῦς
πρακτικός includes more than this αἴσθησις.

1142 Ὁ 16.
διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα πρῶτον.

No ζήτησις occurs in the text. But the words need not therefore
be thought an interpolation with Ramsauer, nor need it be supposed
with Burnet that the lecturer trusts to memory to fill in the usual
facts about βούλευσις. ‘Since the notion of εὐβουλία is a complex
one, the notion of ὀρθότης together with the notion of βουλή, the two
ingredient notions must be understood first. Now the notion of
ὀρθότης here clearly depends on the notion of βουλή. But it is
already known from previous discussion .what the notion of βουλή is.
Bearing this in mind, we may at once go on to determine the mean-
ing of ὀρθότης." ;

1142b 18.
ὁ yap ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὃ φαῦλος ὃ προτίθεται ἰδεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ

τεύξεται.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 201

Surely ἰδεῖν may be taken in the sense of λαβεῖν, μαθεῖν, εὑρεῖν,
and will thus give a quite satisfactory meaning? (See Bonitz, Index
Sv. 520b 20—33.) I have translated ‘will reach through his
calculation the conclusion which it lies before him to ‘discover.’
Dr Jackson’s quotation from Plato (sophist 221 a) ὅπερ ἄρτι προὐθέμεθα
δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν is not an exact parallel to προτίθεται δεῖν here, if δεῖν be
read for ἰδεῖν, since here there is in that case nothing to correspond
to ἐξευρεῖν : besides which the meaning ‘which is put forward as being

necessary’ is less forcible here than ‘which it lies before him to
discover.’

1143 8 Io.
a 8 Ν a XN 2 , XN x Ἂς 3 Ca
TQAUTOV yap συνεσις και ευὐσυνεσια και OVVETOL και EVOUVVETOL.

All that this means is, The word σύνεσις used just now (line 9)
means just the same as the word etovveocia—the adjectives have also
identical meanings—and so no separate discussion of εὐσυνεσία is
needed, but whatever statements are made about σύνεσις apply equally
to εὐσυνεσία. The sentence is a mere footnote, and the γάρ does not
connect it with the previous sentence, with which it has indeed no
special connection. The identity here stated is practically illustrated
by line 16—17 7 σύνεσις καθ᾽ ἣν εὐσύνετοι, where the adjective of one
pair corresponds to the noun of the other. The great attention paid
to the prefix εὖ in discussing εὐβουλία probably suggests the explana-
tion here. The compound forms are far rarer than the simple ones,
but are useful as emphasizing the virtuous nature of σύνεσις.

1143 a 12.
σ Ν , ,ὔ = μ᾿ al a > td
ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται TH ἐπιστήμῃ»
Ὁ 2 a κ᾿ a 4 2 NX A - , \ 2
οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν

ἢ φρόνησίς ἐστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς.

This passage has I believe been generally misunderstood. Ram-
sauer expands it as follows: ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι
ὅταν χρῆταί τις τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἄλλου
λέγοντος, οὕτω καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ
ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἄλλου λέγοντος. I propose the
following instead: ὥσπερ ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ περὶ ὧν ἡ σοφία
ἐστίν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, τὸ μανθάνειν καλώς λέγεται συνιέναι" οὕτως ἐν τῷ
χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἄλλου λέγοντος τὸ κρίνειν
καλῶς λέγεται συνιέναι.

202 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

The following points have hitherto been overlooked : (2) μανθάνειν
is appropriate only to the use of ἐπιστήμη and not to the use of δόξα.
This is proved by line τό ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε ones ἢ σύνεσις, καθ᾽ ἣν
εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειυ" λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι
πολλάκις. That is, the use of σύνεσις to mean ‘practical intelligence’
has come from its use to mean ‘scientific intelligence.’ If μανθάνειν
is understood (as Ramsauer would have it) in the δόξα part of the
antithesis, surely ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε κτλ. becomes unintelligible. (4) τὸ
κρίνειν in the second part of the antithesis is opposed to τὸ μανθάνειν
in the first. The formal expression is loose, but quite natural to
a writer who is careless of formal precision as long as he thinks the
sense clear: I have avoided the looseness by a slight paraphrase in
my expansion. (c) ἐπιστήμη and δόξα are here used in the sense not
of ‘the contents of knowledge’ and ‘the contents of opinion’ but of
‘the faculty of knowledge’ and ‘the faculty of opinion’: χρῆται τῇ
ἐπιστήμῃ = χρῆται TS ἐπιστημονικῷ and not χρῆται τῷ ἐπιστητῷ, χρῆσθαι
τῇ δόξῃ = χρῆσθαι τῷ δοξαστικῷ and not χρῆσθαι τῷ δοξαστῷς Coraes
and Stewart think otherwise—see Stewart's notes. (4) The emphasis
is not on χρῆται and χρῆσθαι but on ἐπιστήμῃ and δόξῃ, in spite of
the order. The usual Greek rule of putting emphatic words at the
beginning of a sentence or phrase is not regularly observed by
Aristotle as it is by Plato. To take an instance close at hand, in
1142 Ὁ 16 ἀλλ᾽ ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς the context shows
the emphasis to be not on ὀρθότης but on βουλῆς---ὈΡ]αῖο would have
written ἀλλὰ βουλῆς ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία or the like. (6) The
two meanings of μανθάνειν that the editors quote may be borne in
mind here: but whereas one of these two meanings of μανθάνειν
admits συνιέναι as a synonym of μανθάνειν, while the other does not,
the point is that συνιέναι can also be used in a sense in which it is
not a synonym of pavédvew.—The passage may be paraphrased as
follows: ‘Learning is often called ‘ understanding,” when a man
uses his faculty of scientific knowledge (which is the faculty always
used in “learning”) to grasp what another teaches him about
necessary truth: and when a man uses his faculty of discriminating
judgment to grasp what another teaches him about practical contin-
gent truth, that exercise of the judgment is by analogy called under-
standing, if it is of the right kind. The name understanding, in this
latter sense, has been diverted from its use as the name of excellence
in “learning” necessary truth from another’s teaching, as may be
seen from the fact that we still (perhaps somewhat improperly now

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 203,

the later use is established) often give the name of “ understanding ”
to this excellence in “learning” necessary truth.’

1143 a 19.

Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ᾽ ἣν συγγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν φαμὲν
γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή.

This section is a remarkable instance of confusion caused by the
view that etymological connection between words must carry with it
kinship of meaning. γνώμη is taken as the common element in
συγγνώμη and γνώμην ἔχειν, which in ordinary language represent two
completely different notions; the meaning of γνώμη is arbitrarily fixed as
about half-way between the meanings of συγγνώμη and γνώμη in γνώμην
ἔχειν : a vague attempt is made to reconcile the two meanings, and
συγγνώμη is forced, by mere unproved assertion, into being a synonym
of γνώμη. As a matter of fact συγγνώμη represents the notions of
‘ forgiveness,’ ‘ making allowances,’ ‘fair kindness,’ and the like: the
moral element in it, as in ἐπιείκεια, is essential. γνώμη on the other
hand has properly no moral significance. γνώμην ἔχειν can mean two
things: (a) ‘to have an opinion’ whether a true or a false one ; (4) ‘to
have a true opinion,’ ‘to be right’ intellectually, ‘avoir raison.’ The
latter meaning, where γνώμηςτε ὀρθὴ or ἀληθὴς γνώμη, is chosen here to
the exclusion of the former. Professor Burnet would, I believe, find
it hard to justify his statement that in actual speech γνώμη had
a sense corresponding to that of our ‘feeling.’ Stewart’s paraphrase
(Notes ii. 89) shows well how the author attempts to unify the two
different notions of συγγνώμη and γνώμη: but no hint is given by
him or any one else of what I believe to be the true explanation, that
the whole attempt is the result of etymological confusion.

1143 a 32.
ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά-
καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ 4
γνώμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἔσχατα.

As the argument stands it is absurd on the face of it, for ταῦτα δ᾽
ἔσχατα assumes the very point to be proved. Some improvement
may be effected by bracketing τὰ mpaxra after ἅπαντα in line 33, as
Ramsauer does. ἅπαντα will then mean ‘all the subject-matter of
these ἕξεις᾽ : and the argument will be :---φρόνησις is concerned with
ἔσχατα (this was stated 1141b 15, 11424 24): also σύνεσις and
γνώμη are concerned with πρακτά, and mpaxra are ἔσχατα (1142 a 25

204 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

τὸ yap πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον, sc. ἔσχατον), and therefore σύνεσις and γνώμη
also are concerned with ἔσχατα. The chief objection to this view is
that αὐτά after δεῖ γινώσκειν in line 34 will have to refer not to ἅπαντα
but to τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων, and this the structure of the
sentence ‘is distinctly against. The sense is not much mended by
the alternative course of putting a colon or a full stop after γινώσκειν
αὐτά. This makes τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά the only reason
given in support of the statement that all πρακτά are ἔσχατα. But it
is obviously a very bad reason.

1143 Ὁ 21.
n μὲν φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ Kai ἀγαθὰ

᾿ Ν ,
ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα. δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν.

Grant points out that we are told here for the first time that
φρόνησις takes cognizance of the δίκαιον and the καλόν: before, it was
only said to be concerned with the ἀγαθὸν καὶ συμφέρον. It is easier
to see why the fresh statement is introduced here than to allow that
Aristotle is justified in introducing it without proving it. The object
is to bring together the two different meanings of ἀγαθός contained in
1143b 22 ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ, and Ὁ 23 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρός. Formally,
indeed, the argument would stand if the words δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ
were left out: for it is obvious that rod ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρός ἐστι τὸ τὰ ἀγαθὰ
ἀνθρώπῳ πράττειν, provided that ἀγαθός means the same thing each
time it is used. But as a matter of fact τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ suggests
self-interest as opposed to moral goodness, while 6 ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ sug-
gests moral goodness as opposed to self-interest. The notions of
δίκαιος and καλός are therefore contained in the words ὃ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ,
but not in the words τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ. It ought to be proved that
according to the true view of life self-interest and moral goodness
coincide so that ἀγαθός really does mean the same thing in each
phrase. Aristotle appears to shirk this proof, and simply to assume
its conclusion by making δίκαια and καλά synonyms of ἀγαθὰ
ἀνθρώπῳ. The assumption is to a certain extent prepared for by the
taking of the φρόνιμος as the fixer of the mean in all kinds of moral
virtue (ws ἂν ὃ φρόνιμος dpiceev). It will readily be admitted that,
whether τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλά are the same as τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ or not,
φρόνησις is concerned with them, even if with other things as well.
The question for discussion is, How far, ga concerned with τὰ δίκαια
καὶ καλά, the possession of φρόνησις is any help to the performance of

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 205

δίκαιαι καὶ καλαὶ πράξεις. The ἀπορία is produced by the objector’s
contention that it is no help at all.

The words at 1144 11 τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν further emphasize
the illicit identification at 1143 Ὁ 22 of δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν with συμφέ-
pov, and confine the following discussion to that kind of πρᾶξις which
is distinctly connected with moral virtue. Other kinds of human
ἀγαθά, it may be supposed, are meant to be apprehended by φρόνησις
κατὰ μέρος of some sort, ὑγίεια, for example, by ἰατρική. φρόνησις
ὅλως which apprehends ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως, 15
limited to conduct that is liable to be influenced by pleasure or pain.

1143 b 30.
οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν.

It has not been noticed that strong support is given to the
reading ἔχουσιν here, as against the οὖσιν of Argyropylus, by 1144b 5
καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τἄλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ
γενετῆς.

11444 9.
~ 9s , Ε "
τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη,
τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ- οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν.

This passage must not be supposed to have too wide a reference.
ὑγίεια, the ἀρετὴ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ, is a part of 4 ὅλη ἀρετή, and as such
is what I have called a ‘component’ means to the end εὐδαιμονία :
this is stated above, 1144a 3—6. It is when the ἔργον of man
comes to be considered, the specifically human activity, that con-
sideration of τὸ θρεπτικόν and its ἀρετή ὑγίεια becomes out of place.
τοιαύτη means οἷᾳ ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὸ ἔργον. Health becomes degraded,
from this point of view, to the position of a mere external means or
prerequisite to happiness, on a level with friends and riches and so
on. The fact is, Aristotle thinks, worth pointing out after the state-
ment of 1144a 3—6, which would otherwise be likely to mislead.

1144.4 27.

x ‘ ‘ y \ . [ἢ 7 x >
διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι.

Much the best sense will be got by transposing δεινοὺς and
φρονίμους. The use of the first person in φαμέν surely points to an
opinion with which the writer does not wholly disagree: but the
view that ‘the φρόνιμος may be called πανοῦργος (which is the view
conveyed by the text as it stands) is the direct negation of the

206 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

distinction just made, which it cannot therefore be introduced to
illustrate. To understand, or to supply in the text, rovs before
πανούργους is hard if not impossible: and in any case the best sense
is got by making δεινούς subject rather than φρονίμους καὶ πανούργους:
‘we say that clever persons are ‘prudent’ or ‘rascally’ as the case
may be’ rather than ‘we say that pradent persons are ‘clever,’ and
also that ras¢ally persons are ‘clever’.’ Rassow’s defence of the text
will hardly stand: it amounts to showing that φρόνιμος has sometimes
a slightly bad meaning, and πανοῦργος sometimes a slightly good one.
But this is irrelevant in face of the distinction just laid down, ἀν μὲν
οὖν ὃ σκοπὸς ἦ καλὸς, ἐπαινετή ἐστιν (sc. ἡ δεινότης), ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλος,
πανουργία: which distinction, as the word διό shows, is regarded as
the reason for the usage of words stated in the following sentence.

1144 Ὁ 13.

eg ag « ΄ > roy δ > δὰ
n ὃ ἕξις ομοια οὐσα TOT ἐσται KUPLWS APETY.

Burnet says “ὁμοία οὖσα, 1.6. τῷ ὄψιν ἢ νοῦν λαβόντι." This
seems to mean “like the person who acquires sight or reason,” which
is surely impossible. ὁμοία οὖσα means “κα what it was before.”
The moral quality remains in itself unchanged ; by combination with
φρόνησις it produces a better whole, and therefore has a new name
given to it; but in itself it no more changes than bodily strength
changes in a man when he recovers or acquires the power of sight.

1144 Ὁ 32.
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ᾽ ἄν, ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις ἂν ὅτι

χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί.

With what object should anyone advance the statement that the
various moral virtues are independent of each other?

1. It cannot be an objection to the theory just laid down of the
relation of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή and φρόνησις, for that theory is itself the
means of refuting this statement, as the word ταύτῃ shows.

2. I do not think Professor Stewart’s view can be right, that the
object is ‘to make a casuistical interpretation of duty possible, by
showing that there may be a conflict of duties in any given case’:
for the uneven development of virtuous tendencies does not make
conflict between them more likely—the more developed virtues there
are present, the greater the possibility of conflict between them.

3. It is possible that the statement is an objection to the way in

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 207

which, in this and in the previous chapters, ἠθικὴ ἀρετή has been
spoken of as a connected whole.

4. It seems most likely to me that the statement is a mere
observation about what seems to be a curious fact demanding
explanation: the answer consists not in explaining the statement as
a fact, but in challenging its truth.

The independence of the virtues is simply what is noticed in
line 34. οὐ γὰρ ὃ αὐτὸς εὐφυέστατος πρὸς ἁπάσας, ὥστε THY μὲν ἤδη τὴν
δὲ οὕπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται. The different virtuous tendencies are not
possessed by all people in the same proportion: and for this reason;
it is argued, a man may have acquired one virtue, and yet not have
acquired another. The answer is that in so far as any person is in a
state of uneven moral development he has not acquired any true
virtue at all. True virtue can only be produced in the man who
Possesses practical wisdom, and on the other hand in such a man it
cannot but be produced. Practical wisdom shows what goes to
make up the life of happiness, and leaves no virtue out of account:
the great complex μεσότης that is ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή is necessarily com-
pounded of all particular μεσότητες. Nor does this view regard only
the unattainable ideal of goodness. φρόνησις and the various moral
virtues may be present only in what may be called a quantitatively
small amount, but if the equilibrium is maintained, there are present
true φρόνησις and true moral virtue so far as they go. But a man
may have certain virtuous tendencies that are very strong indeed,
and yet he may be without real virtue altogether. In so far as a
man has practical wisdom to tell him what the means to the end are,
component means as well as external, his virtuous tendencies will
develop with that even balance which will best lead to the attainment
of the end—the great final end εὐδαιμονία or Happiness.

ENGLISH INDEX

Academic school 138

— psychology 139

altruistic doctrine 193

‘Analytics’ 27, 30, 31,132, 152, 160, 192

Anaxagoras 16, 83, 150, 153

‘architectonic’ 62

arguments, instances of badly stated,
164, 184

Argyropylus 205

arrangement of buok vi. 38

Asclepius 6

authorship of book vi. 1-20

Bonitz 33, 129

bracketed passages 176, 189, 190, 200,
203

Burnet, Professor, z, 5, 8, 10, 27, 32,
33, 127-144 passim, 154, 160, 163,
167-207 passim

changes in use of words 12

‘cheirotechnic’ 62

circular argument 55, 157

connection of thought 170

consistency of opening paragraphs of
book vi. 170

‘contingent’ dist. ‘necessary’ 39

Coraes 202

‘Cratylus’ 158

definition, exaggerated carefulness of,
155
— of intellectual goodness 173
developments of doctrine 12, 13
dialectic
— method in Aristotle 11
— inductions and deductions 31
— method in book vi. 127-144
— as a mental gymnastic 127-128
— as reasoning from probable pre-
misses 128-129
— as a means of obtaining probable
premisses 129
— form dist. spirit 136
relation between the different kinds
of dialectic 130 foll.
didactic method of Eudemus 11
Diels 138

G.

Empedocles 140

end, the chief, 25, 46

eristic 131, 137

etymology a cause of confusion in
argument 158, 203

Eudemus 1-20, 153

Eustratius 163, 167, 193, 195

exhaustion, proof by, 23, 29

fanaticism 56
Fischer 1-2
formal inaccuracy 14, 67, 145-166
gas for its existence in Aristotle
I
Aristotle first consciously aimed at
accuracy 145-146
Fritzsche 1-5, 6, II

Grant, Sir Alexander, 2, 5-16, 31,
168-207 passim

‘Great Ethics’ 19, 69

Grote 132, [37

happiness (see also εὐδαιμονία)
relation of intellectual goodness to
73-85
harmony of λόγος and ὄρεξις in προαίρεσις

175
Heliodorus 193, 195
‘Historia Animalium’ 192

imperative mood, dialectical use of, 140

incompleteness, cases of, 163

independence of the moral virtues 206

induction (see also ἐπαγωγή) 29, 70,
151, 179

‘infallibility’ of the virtues 156, 179

— of νοῦς 157, 179

intellectual goodness not useless 137

intuitionalist, Aristotle an, 135

Tsocrates 133

Jackson, Dr Henry, 5, 7, 16, 201

language as a guide to truth 64
lecture notes 145

‘like is known by like’ 40, 139
looseness of expression 162

14

210

mathematics 18, 24, 36, 37, 76
mean, the moral, (see also μέσον, μεσό-
Ts) 170
means to an end, ‘component’ dist.
‘external’ 47, 79-80
— to the end happiness 44
medical illustrations 14, 45-46, 169
metaphors, dead, 13
metaphysics 24, 39
-- oe in book vi. 134, 154,
I
siete pbysieal sense of λόγος 154, 167
‘Metaphysics’ 6, το, 27, 29, 30, 32,
34, 36, 76, 77) 144, 152, £79
‘Meteorology’ 192
moral goodness 21-85 passim
as an end 45
how related to practical wisdom
48 foll.
not knowledge 137
not merely κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον 137
‘Motions of Animals’ 10, 42-43, 67
Munro 2, 4

names: new names for things in the
‘Ethics’ 148

‘necessary’ dist. ‘contingent’ 39

non-practical contemplation of the con-
tingent 155, 172

order of words and arguments 160
— — in Aristotelian Greek 202

Parmenides 150
‘Parmenides’ 166
particular actions 44 foll.
‘Parts of Animals’ 30, 67
parts of the soul 139
Pericles 83
Peters 167
philosophers, the opinions of other, as
the ground of Aristotle’s ethical
doctrines, 134
‘Physics’ 24, 30, 36
Plato 17, 18, 52, 132, 143, 148, 150,
158, 166
— careless of formal accuracy 147
Platonic doctrine in vi. 139
— — of the contingent 25
Platonic usage of words 22, 150
popular Platonism 133
politics not a higher study than science

137
‘Politics’ 61, 133, 171, 177, 192
popular uses of words 143, 184
i a uses of φρόνησις and πολιτική
I
— — dist. philosophic uses 64
popular terms adopted by Aristotle in
a special sense 149

ENGLISH INDEX

popular opinions as a ground of ethical
doctrine 134

‘Posterior Analytics’ 14, 27, 136, 150,
179, 180

practical wisdom, see φρόνησις

practical syllogism 9, 50, 54

‘Prior Analytics’ 27

Prodicus and ὀρθοέπεια 146

Protagoras 150

‘Protagoras’ 146

psychology 10, 26, 39

neglected in vi. 134

‘Psychology’ 9, 32, 34) 139) 140) 157
161, 171, 174

punctuation 173, 180, 188

Ramsauer 163, 167-207 passim

— on the opening paragraphs of vi.
170

Rassow 170, 185, 190, 206

re-arrangement of the. text 165, 174,
185

‘reason’ as the meaning of λόγος 167

references in vii. to vi. 4

repeated definitions 155

‘Republic’ 139, 171

‘Rhetoric’ 171

selfish prudence not the highest. kind of
φρόνησις 137

Socrates 49, 129, 150

— and induction 29

‘— and accuracy in the use of words
147

sophistic 131, 137

‘Sophistic Fallacies’ 132

spurious passages 176

statesmanship, practical and theoretic,

137
Stewart, Professor, 2, 13, 27, 31, 48,
53, 140, 160, 163, 167-207 passim
stupidity 57 .
summum bonum 26, 45, 73785
syllogism 26 foll.

terminology 143

— Aristotle’s
popular 134

— his desire to improve 137

‘Topics’ 29, 30, 128, 132, 144, 152,
171, 192

readiness to adopt

universal propositions (see also καθόλου)
51

vagueness of expression 161
villainy (πανουργία) 56

Welldon 167

GREEK

ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ 46, 74, 204
ἀγχίνοια 60, 64, 72
ἀδιαίρετα 34, 144, 179
ἀθανατίζειν 82
αἴσθησις 70, 143, 174, 197
αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις 160
ἡ τῶν ἰδίων dist. ἡ κοινή 199
ἀκίνητοι πρῶτοι ὅροι 71
ἀκολασία 53
ἀκρασία 54
ἀκρίβεια 34
ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι 156
ἀλήθεια
and σύνεσις 68
the ἔργον of the intellect 74
ἀληθὲς μὲν οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές 14
ἄλλου λέγοντος 67, 69
ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι 195
ἄμεσοι προτάσεις 29, 33
ἀμφότερος: τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα

72
ἀνάγκη: τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης 23
ἀντικεῖται 107
ἀξίωμα 33
ἁπλῶς dist. πρός τι 65

— dist. κατὰ μέρος 67
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν as an Eudemian formula 2
ἀποδεικτικός 28 :
ἀπόδειξις dist. ἐπαγωγή 30
ἀπορία 133, 136
ἀποφάνσεις 33
ἀπόφασις 33
— and φυγή 41, 176
ἀποφάναι 179
ἀρετή, loose use of the word, 162
ἄριστον μέρος 76
ἀρχαί 31-33
— τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα 72, 142
ἀρχή as=‘ starting-point’ 180
ἀσύνθετα 34
αὐτόματον 24, 43
ἀχώριστα 36

βέλτιον μόριον 77
βίος: θεωρητικός dist. πολιτικός 77
— πολιτικός, a means to εὐδαιμονία 78

INDEX

βούλευσις 13, 43
βουλευτικόν 22, 155, 171
variations in Aristotle’s use of the
term 153

γένει, vague use of the term, 161

᾿γεωμητρικός dist. μαθηματικός 162

γνώμη 37, 60, 69
Aristotle’s restricted use of the word

149
etymological confusion regarding
159, 203
γνώμην ἔχειν 159
γυμναστική 128, 152

δεινός dist. φρόνιμος 205
δεινότης 55-58, 158, 173 -
δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἴδους ἄνεν τῆς ὕλης 26
διαλέγεσθαι τε σομινεγβαίίοη 129
διαλεκτική 127-144
διαλεκτικὸς λόγος 29
διανοητικὸν μέρος 69, 154
λογιστικόν Ξε διανοητικόν 171
διάνοια
variations in Aristotle’s use of the
term 153
the word used in a Platonic sense

144
dist. ἦθος 8
dist. νοῦς 14
=vois 40
αὐτή 77
θεωρητική and πρακτική 143
ἡ ἕνεκά τον καὶ πρακτική 38
οὐθὲν κινεῖ 14
διαφορά, meaning of, 191
δίκαια καὶ καλά 46, 204
δικαστική 154
διό 181
δόξα 140, 179
δοξαστικόν 23, 25, 143, 155, 171, 173
δύναμις dist. ἕξις 57
— =#is 162

ἐθισμός 51, 52, 70
εἴδη ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης 140

212 GREEK

εἶδος
loose use of the word 192
dist. ὕλη 154
as a meaning of λόγος 167
εἰδότες dist. ζητοῦντες 78 :
εἴρηται of what has zot been explicitly
said 164
els ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι 163
ἕκαστα: τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα 29 (see also
καθόλου)
ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν 22-26, 70, 150,
178
ἔνδοξα 120
ἐνέργεια dist. ἕξις 27, 36
ἔνστασις 133, τ36
ἔντευξις : πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις 128
ἔξις
dist. ἐνέργεια 27, 36
dist. δύναμις 57
σοφία ἐπιστήμη νοῦς 36
is εὐβουλία a ἕξις ἢ 65
ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι 138, 141
ἐπαγωγή 29 foll., 179, 180
— and ἐπιστήμη 15
— and practical νοῦς 51
ἐπιείκεια 69, 159
ἐπιμέλεια 152
ἐπιστήμη
Aristotle’s account of it 26-28
popular and philosophic uses of the
term 150
variation in Aristotle’s uses of the
term 152
dist. δόξα in Plato 143
περὶ τῶν καθόλου 187
dist. εὐβουλία 142, 165
dist. φρόνησις 164
dist. σύνεσις 68
ἐπιστημονικὸν 25, 40, 77
— μέρος 69, 153
ἐπιτακτικός 68, 69
ἐπίταξις and κρίσις 69
ἐπιτείνειν καὶ ἀνιέναι 170
ἔργον
τῶν διανοητικῶν μερῶν 173
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου 74
ἔστω 140
ἔσχατα
object of νοῦς 15, 71
ψήφισμα is ἔσχατον 63, 191
‘last in order of analysis’ 195
τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον 197
ἕτερος 181
τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως 34, 71
εὐβουλία 13, 37, 60, 64-67, 142
use of the term by Plato 150
argument from the etymology of
159
looseness of formula describing 162
why omitted at 1143 a 25? 163

INDEX

εὐγνωμοσύνη 69
εὐδαιμονία
defined in book α- 44
relation of διανοητικὴ ἀρετή to it
73-85
εὐήθεια 17
εὐπραξία 176
evoroxla 60, 72-73
εὐσυνεσία 201

ζητεῖν dist. βουλεύεσθαι 62
ζητοῦντες dist. εἰδότες 78

ἡδονή dist. φρόνησις and ἀρετή 16
ἠθικὴ ἀρετή and φρόνησις τό, 78
ἦθος dist. διάνοια 8

θεῖος 78

θεολογική 18, 36, 37, 76

θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν 18
θέσις 133

θεωρητικὴ ἀρετή dist. πρακτική 25
θεωρητικός 76, 77

θεωρία dist. πρᾶξις 18, 187

— 23

θιγεῖν 32, 34

θρεπτικόν 47, 205

ἰατρική 152
ἰδεῖν 201

καθόλου dist. καθ᾽ ἕκαστα 31, 32, 34, 445
62, 70, 180
καλοκαγαθία 15, 18
κατάφασις 33
— and δίωξις 41, 176
καταφάναι 179
ae significance of the metaphor,
168
κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα 34
κινέω: τὰ κινοῦντα τὸ ζῷον 67
κοινός: τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα 63
κρίσις 149
κριτικός 67, 69
κυρία ἀρετή 56, 158

λεγέσθω 140
λείπεται 23
λήθη and φρόνησις 157, 187
λογίζεσθαι 172
λογιστικόν 22, 40, 77, 137, 140, 143,
155, 171
— μέρος 37, 153
— use of the word by Plato 150
λόγος
variations in Aristotle’s use of the
term 154
metaphysical use of the term 134
dist. ἐπαγωγή 30
= ‘reasoning’ 55

GREEK
λόγος

ene of the word in chapter i.
107

— ἀληθής 39, 175

ὀρθὸς λόγος v. ὀρθός
λύσις 136

μαθηματική 18, 24, 86, 37, 76
μανθάνειν and συνιέναι 202
λέγομεν τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις
8

Μεγάλα Ἢθικά το, 69
μέσον in vi. 8
μεσότης 52

μετὰ λόγου 32, 163
— — ἀληθοῦς 43

νομοθεσία 190
νομοθετική 62, 152
νόμος 191
vous
Aristotle’s account of it 28-34
meanings of the word 69
the word used in four senses by
Aristotle 153, 179
popular and philosophic uses of the
term 150
practical νοῦς 34, 37, 51, 60, 69-72
θεωρητικός dist. πρακτικός 72
dist. ἐπιστήμη 26.
= διάνοια--:4,. 45
νοῦν" ἔχει» 70, 153
as a name for the best part of the
soul 76
definition of νοῦς dialectically obtain-
ed 141
νοῦς αἴσθησις ὄρεξις 174
in what sense infallible 179

οἰκονομική 37, 60, 185
φρόνησις περὶ οἰκίαν 41
ols=xad’ ἂς ἕξεις 35
ὅλη ἀρετή 15, 81
ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ 40, 139
ὁμοιότητες 28
ὄρεξις 14, 39, 50 [0]]., 55, 67, 174, 175
ὀρθοέπεια 146
ὀρθὸς λόγος 8, 21, 38, 74, 167, 169
— and σωφροσύνη 53
what it is 58, 154
various meanings of the phrase 150
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον dist. μετὰ τοῦ
ὀρθοῦ λόγου 150
ὁρισμός 33
ὅρος ; Σ
meaning of the word in Aristotle 32
— τῶν μεσοτήτων 74, 168 ᾿
the ὅρος whereby the φρόνιμος ὁρίζει 59
νοῦς is τῶν πρώτων ὅρων 71, 197
ὅρος as an Eudemian formula 2

INDEX 213

οὗ ἕνεκα 70-71
Οὐρανοῦ, περί, 177

παιδιά 75
πανουργία 17, 56, 176
πανοῦργος 205
περιέχειν 182
περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπόντες 161
πιστεύομεν 141
ποίησις 38
ποιητικὴ ἀρετή dist. πρακτική 26, 139
ποιητόν 23, 177
πολιτική 12, 45, 137
dist. φρόνησις 9
one kind of φρόνησις 62
φρόνησις περὶ πόλιν 41
Aristotle broadens the meaning of
the word 149, uses it in different
senses 152
‘cheirotechnic’ πολιτική 62, 152, 154
πολιτική οἰκονομία φρόνησις 9, 60-64,
185
parliamentary and judicial 154
prematurely mentioned 188
πρακτά 22, 69
σύνεσις is περὶ τὰ πρακτά 67
πρακτικὴ ἀρετή dist. ποιητική 26, 139
πρακτική as epithet of σύνεσις 68
πρᾶξις 22
a ποίησα 41~42, 43, 147, 154, 174,
182
absent from τὸ θρεπτικόν 47
πράττειν used loosely of an intellectual
act 162
προαίρεσις 40, 49, 55, 175» 178
dist. πρᾶξις 80
ὄρεξις as well as νοῦς needed for it 14
not of things past 13, 178
πρός with the genitive in Aristotle 177
πρὸς ἄλλον 69
πρότασις 33
τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως 34, 71
προὔπάρχουσα γνῶσις 180
πρῶτος
νοῦς is τῶν πρώτων ὅρων 71
πρώτη φιλοσοφία 36

σκεπτέον 103
σκοπός 13, 59, 74, 168
σοφία
Aristotle’s doctrine of 34-37
dist. -φρόνησις τό
popular and philosophic uses of the
term 151
σοφός -- φιλόσοφος or θεολογικός 162
στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ 197
συγγνώμη 159, 203
συλλογισμός 9, 26-29, 180
ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς 30
συμφέρον -- ἀγαθόν 204

214

σύνεσις 67-69
a division of φρόνησις 37, 60, 64
Ξεεὐσυνεσία 154, 201 ᾿
συνετός dist. φρόνιμος 17
Ξε εὐσύνετος 154
σωφροσύνη 51-53

τέλος ἁπλῶς 177

τέχνη
Aristotle’s account of it 42-43
utilitarian conception of it 42
included under φρόνησις 60
use of the word by Aristotle 149
dist. πρᾶξις 149
dist. φρόνησις 184, 186
variations in the meaning of the
᾿ word 152, 155, 183
argument leading to the definition of

it 182 é

dialectical nature of the chapter on it

141
why left out of the list of virtues
(1141 a 3) 163
τίμιον 24, 36 note
(τὰ) τιμιώτατα τῇ φύσει 26, 78
ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων 35
τρία δή ἐστιν κτλ, the argument stated
fully, 173
τρίγωνον 197
τύπῳ καὶ ws ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ 133
τύχη 25, 43

ὑγίεια as a means to εὐδαιμονία 47,
205
meaning of ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια 47
ὑποκείσθω 140

GREEK INDEX

ὑπόληψις 140
ὑπολήψει yap καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται pev-
δεσθαι 179

φάναι 33
φαντασία 174

- κινεῖ τὸ ζῷον 67
φάσις 33
φιλοσοφία Ξε σοφία 76
φρόνησις 21-85 passim
Aristotle’s account of it 37-73
use of the word in Aristotle and
Eudemus 16-18
variations in Aristotle’s use of the
word 37, 153
popular and philosophic uses of the
word 151
its varieties 59-73
ways of classifying it in book vi. 60
κατὰ μέρος 45, 185
περὶ ἕνα καὶ αὐτόν 37, 60, 185
dist. τέχνη 37, 60
dist. εὐβουλία 37, 65-67
not superior to σοφία 137, 189
how does it determine the moral
μέσον ἢ 58
φυγή and ἀπόφασις 41
φυσική 18, 24, 36, 37, 76
φυσικὴ ἀρετή 55-38, 158
φύσις 43
τὰ κατὰ φύσιν 23, 43

χωριστά 36
ψήφισμα dist. νόμος 63, 191
ὡς ἐπὶ rd πολύ 43

CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS,

SC